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Abstract 
Innovation is fundamental to long-term business success in 
technology medium-sized enterprises (MSEs). The owner-CEO 
interrelationship is likely to set the culture and be an important influence on 
the enterprise innovation capability. Previous studies of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship have produced varying results but few have examined the 
influence on innovation capability. Agency theory assumes that owners 
and CEOs have contrasting objectives but it is silent when owners and 
CEOs are in accord. Companies may have varying dominant ideologies, 
such as entrepreneurialism, managerialism, and paternalism, which likely 
influence their innovation capability. Using primary data from three 
different German MSEs, selected for their contrasting ideologies, this 
study examines how interrelationship influences of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship have the potential to influence the innovation capability of 
MSEs. The results show that the influence of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship on the innovation capability is associated with social and 
situational influences. This thesis provides an original contribution by 
developing an “interrelationship influence model” that captures the 
interrelationship factors that influence innovation capability, namely: 
action, support, communication, responsibility, power and autonomy. This 
study has important implications for researchers in corporate governance 
as well as in innovation. Enterprises aiming to improve their innovation 
capability should pay attention to interrelationships and the influence of 
owners as well as to the CEO and the management team. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Technology medium-sized enterprises (MSEs1) live in a state of 
continuous tension in order to improve their technology by innovation for 
their markets and customers under ongoing challenges. Global 
competition and rapidly changing markets mean that innovation is vital, but 
the need for frequent innovation can be a burden for the top management. 
The owner and the CEO most often influence the enterprise through their 
interrelationship, which found different interests in the literature (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1976; Blair and 
Stout, 1999), where individual and situational mechanisms stand in the 
foreground of the research. Much of the research on the interaction of 
owners and CEOs sits within the field of corporate governance, based on 
economic theories: agency theory, stewardship theory, and team 
production theory. Research has generally neglected the impact of 
everyday emotions on organisational life (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995; 
Ngonyo Njorge and Yazdanifard, 2014), and relational dynamics in the 
owner-CEO interrelationship are less observed. This thesis will explore the 
potential relevance of the interrelationship influences within the owner-
CEO dyad and their impact on the innovation capability of MSEs through 
the research question:  
“How does the owner-CEO interrelationship potentially 
influence the innovation capability of medium-sized technology 
enterprises?” 
                                            
1 Medium-sized enterprises are a part of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMSs) and are called KMU in German (Klein und Mittelständige Unternehmen, or 
German Mittelstand); they are defined by clear parameters (see Chapter 2) by the 
German IfM (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung, Bonn) 
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The research focus is the interrelationship between the owner and 
CEO as relevant to the innovation capability of the enterprise. This 
interrelationship contains different influences, especially relational 
dynamics, interhuman dynamics, power dynamics and authority issues. 
The owner is the personification of the ownership structure and hence 
indirectly the employer of the CEO. Contract extension, strategic 
reconciliation, personal biases and characteristic attributes, individual 
abilities and various ideologies likely influence the interrelationship.  
An interrelationship is hereinafter referred to as a relationship 
between two people and how they interrelate rationally (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and emotionally to each other in an economic setting. 
Previous research on innovation has tended to look at the internal 
workings of the enterprise and ignore the influences of the owner, while 
corporate governance theories depict owners and CEOs as lonely and 
ostensibly rational individuals who manage effectivity and productivity, 
separated from the entire organisation and devoid of emotional context as 
they navigate their enterprise. Thereby, emotional and rational attributes 
are intertwined in (inter-) human relationships2(Ashforth and Humphrey, 
1995). The owner-CEO relationship in MSEs is often more than a platform 
to change information and goals. The owner and the CEO frequently seek 
the emotion of nearness, protection, safety, and affiliation on an interactive 
level (Petzold, 2012) within this interrelationship. Hence, both the rational 
and emotional aspects within the interrelationship have the potential to 
stimulate or constrain the innovation capability, which this thesis focuses 
on. To external observers, the decision making and actions of the 
enterprise probably look coherent and rational. However, the internal 
workings of the owner-CEO interrelationship seldom reach the public 
arena and are hidden in their dyad by social relational dynamics. 
Influences on the interrelationship could arise from internal and external 
tensions, affecting decision making and actions that might have significant 
influence on the success of MSEs.  
                                            
2 In this thesis, “interrelationship” is the used context, and defined as a human 
relationship which is influenced by rational and emotional aspects. 
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MSEs3(German Mittelstand) are very relevant for the development 
of Germany’s economy (Maaß and Führmann, 2012; Massis, Audretsch, 
Uhlander and Kammerlander, 2017). MSEs are innovation drivers, take 
over an important role in the labour market position, and promote 
structural transformation (Audretsch and Acs, 1986; Buse, Tiwari and 
Herstatt, 2010). In the same way as big stock corporations, MSEs are 
faced with different competition aspects and have to change their strategy 
because of current environmental conditions and then find their own path 
in order to secure their long-term competitiveness (Boston Consultancy 
Study, 2017). Hence, innovation qualifies as the key to sustainable 
success in German MSEs. The German government recognises this and 
supported MSEs in 2017 with €320 million to improve their innovation 
capability (BMBF4, 2016) and thus the competitiveness of the German 
economy. A Boston Consulting Group study5, published in January 2017, 
certified German industry as having had a loss of their innovation 
capability and as experiencing innovation fatigue, attesting that German 
enterprises are behind Asian or US enterprises in this regard, which is a 
significant issue in terms of global competition, while an analysis of the 
WEF6 (2018) confirms Germany as the most innovative country in the 
world. Under the specific and general success criteria of their enterprise, 
CEOs tend to innovate their products, sales markets or processes. These 
innovation activities are burdened by uncertainties and risks and therefore 
need backing by the owner. Different risk perceptions of the CEO and 
owner would make it difficult to reach consensus on the innovation 
strategy for the enterprise and could increase tension and dynamics within 
their interrelationship. 
 The CEO-owner interrelationship has been the subject of 
research by different scholars. Organisational theory and business policy 
                                            
3 MSEs are defined in Germany by more than 10 and up to 499 employees with 
an annual turnover of up to €50 million. 
4 Bundes Ministerium für Bildung und Forschung (German Ministry for 
Education and Research) 
5www.bcg.de/media/PressRelease Details, 2017 
6World economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2018, 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2018/ 
4 
 
have been strongly influenced by agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), which depicts top managers (such as the CEO) in large enterprises 
as agents, whose interests may diverge from those of their owners (i.e., 
the principal) and ownership and control is separated. Agency theory 
appears to be the dominant underlying paradigm in most governance 
research and prescriptions (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), 
even if some theorists have suggested theoretical limits of agency theory 
(Perrow, 1987; Hirsch, Michaels and Friedman, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Huse, 
2005a): limits especially in respect of the economic and traditional rational 
focus and the lack of consideration for the complexity of organisational life, 
particularly relating to psychological and sociological effects. Agency 
theory’s long existence rests on the theory of rational man. Yet in 
contemporary times the complexity of organisational chances, not least 
through the digitalisation age, the information and communication age 
(Harari, 2017), globalisation, self-actualisation desires of individuals, the 
group membership of different communities, a shortage of highly educated 
young people, an unlikely dynamic trend in respect to fear of financial 
aspects, and the loss of trust in respect to the present economic system 
(Herzog, 2011), makes the world more complex and in the same way more 
uncertain, and could conceivably influence the relevance of theories 
explaining the owner-CEO interrelationship. 
As a logical consequence to the rational agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), with an emphasis on self-serving managers, 
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997) arose with a 
focus on the self-actualising man and the concept of collective serving. In 
the beginning of organisation theory, the founder and entrepreneur, who 
was simultaneously shareholder and owner, saw a step change from the 
mercantilist and physiocrat to modern economics, where the specialist, by-
hand manufacturer changed to industrialisation (Bröckling, 2007).The 
stewardship theory defines interrelationships in which managers are not 
motivated by individual goals, like in the agency theory, but rather by 
CEOs whose motives are aligned with the goals of their owners (Davis, 
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Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). This is because agency theory and 
stewardship theory are polarising the owner-CEO interrelationship, 
predominantly in large modern enterprises, where a focus on 
shareholders’ interest is mandatory. Beyond this shareholder approach 
emerges the team production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999), which 
provides a more collective conceptualisation between different team 
members, where the CEO should seek to maximise the joint welfare of all 
the enterprise stakeholders, including shareholders, managers, 
employees, and possibly other external groups. Team production arises 
when different individuals invest enterprise-specific resources to produce a 
non-separable output and prefer to give up control over their enterprise to 
an independent third party charged with representing the team´s interests 
and allocating rewards among team members, rather than to maximise the 
owner´s welfare (Blair and Stout, 1999). The actors participate in a 
network and contribute their different knowledge by transaction in such a 
way that the team performance is more than the sum of the individual 
performance. In addition to this is the outcome of the economic endeavour 
- to share and reduce the shareholder influence to a mediation hierarchy. 
The team production theory also defines their interrelationship in a nexus 
of symmetric contracts, in the context of large enterprises among internal 
and external stakeholders. 
Their theoretical contribution is missing a model of how CEOs and 
owners might work together in their dyads in MSEs in order to reduce 
relational dynamics and improve the innovation capability. Owners of 
MSEs have more input than in large enterprises, and the owner-CEO 
interrelationship is believed to have the potential to stimulate or constrain 
the innovation capability of the enterprise. Previous research on innovation 
has tended to look at the internal workings of the enterprise and ignores 
the influence of the owner on the CEO. A clear understanding of the 
characteristics of the owner-CEO interrelationship, and of the situation and 
their decision theory, is essential in understanding the actors’ convergence 
and divergence within their interrelationship.  
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In addition to the individual characteristics of the CEO and the 
owner, it is important to understand ideological variations in the owner-
CEO interrelationship that might be expected to affect the innovation 
capability within the enterprise. Large modern enterprises are mainly 
organised by managers (Johannisson and Huse, 2000), who follow a 
leadership method by teaching ‘from the book’. But MSEs in Germany are 
manifoldly family, strategic or financial invested entities and might have a 
management approach that seems to be less rational and rather saturated 
with emotions. Johannisson and Huse (2000) explain varying approaches 
to the management and leadership of such enterprises and define the 
characteristics of three different ideologies: entrepreneurialism, 
paternalism, and managerialism. An influence of particular factors of 
ideologies on the daily decision-making processes within the owner-CEO 
interrelationship has not been considered, but these could be essential to 
understand the interrelationship structure. Although the assumptions 
underlying agency theory, stewardship theory, team production theory and 
the ideological influences have been identified, as yet, no author has 
attempted to develop a model of influence factors in terms of its underlying 
assumptions and dimensions in a relational model.  
The vast majority of studies in this field have focused on different 
aspects, mostly in large organisations, as noted above. Several studies 
have examined potential problems in the management of innovation (Van 
De Ven, 1986; Gundersen, Engeset and Stubberud, 2017), the leaders’ 
influence on innovation (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002; 
Mumford and Hemlin, 2017), personal traits (Csikszentmihalyi, 1994; 
Dovey, Burdon and Simpson, 2017; Laustsen and Petersen, 2017) and 
social environment influences (Amabile, 1996; Huse, 2005a; Amabile, 
Schatzel, Moneta and Kramer, 2006; Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2009 ), and the studies have focused on cultural influences and the launch 
problems of start-ups (Cooper, 1979). Others have focused on the process 
stages of innovation (Rogers, 1981) or the strategic problem of creating an 
infrastructure that is conducive to innovation. Amabile (1996) and Amabile, 
Schatzel, Moneta and Kramer (2006) stress that the social environment of 
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work influences creativity by influencing the individual components of 
humans. Hence, the social work environment is also influenced by 
individuals like the owner and the CEO and their various ideologies.  
It is the main objective of this study to examine the owner-CEO 
interrelationship and identify whether particular interrelationship influences 
of that dyad could potentially influence the innovation capability of the 
enterprise. As a conceptual platform, I identified social, psychological, and 
situational interrelationship influences out of the analysis that potentially 
influence the innovation capability in MSEs to develop an interrelationship 
influence model (Figure 3) of the owner-CEO dyad. 
In this thesis, I make two different contributions to knowledge. 
First, analysis of the cases enables an interrelationship influence model, 
which provides a dynamic representation of social interrelationship 
influences that affect the innovation capability. Second, the adoption of 
the ideology-based framework of corporate governance enables me to 
examine variations in CEO/owner relationships to tease out how specific 
economic theories might or might not be relevant to the research question. 
This thesis will not focus on the process of innovation generation but will 
instead focus on the influence of the owner-CEO interrelationship in 
respect to the innovation capability. Problems and dynamics that occur 
among these two major decision makers and drivers, the owner and the 
CEO, will be analysed. A theoretical interrelationship influence model will 
provide understanding to help address practical issues that could 
potentially stimulate or constrain the innovation capability of MSEs. 
 
1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven main chapters. In this 
investigation, I have chosen to review first, in Chapter Two, the current 
literature, which starts with the definition of the concepts of the scientific 
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research into agency theory, stewardship theory, and team production 
theory that provide different perspectives on the owner-CEO 
interrelationships in corporate governance theory, followed by an 
evaluation of three various ideologies. Finally, there follows the theoretical 
part of the current innovation theory, where the literature of innovation in 
SMEs and leaders and organisational influences on innovation is 
reviewed. Second, in Chapter Three I consider methodological issues and 
justify the methodological choices of the current study, and evaluate the 
method of this multiple case study in particular. Then I move, thirdly, to 
Chapter Four, to present the different research cases and the organisation 
of the findings of the cases, as well as the constellations of the owner-
CEO interrelationships. The entrepreneurial oriented, the managerial 
oriented, and the paternalistic oriented cases will be explained and the 
actors introduced. The basis of their interrelationship will be depicted and 
their enterprise plans for the future presented. Fourth, in Chapter Five, a 
critical analysis of the data will be provided, examining social and 
psychological interrelationship influences. Cases with different owner-CEO 
interrelationships under different ideologies have been selected in this 
qualitative study to examine the influence of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship on the innovation capability in German MSEs. Interviews, 
observations and different analyses will be debated and outlined. Influence 
factors will be provided. The fifth part, Chapter Six, follows the same 
structure but will focus on situational interrelationship influences based on 
exogenous factors, which impact innovation capability. Sixth, in Chapter 
Seven the findings will provide the basis to present a conceptual model of 
interrelationship influences derived from the analysis and an 
interrelationship influence model will be visualised. Finally, Chapter Eight 
will discuss conclusions and therefore implications for policy and practice, 
a critical reflection, limitations of the research, and recommendations for 
continuing research. The next chapter will focus on the literature review 
underpinning this work and give a theoretical review of the main theories 
under study. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Literature Review 
This literature review is divided into three sections in order to 
review the current state of existing knowledge relevant to the research 
question. First, I review the innovation literature to identify the concepts 
where the interrelationship may impact on innovation capability. 
Secondly, theories relevant to the owner-CEO dyad are examined. The 
owner-CEO relationship has often been studied within the corporate 
governance literature in agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), and team 
production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999), depicting top managers in the 
large modern corporation respectively as agents, stewards, or team 
members in their relationship to their owner. Section Three identifies that 
different enterprise ideologies have been presented: entrepreneurialism, 
managerialism, and paternalism will be employed to identify cases where 
variations in the owner-CEO interrelationship in German MSEs might be 
expected. The Final Section concludes the literature review and offers 
some observations. 
The main objective in this thesis is to provide an important 
understanding of the owner-CEO interrelationship and seeks answers to 
the question: “How does the owner-CEO interrelationship potentially 
influence the innovation capability of medium-sized technology 
enterprises?” 
Corporate governance research has been dominated by US 
research traditions, with a focus on protecting the owner’s interest since 
the beginning of the 1990s (Huse, 2005a). Governance research has been 
strongly influenced by agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which 
depicts top managers in corporations as agents whose interests may 
diverge from those of their principals (owners) and where ownership and 
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control is separated. The focus of corporate governance research has 
been focused on large listed corporations (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004) 
rather than on privately held enterprises (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 1999) and SMEs.  
Corporate governance is defined as the mechanism, processes, 
and coherences by which corporations are controlled, and is an interaction 
among external and internal stakeholders and the board members in 
directing the enterprise for value creation (Huse, 2005a). The most 
theories originate from the discussion of Berle and Means (1931) in the 
separation of ownership and leadership in big enterprises.  
National contextual factors have to be considered in corporate 
governance research. The British approach uses a single board system of 
corporate governance, consisting of executive and non-executive 
directors, whilst in Germany a dual system (two-tier system) is usual, with 
a management board and a separate supervisory board (Jungmann, 
2006). In Germany there is a clear division of responsibilities and 
management issues are reserved for the management board, which is 
autonomous in that respect and not bound by orders of the shareholder, 
owner, or supervisory board. The management/CEO is recruited, and can 
be dismissed by the supervisory board or the owner. The task of the 
supervisory board is to advise and supervise the management board in 
the management of the enterprise and consider fundamental decisions 
with a high importance for the enterprise. In German SMEs with a small 
number of owners the influence of the owner is more significant. The 
members of the single board in the British approach (one-tier system), with 
its executive and non-executive directors, are elected by the shareholders, 
who have also the right to remove directors. Non-executive directors are 
not employed in the enterprise, but are members of the board and are 
concerned with managerial issues like strategy, standards of conduct, and 
appointments. The executive board member behoves the management of 
the daily business affairs of the enterprise (Jungmann, 2006). Hence, the 
role of the non-executive board members in the British corporate 
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governance is roughly comparable with the supervisory board in German 
enterprises and the executive board is the counterpart of the British 
executive board. The ownership of large British enterprises is believed by 
some to be more likely to be widely dispersed than in German firms, where 
banks, families, investment institutions, and other enterprises have large 
share stakes (Franks and Mayer, 1997). 
Corporate governance constructions in SMEs differ substantially 
from those in large enterprises (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2011; Welge 
and Witt, 2013; Gabrielsson, 2017). Governance structures are more likely 
to be complex and relatively unsophisticated in SMEs. The separation of 
ownership and management is often not clear. Publicity requirements are 
fewer than in large enterprises and hence monitoring for external 
shareholders is more difficult. In many SMEs, rules, incentives, 
accountability, goals, and control are less distinct, and are accompanied 
by a lack of financial and human resources (Yacuzzi, 2007; Gabrielsson, 
2017), in contrast to large enterprises. Finally, the owner-CEO relationship 
is different, tighter and more personal in respect to their closer 
cooperation, which could have relevance for the owner-CEO dyad. 
Cowling (2003) highlights the relationship between owner and CEO as a 
key to productivity in SMEs and underlines this relevance. The owner-CEO 
interrelationship emerges as a lever to enhance or hinder the enterprise 
performance in SMEs (Gabrielsson, 2003; Gabrielsson, 2017). Welge and 
Witt (2013) find that in German SMEs there exists an aversion by the CEO 
to controlling activities inside the enterprise and a reluctance to practise 
transparency and claim for a clearer corporate governance code and a 
better cooperation within the owner-CEO dyad.  
Figure 1 presents the scope of the literature reviewed in this 
thesis. The context is German MSEs. Around 41% of German MSEs with 
50-499 employees are family businesses (BDI, 2016). The corporate 
governance structure is different in family businesses, where the family-
owner and the family-CEO have a family tie and mutual dependences. 
Socioemotional mechanisms (Kotlar, Signori, De Massis and Vismara, 
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2017) and the family tie could motivate the owner to spend more time with 
familiar individuals with whom they have had rewarding relationships, and 
hinder the owner from acting rationally. Hence, literature from other fields 
like psychological and sociological examinations, which can cast light on 
this phenomenon, are also examined in the next sections. 
 
Figure 1: The scope of the thesis 
 
2.1 Innovation and Innovation Capability 
This section examines the literature regarding innovation and 
innovation capability in order to identify particular factors that have the 
potential to influence the owner-CEO interrelationship. 
Multiple companies in many industries generate competitive 
advantages by technological innovations, and define these innovations as 
Interrelationship
influences on 
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capability
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Innovation 
Capability
Ideologies
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crucial to their firm’s strategies (Lengnick-Hall, 1992; Rosenbusch, 
Brinkmann and Bausch, 2011; Massis, Audretsch, Uhlander and 
Kammerlander, 2017). In some big companies, like 3M for example, over 
40% of their sales have been generated from products that did not exist 
five years ago (Shane, 2009, p. 3). 
German MSEs have a significant relevance for the development of 
Germany’s economy (Maaß and Führmann, 2012) and are traditionally the 
engine of German industry; they provide skilled crafts and trades and 
hence are innovation drivers, and assume an important role in the labour 
market position and promote structural transformation. Innovations are 
powerful source of competitive advantages (Lengnick-Hall, 1992; Sastry, 
1999; O`Cass and Weerawardena, 2009; Rosenbusch, Brinkmann and 
Bausch, 2011; Massis, Audretsch, Uhlander and Kammerlander, 2017). 
The individual and personal skills and traits of the owner and CEO are 
crucial factors for sustainable success in German MSEs, because the size 
of these firms means that owners and CEOs are likely to be very involved 
in developing or championing innovations. Middle management members 
like an R&D responsible person have, as a rule, no access to the whole 
process and so are not able to call the shots. In the majority of cases, 
German MSEs have no R&D department or R&D manager (IfM Bonn, 
2012), but have a significant focus on innovation. This function behoves 
frequently as personal union in the hands of the management or the 
responsible design person.  
The description and consequential actions pioneered by the CEO 
in German MSEs in respect to the capability to generate innovations 
creates the core for sustainable business and the long-term survival of the 
entity. Much of the theory and practice of innovation has been developed 
in large, blue-chip companies that provide different constructs and 
methods (Van de Ven, 1986; Terziovski, 2010), which may be less 
applicable for MSEs. In the majority of big firms, the situation 
predominates that a CEO and a board of directors lead the operation, and 
they are audited by a supervisory board. Different board compositions 
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occur in MSEs under varying ideologies (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). 
Family-owned companies with a hired CEO or family member as CEO, 
financial or strategic investor-dominated entities with a hired CEO, or even 
an invested CEO with a minority shareholder status, might provide 
different ideologies and different individual motives between the principal 
and the executive directors, and will be examined later. 
MSEs in Germany have demonstrably different innovation 
behaviour in respect to technological innovation and non-technological 
innovation related to organisations than comparable big public limited 
companies. 39.1% of the total turnover generated by all enterprises in 
Germany in 2005 came from MSEs; in 2011 it was 35.9% and in 2010 it 
was 37.1%, whereas the total turnover in the German economy grew by 
5.5% in comparison with 2010 (IfM, 2008; 2012; 2014). More than 84% of 
MSEs are involved in innovation activities (Maaß and Führmann, 2012, p. 
VI). 
The following section has been divided into five sections. It begins 
by describing the current innovation literature, followed by innovation in 
SMEs and MSEs. The section then moves on to consider the innovation 
capability and proceeds to discuss the leaders’ influence on innovation. 
The last section, finally, offers obstacles and challenges to innovations in 
German MSEs.  
 
2.1.1 Innovation 
The notion of different kinds of innovation with different effects has 
been an important theme in technology innovation literature since 
Schumpeter´s (1934;1942) emphasis on creative destruction. Whilst 
creativity has to do with the production of novel and useful ideas (Mumford 
and Gustafson, 1988) and is an individual ability, innovation has to do with 
the production or adoption of useful ideas and idea implementation (Van 
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de Ven, 1986), and is an organisational capability. Organisational 
innovation capability depends on individual creativity and stands in close 
coherence. 
Innovation is not the enterprise of a single entrepreneur. Instead, it 
is a network-building effort that centres on the creation, adoption, and 
sustained implementation of a set of ideas among people who, through 
transaction, become sufficiently committed to these ideas to transform 
them into “good currency” (Van de Ven, 1986, p. 601). Amabile (1996) 
summarised the content of creativity as “…the seed of all innovation, and 
psychological perceptions of innovation…” (p. 1155). The current literature 
differentiates between product and process innovation (Maaß and 
Führmann, 2012; Uttermark, 1994).  
Not only technological advancements, but also innovations in the 
formation of new markets, which break into new markets, and the 
distribution of information to customers (Dean and McMullen, 2007; 
Frankelius, 2009), as well as new methods of organising (Casson, 2003), 
depict the potential of innovation. Behavioural emphasis on existing 
markets and customers of the CEO and ownership, and a distance from 
new markets, depict major inabilities in respect to innovations. Hence the 
volition to change the customer focus and to go abroad constitutes a 
change process and depends on the bias of the CEO and the owner and 
their commonality. Consequently, it is required for a CEO and/or an owner 
to have creative and innovative skills, as the individuals most responsible 
for the innovation capability in German SMEs. 
 
2.1.2 Innovation in Small-and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are increasingly 
searching for opportunities to improve their capability to innovate 
sustainably. The capability to develop new products and services by using 
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the latest technology before global competitors emerges as a key factor in 
gaining advantages in product development, services, processes, and 
capturing new market shares (Allocca and Kessler, 2006) or business 
models, and is more recent in the investigations of SMEs (Audretsch and 
Lehmann, 2011). Innovations are expected to increase long-term 
economic performance but they entail substantial risks, and expenses are 
irreversible and uncertain (Shi, 2003). The results of the German 
innovation survey (Aschhoff at al. 2013) pointed out that the innovation 
rate rises with the enterprise size in German SMEs, and that SMEs have a 
significantly lower innovation intensity than large enterprises. Terziovski 
(2010) pointed out that SMEs are similar to large enterprises in respect to 
the way that formal structure and innovation strategy are the key drivers of 
their performance, but in general they are different, which relates primarily 
to the reactive flexible character and structure of SMEs and their resource 
limitations. SMEs develop competitive advantages in the manufacturing 
sector through their employees’ creative potential and the development of 
differentiated products for niche markets (Damanpour, 1992), whilst large 
manufacturing enterprises develop competitive advantages based on cost-
efficient systems (Bessant and Tidd, 2007). 
Block, Miller, Jaskiewicz and Spiegel (2013) pointed out that 
family-involved SMEs invest less into innovation activities than non-family 
SMEs because of the negative effect of family ownership on innovation 
intensity due to its focus on socio-emotional wealth and its interest in 
preserving the status quo rather than moving into entrepreneurial risks. 
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) suggest that the ownership structure of an 
enterprise inhibits its innovative activity, and underpins the crucial impact 
of the owner on innovativeness in SMEs. On the other hand, family-
involved SMEs tend towards long-term behaviour (Zellweger, 2007), a 
lower power distance to the CEO and employees, a more stewardship 
style of behaviour (Eddlestone and Kellermans, 2006), and knowledge-
sharing propensity (Zahra, 2012) which is more positively related to 
innovation activities. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that family-involved 
SMEs create value only when the founder acts as CEO or as chairman. In 
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the case where descendants serve as CEO, the firm’s value is reduced, 
with negative impact on the enterprise performance and productivity, and 
in particular on innovation activities.   
SMEs are more heterogeneous groups in respect of size and 
sector diversity than large public enterprises; they often have limited 
resources (De Massis, Audretsch, Uhlander and Kammerlander, 2017) in 
areas like human resources and knowledge constraints, financing, and 
lack of formalised planning, which may prevent SMEs from proactively 
investing in the innovation process (Del Brio and Junquera, 2003) and 
influencing the owner-CEO dyad in their decisions. On the other hand, 
SMEs are often characterised by flat hierarchy, lean organisational 
structures (Bos-Brouwers, 2010), are dominated by their owner-manager 
(Jenkins, 2004) and hence there is a close relation between ownership 
and operational management. Sharma and Sharma (2011) support these 
findings that different innovation degrees are a result of the SMEs’ 
innovation strategies, which lie in the hands of the owner and the CEO. 
Gronum, Verreynne and Kastelle (2012) highlight that strong, 
heterogenous relationships within networks improve innovation in SMEs. 
Networks provide SMEs with more access to complementary skills, 
capabilities, resources, and knowledge that are not internally available but 
which are essential to innovate. These findings support a closer 
relationship between the owner and the CEO in SMEs rather than in big 
stock enterprises, and underline the crucial factor of the cooperation within 
the dyad. An interrelationship beyond rational cooperation is necessary for 
a social relationship based on trust and mutual dependences inside the 
owner-CEO dyad to support innovation activities in SMEs. 
The focus of the existing relevant literature on SMEs has less 
focus on social tensions between the owner and the CEO. It focuses 
mainly on rational effects and influence factors, and less on emotional 
influencing variables, which will unavoidably occur in the daily 
togetherness between the owner and the CEO. The possibility that 
emotional perceptions based on sentimentality and instinct affect influence 
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more than rational perceptions of the economic situation attracts no 
attention. Here lies the main critique of the current literature, and this 
highlights the emphasis of the current thesis and will be further examined 
in the existing literature on innovation capability.  
 
2.1.3 Innovation Capability 
The enterprise innovation capability defines the potential to 
generate new and unique values by converting new ideas to integrate, 
shape, and reconfigure competence in order to address fast-changing 
environments (Terziovski, 2007), and is one of the most important 
determinants of firm performance (Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998). It 
should be one of the key areas of the top management teams in SMEs: 
how to promote and sustain (Cakar and Ertürk, 2010) this capability, how 
to mobilise the knowledge possessed by its employees and combine it to 
create new knowledge, resulting in product and process innovation (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992), and how to challenge owner-CEO dyad support in 
organising structure, ideation, and know-how development (Saunila, 
2017a). 
The challenge of the owner, the CEO, their dyad and 
organisations to generate innovations continuously is revealed as 
individual and organisational interaction (Hansen, Trantow, Richert and 
Jeschke, 2011). The management must be open to innovations and go 
forward as role models (Miao, Newman, Schwarz and Cooper, 2017); they 
have to show the capability and the volition to invest and spend money in 
this topic and signalise trust as well. The success or failure of innovations 
within the organisation is dependent on the status that is given by the CEO 
and the ownership. Dixit and Nanda (2011) point out that supportive 
behaviour by the owner and CEO plays an important role in improving 
communication and trust in the organisation. Ozcelik, Langton, and Aldrich 
(2008) show that leadership practice that facilitates a positive emotional 
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climate in an organisation has a significant effect on the innovation 
capability. Wan, Ong and Lee (2005) referenced that enterprises where 
the owner and the CEO have a tolerance of employees’ mistakes and 
encourage learning from failures have a higher innovation capability. 
Saunila (2017a) referenced that managers’ and employees’ perception of 
innovation capability aspects are different and could be bridged by 
communication. 
Franke (2014) assess the promotion of innovation by top 
management as one of the key factors besides innovation climate, 
processes and organisation, and innovation success in fostering 
innovation potential in German MSEs. Isenhardt, Hees and Trantow 
(2011) point out soft factors in the context of innovation capability. In their 
study, they focus on human and social aspects and consider the long-term 
sustainable profit in the foreground instead of short-term commercial 
profits, and try to explain how to enable innovation on a soft factor basis 
top down, and focus on the owner-CEO interrelationship, as well as 
between the CEO and operative management. Cakar and Ertürk (2010) 
found that empowerment, uncertainty avoidance and power distance have 
an impact on the innovation capability. Empowerment, as the transfer and 
authorisation of responsibility, is positively related in comparison to power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance, which are negatively related to the 
innovation capability. Therefore, the innovation capability seems crucially 
dependent on the CEO and the owner-CEO interrelationship in MSEs.  
It seems that the openness of the owner and CEO to innovation 
also plays a crucial role in the consideration to go beyond their own 
organisation as an innovation driver to enhance the innovation capability. 
The value creation platform in SMEs is internally limited to the number of 
individuals in the enterprise. To enhance this platform, external resources 
could support areas like: co-opetition, co-creation, and open innovation.  
Co-opetition describes the phenomenon of simultaneous 
cooperation and competition between enterprises (Gnyawali, He and 
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Madhavan, 2006; Gnyawali and Park 2009); in other words, it is a form of 
working together with stakeholders like customers and suppliers in 
collective interests and could help SMEs to develop technological 
innovation and create benefits. Co-opetition describes simultaneously 
collaborating and competing with the same partner at the same time.  
Morris, Kocak, and Özer (2007) suggest that MSEs in industry need to 
collaborate with competitors to create economies of scale (cost reduction), 
leverage resources, and mitigate risks and uncertainties in order to 
compete against large market players and reduce their vulnerability to 
environmental forces.  
Co-creation innovation defines an approach that brings different 
parties together - where new ideas from external and internal sources are 
integrated into a platform to generate organisational innovations 
(Ramaswamy and Ozcan, 2014; Lee, Olson and Trimi, 2012). A collective 
collaboration network amplifies the platform for value creation out of ideas 
and could enhance innovation opportunities with a parallel reduction of 
R&D costs and could be interesting for MSEs in creating a shared value 
for all stakeholders. The challenge is to enable interactions among 
different stakeholders, everywhere in the network, with the goal of creating 
greater value by fostering more rewarding and valuable experiences.  
Open innovation describes the opportunity from external sources 
like specialised enterprises and universities of innovation (Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke and West, 2006), and assumes that enterprises can use 
external value creation (as well as internal) by license processes and 
external development to use them for their own purposes. Hung and 
Chiang (2010) reference that enterprises who concentrate on open 
innovation by improving innovation performance, not by trying to develop 
all know-how themselves but by interacting with outside parties, can result 
in a higher performance, in which trust emerges as a crucial factor in the 
cooperation (Hasche, Linton and Öberg; 2017) and challenges the owner-
CEO interrelationship many times in its dynamic. Another external 
resource could be the creation of innovations by users who utilise their 
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own rare knowledge to provide utility for their own benefit (Bogers, Afuah 
and Bastian, 2010) and gain a competitive advantage based on trust and 
disclosure in order to enhance the innovation capability. 
To enhance the innovation capability in MSEs, it is essential to 
measure their performance and generate base points that are not usual in 
MSEs. The measurement of innovation capability is a critical discipline for 
both academics and practitioners (Adams, Bessant and Phelps, 2006). 
The capability of organisations to innovate is determined by varied factors 
that relate to their market environment and their own internal organisation 
(Rothwell et al., 1992) and requires high levels of inter-functional 
coordination and integration. The relevance and diversity of elements of 
innovation capability that ideally need to be measured is comprehensive 
and focused in different areas on inputs, knowledge management, 
strategy, organisation and culture, portfolio management, and 
commercialisation (Adams, Bessant and Phelps, 2006). The focus of 
performance measurement perspectives lies more on finance and 
production (Bititci, Garengo, Dörfler and Nudurupati, 2012) e.g., related to 
the innovation capability to annual R&D spend. The measurement of the 
innovation capability is based on multiple and simultaneous influences of 
collective and individual aspects (Aragón-Correa, García-Morales and 
Cordón-Pozo, 2007). These aspects include leadership practices, 
employees’ skills, processes and tools for managing ideas, a supporting 
culture, information management, development of individual management, 
employees’ welfare and links to strategic goals (Smith, Busi, Ball and Van 
der Meer, 2008: Saunila, 2017b). The Oslo Manual (2005) provides 
guidelines for collecting and interpreting data in an internationally 
comparable manner and identifying knowledge accumulated by the firm 
that is embedded in human resources as the most significant issue 
besides linkages and information and communication technologies, their 
incorporation and use, and evaluates the activities that have been 
undertaken by the enterprise.  
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Crossan and Apaydin (2010) provide different input drivers on 
innovation capability. They analysed time that the owner and the CEO 
spend on innovation activities, their openness and motivation and personal 
initiative to innovate, and their commitment to new product development 
as drivers for the innovation capability. In respect to the owner-CEO 
cooperation, they provide as a driver the owner’s trust of the CEO´s 
creativity, a non-authoritarian behaviour of the owner and autonomy of the 
CEO, a tolerance of failed ideas, and independence of the CEO in 
innovation activities. Further, they argue that fixed innovation goals in the 
mission and vision and actions defined in the strategy are innovation 
capability drivers, and hence the number of projects in the pipeline, the 
number of employees involved in innovation activities, and the number of 
open innovation activities are activities that can give an indication of the 
innovation capability of the enterprise (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010). To 
measure the innovation capability seems to be a huge challenge, which is 
focused predominantly on understanding the effectiveness of innovation 
actions responding to needs at both academic and firm level. Scholars and 
practitioners adopting their own partial view on the issue make it difficult, 
especially when emotional areas beyond rational management areas 
occur that have potential to influence the innovation capability, like in the 
owner-CEO interrelationship where interpersonal dynamics, information 
flows, strategic organisation and leadership, culture and structure, as well 
as communication and collaboration (Adams, Bessant and Phelps, 2006) 
could likely influence the innovation capability.  
The innovation capability emerges as a multi-faceted underpinning 
entity; it defines the potential in generating new idea (Terziovski, 2007) 
and emerges as an interaction between individual and collective activities. 
Time and resources are key issues of the current innovation capability 
literature as quantitative measurement parameters. Trust moves as a 
qualitative social influence parameter under observation. But in general, 
the current literature in respect to the innovation capability is mostly 
rational-oriented. Emotional parameters between a CEO and an owner are 
quite complicated to measure but should not be neglected, which is mostly 
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the case in the current literature. The “what” is described to improve the 
innovation capability, but less the “how”, which this thesis tries to examine. 
How non-rational and hence emotional facts can be improved within the 
owner-CEO interrelationship is seldom part of the existing literature and 
deserves a critique.  
 
2.1.4 Leaders’ Influence on Innovation 
 Mumford et al. (2002; Mumford and Hemlin, 2017) state one key 
proposition - that the ability of leaders to encourage creativity and 
innovation is not only dependent on the situation at hand, but refers to the 
characteristic and individual traits of the leader (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; 
Laustsen and Petersen, 2017). They argue in particular the importance of 
leading creative efforts; leaders must possess substantial technical and 
professional expertise and substantial creative thinking skills. The 
argument does not only apply that leaders of creative people need social 
intelligence, it is also important that the capability for quick on-line 
adjustment of affect and affective framing may be vital. Beyond this it 
seems not only significant to manage creative efforts, but also, more 
centrally, how they evaluate creative ideas (Halbesleben, Novicevic, 
Harvey and Buckley, 2003; Amabile, Schatzel, Moneta and Kramer, 2006). 
Whereas leaders, by virtue of their position and influence in the 
organisation, can decide who, when, and how they can pursue new ideas, 
for the leader themselves, time is undoubtedly an important aspect of a 
leader´s creative thinking and in the daily whirl of business difficult to find, 
which reflects in great part a dilemma for the CEO and the owner.  
A marked individual character and transformational leadership 
style are preferred traits of most intrinsically motivated creative leaders 
(Wang and Rode, 2010). The leader´s vision may prevent creative people 
from forming their own unique ideas and pursuing their own vision as work 
leaders (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002). Guo, Katila, Magitti 
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and Tesluk (2017) support a positive effect of a proactive personality of 
the CEO, backed by a clear, defined innovation strategy to motivate 
individuals to explore new ideas. The unique nature of creative work and 
the need and capability for creative problem solving in social settings must 
be considered if we wish to understand how leaders influence the 
generation of ideas.  
Additional variables for leadership influences on innovation are 
identified at group level. Composition and characteristics of top 
management teams yield a stronger explanation of organisational 
outcome than leaders’ characteristics alone, including the amount of 
education and age in respect to banking business (Bantel and Jackson, 
1989), as well as perceptual and affective reactions (Amabile, Schatzel, 
Moneta and Kramer 2006). Hence, the derived owner-CEO 
interrelationship seems to be a crucial influence factor in the capability to 
generate new ideas and innovations and the platform for implementation 
of business processes that support creative idea generation and 
innovation (Jansen, Vera, and Crossan, 2009). 
West et al. (2003) have recently found that leadership has a strong 
influence on creativity and innovation in respect to the area of health care. 
Yukl (2002) found out that leaders’ idealised influences and inspirational 
motivation behaviours may influence the outcome of innovation by two 
related complementary mechanisms: internalisation and personal 
identification. Internalisation refers to a process in which followers accept 
the leaders’ value as their own, whilst personal identification occurs when 
followers seek to emulate leaders’ behaviour (Yukl, 2002; Elenkov and 
Manev, 2005). Howell and Avolio (1993) found support for a positive 
relationship between intellectual stimulation and leaders’ support for 
innovation. A leader´s intellectual stimulation for new ideas and 
experimentation are integral parts of the innovation process (Elenkov and 
Manev, 2005; Mumford and Hemlin, 2017).  
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Van de Ven (1986) mentioned the important role of people in 
respect to creating new ideas and innovation: “…people who develop, 
carry, react, and modify ideas” (p. 592). Such people lead others to be 
creative and innovative. Leadership makes a difference in the nature and 
success of creative efforts (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002), 
whilst it is not necessarily given that leaders’ and top managements’ 
behaviour currently applies notable effects in creativity and innovation. 
Several examinations (Mumford and Licunan, 2004; Mumford and Hemlin, 
2017; Dentin and Hemlin, 2012) identify a clear influence of leadership in 
respect to the innovation capability of organisations and creativity at the 
individual level, and assess that leadership contributes to effective 
interactions among team members. Smith, Busi, Ball and Van der Meer 
(2008) define management style and leadership, among other things 
(technology, organisational structure, and resources), as crucial factors 
that influence an organisation´s capability to manage innovation. In their 
literature review they point out that management and leadership style play 
an important role in the antecedent phase of effective innovation 
management and an important impact on an organisation´s capability to 
manage innovation.  
Several scholars (Dansereau, Graen and Haga, 1975; Graen and 
Scandura, 1987; Winkler, 2009; Jian, 2015) have examined and provided 
the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory, which has been previously 
tied to innovation, and suggest that the relationship between a supervisor 
and a subordinate is verifiably related to innovativeness. The above 
theorists postulate that supervisors and subordinates involve in a role 
development process during which understandings are arrived at in 
respect to the amount of decision latitude, influence and autonomy that the 
subordinates will be allowed. Commensurable results were found by Basu 
(1991) and confirmed that there is a positive relationship between leader-
member exchange and innovative behaviour. Scott and Bruce (1994) also 
confirm in their examination the positive link between leader-member 
exchange and innovation behaviour in the same way as between the role 
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expectation of subordinates in respect to their supervisor and innovative 
behaviour.  
Other theorists also make the psychological climate between 
supervisors and subordinates responsible for the innovation ability in 
companies, amongst other things (Glick, 1985, Amabile et al., 2006). 
Already implemented studies from the late 1930s theorist Lewin (1938) 
claim a positive relation between supervisors and subordinates in the case 
where there is a direct closeness in daily work in respect to individual 
psychological traits and an impact on the individual´s perception (Gregory, 
2004) of the psychological climate that indirectly has a link to the 
innovation capability of the firm. Kozlowski and Doherty (1989) argue that 
supervisors are the most relevant individuals as regards management 
actions, policies, and directing procedures to their subordinates. Denti and 
Hemlin (2012) highlight the crucial role of the top management increasing 
an environment that either facilitates or inhibits innovation and creativity. 
Subordinates favour high quality interrelationships with their 
supervisors and thus identify, by implication, their organisation in the way 
that they are willing to give their employees greater autonomy, decision 
making latitude, and more supportiveness (Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011). 
The CEO has to engage in open information politics and not stereotypical 
thinking in order to involve subordinates in the creative process. The more 
specialised, insulated, and stable the individual’s job, the less likely the 
individual will recognise a need for change or pay attention to innovative 
ideas (Van de Ven, 1986). The resilience of the CEO´s job (Dovey, Burdon 
and Simpson, 2017) also plays a crucial role in the creativity generation of 
the CEO and is different in its fundamental grasp under different 
ideologies. Subordinates perceive their managers as encouraging and 
facilitating in their innovative effort in the case whereby managers like to 
motivate subordinates (González-Roma and Hernández, 2014) in respect 
to innovation. Management support for innovation is positively related to 
innovation behaviour in the firm (Scoot and Bruce, 1994, Mumford and 
Hemlin, 2017) and disembogues ultimately in a role model of the leader for 
27 
 
the organisation (Miao, Newman, Schwarz, and Cooper 2017), which 
requests professional leadership expertise (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and 
Strange, 2002; Mumford and Hemlin, 2017), and social intelligence in a 
social specified environment (Amabile, 1996).  
The social environment can influence the level and the frequency 
of creative behaviour (e.g. Stein, 1974; Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin, 
1993; Amabile et al., 1996; Patterson, Kerrin and Gatto-Roissard, 2009). 
Three broad organisational factors (Amabile et al., 1996) are proposed to 
support organisational innovation: organisational motivation, resources 
and management practices. Further different dimensions play an important 
role in influencing creative behaviour in organisations: challenge, 
organisational encouragement, work group support, supervisory 
encouragement and organisational impediments (Amabile, 1988). The 
CEO as the enterprise leader in MSEs exemplifies the bottleneck and 
hence bears a key role in the generation of organisational innovation. 
Empirical findings and practical knowledge suggest that people will 
produce more creative work when they perceive that the management is 
encouraging them to solve problems creatively (Amabile, Schatzel, 
Moneta and Kramer. 2006).  
The current literature confirms the importance of leadership to the 
innovation capability. The relationships between superiors and 
subordinates are examined, apart from the owner-CEO interrelationship in 
MSEs. In the aim to define the superiors and subordinates’ high-quality 
relationship belongs an examination of what a high-quality relationship 
defines and how it works. This is missing in the existing literature. Further 
influences in terms of obstacles and challenges to the innovation capability 
in German MSEs will be discussed in the next section. 
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2.1.5 Obstacles and Challenges to Innovation in German MSEs 
The dynamics and complexity of today’s global markets reduce the 
time given for planning, so that it is mostly not possible to focus on long-
term action. German MSEs are under economic pressure to deliver 
economic success and force their owner, management, and employees to 
focus on maximising short-term, usually monetary, profits (Trantow, Hees 
and Jeschke, 2012). Due to this economic pressure, MSEs have to be as 
innovative as big firms, despite the consideration of lower financial 
resources in relation to their big competitors. The empirical evidence 
indicates that the market environment most conducive to innovation is 
remarkably singular for MSEs and large firms (Audretsch and Acs, 1986). 
These dilemmas in modern working environments - between sustainability 
and short-term profit maximisation - have therefore grown as a 
paradigmatic challenge for activity conducive to innovation (Trantow, Hees 
and Jeschke, 2012). Van de Ven (1986) points out that the more 
successful an organisation is, the more difficult it is to trigger people’s 
action threshold to pay attention to new ideas, needs, and opportunities. 
The underlying economic maxim, which is to realise the greatest profit, 
forces actors in German MSEs to behave in a unilaterally monetarist and 
reckless way, and is incompatible with far-sighted, responsible and long-
term successful management (Thielmann, 2009) and depicts the 
management dilemma in German MSEs. An IMO7 project focused on four 
dimensions of economic power: cost pressure, pressure to succeed, time 
pressure, and flexibilisation pressure (Jeschke, Isenhard, Hees, Trantow, 
2011).  
The responsible use of human resources versus cost pressure 
develops more and more as a dilemma for MSEs (Jeschke, Isenhard, 
Hees and Trantow, 2011). Long-term strategies to increase innovative 
capabilities versus pressure to succeed place increasing pressure on 
                                            
7 IMO: International Monitoring, joint project of RWTH Aachen and BMFD, 
“Working – Learning – Skills. Potential for Innovation in a modern working environment” 
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companies to make fundamental changes to structures and processes in 
order to strengthen their innovative capability whilst being required to 
quickly achieve objective measurable success. Time for learning process 
versus time pressure provides the individual, organisational and social 
necessity for learning and development processes under conditions of 
increasing time constraints on work. The need for stability versus 
flexibilisation pressure creates the demand of individuals, organisations, 
interrelationships, networks and societies for the safety of current and 
future planning of processes under the increasing pressure of permanent 
transition and the associated handling of uncertainty of change (Jeschke, 
Isenhard, Hees and Trantow, 2011, p. 7). An increasing pressure on the 
enterprise under global market conditions, internal cost-cutting targets, an 
acceleration of the implementation time and an insidious loss of 
entrepreneurial stability pose a challenge for the enterprise as well as for 
the owner and the CEO. 
Different studies (Imran, 2018; Chiang, Hsu and Shih, 2015; 
Patterson, Kerrin and Gatto-Roissard, 2009; Csikszentmihalyi, 1994; 
Amabile, 1996; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018) have observed individual 
and organisational impacts on creativity and innovation within an 
organisation. The results are similar in respect to management style and 
leadership (Gundersen-Engeset and Stubberud, 2017; Van de Ven, 1989; 
Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002) - that these factors play an 
important role in the individual creativity activities and the organisational 
capability to generate innovation. Van de Ven (1986) mentions that 
organisational design for innovation is not a discrete event but a process 
of integration of all the essential functions, organisational units, and 
resources needed to manage innovation from the beginning to the end.  
Innovations in SMEs are often revealed as a fight against different 
barriers in respect to economic and non-economic goals (De Massis et al., 
2016), with the most dominant problems based in the access to qualified 
problems (Ylinenpäa, 1998; Ramer et al., 2006), missing project 
management know-how to organise the innovation process efficiently 
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(Ramer et al., 2006), financial bottlenecks to cover the innovation costs 
and the economic risk (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Ramer et al., 2006), and 
finally specific know-how of new markets and customer needs rather than 
on technology know-how (Ylinenpäa, 1998). All these problems confront 
the owner and the CEO much more than in large enterprises, where 
specialised and professionalised departments focus on key issues with 
teams of specialists. Global activities, for example in emerging markets 
like China and India, offer on one hand tremendous opportunities, and on 
the other hand huge risks for SMEs. A shortage of relevant experiences, a 
lack of local know-how, and the risk of trusting local advisors create 
unpredictable uncertainties as well as unwanted dependences and anxiety 
in SMEs. Almost always the CEO and the owner und must make difficult 
decisions that stress the owner-CEO dyad way beyond rational business 
ties. The socio-emotional wealth in family-involved SMEs may have here 
further barriers (Kotlar, Signori, De Massis and Vismara, 2017, De Massis, 
Frattini and Lichtenthaler, 2012) founded in their intention to ensure the 
enterprise for the next generation, rather than strategic or financial 
investors in SMEs, who focus sometimes on a fast track to economic 
success.  
The existing literature on innovation and innovation capability has 
examined the influence on the owner-CEO interrelationship less, even if 
the research has mostly been on rational factors. Individual and collective 
influence factors, as well as obstacles and challenges in respect to 
innovation and the innovation capability, were multiple foci of 
investigations. Emotional perceptions based on sentimental and instinctive 
affects were less of a focus in the research. This conceals the main 
critique on the current literature - that frequently, social influence factors 
between the CEO and the owner were neglected, even if the pragmatic 
reality indicates that emotional influences could have a significant impact 
on an interpersonal relationship. This research aims to highlight this 
circumstance and tries to close this gap in respect to the innovation 
studies.  
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The next section states that the owner-CEO dyad has mostly been 
studied from a corporate governance perspective and these are the 
theories that have been examined: agency theory, stewardship theory, 
and team production theory. 
 
2.2 Owner-CEO Interrelationships in Corporate Governance 
The motivation of this research is to direct attention to the owner-
CEO-interrelationship inside the board room in German MSEs, and it 
focuses on the complexity of relational dynamics (Doucouliagos, 1994). 
Three corporate governance theories are reviewed to examine the owner-
CEO dyad. By the effort to focus on self-serving economic man in the 
agency theory, some flaws in explanations to characterise the dynamics of 
the owner-CEO relationship arise, and this opens up alternatives within 
stewardship theory to better explain the owner-CEO interrelationships, and 
the team production theory that provides a more collective 
conceptualisation that can be found of owner-CEO interrelationships, and 
that facilitates a more innovative environment within MSEs. The three 
theories will support the research question within the current literature: 
How does the owner-CEO interrelationship potentially influence the 
innovation capability of medium-sized technology enterprises?   
The section will start first with a review of the literature on the 
agency theory, second the stewardship theory, and third the team 
production theory. It ends, finally, in the concluding section, where the 
three governance theories will be confronted and criticised.  
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory follows the economic model of man (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Madison, Holt, 
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Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016) and is based on the neo-classical 
paradigm; it is rationalistic, individualistic, and utilitarian (Etzioni, 1988). It 
is based on the owner-CEO relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), where the owner depends on the CEO to undertake 
certain actions on behalf of the owner and where the two parties are 
motivated by opportunities for their own personal gain and follow the 
“homo economicus” theory (Ingram, 1888). Agency theory addresses the 
relationship from a behavioural and a governance perspective, which 
describes the individual level agent behaviours and the firm level agency 
governance mechanisms that are implemented in response between the 
two parties (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016). The execution 
is delegated from a principal to a manager, where the principal controls 
and monitors the management (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Shapiro, 2005). 
The consequent depiction is an agent and principal who chooses 
opportunistic self-interested behaviour rather than behaviour aimed at 
maximising the principal´s interests (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) by cost minimisation (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and 
Ranft, 2016), which reveals agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Chowdhury, 2004; 
Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016). Agency problems focus 
mandatorily on the conflict of interests and asymmetric information and 
further when the agent and principal have different attitudes toward risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1988; Chowdhury, 2004; Agarwal, Goel, and Vashishtha, 
2014). In respect to this imbalance of interests and asymmetric information 
between the two parties, the principals will predominantly enact 
governance mechanisms like monitoring and incentive systems to 
moderate managers’ opportunistic behaviour by aligning the interests of 
the manager with those of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989b; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Madison, Holt, Kellermanns 
and Ranft, 2016, Demsetz and Lehm, 1985; Walsh and Seward,1990; 
Agarwal, Goel, and Vashishtha, 2014).  
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These days, the agency theory, based on self-serving behaviour, 
is the most examined and applied principal/manager relationship theory in 
general; since the 1960s and early 1970s, economists have explored risk-
sharing among individuals or groups (Wilson, 1968). Agency theory has 
been used by different scholars in accounting (Demski and Feltham, 
1978), economics (Spencer and Zeckhauser, 1971), finance (Fama, 
1980), political science (Mitnick, 1986), organisational behaviour 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Kosnik 1987), board accountability (Taylor, 2001; 
Huse, 2005b), board processes and dynamics (Daily, Dalton and Canella, 
2003; Pettigrew, 1192; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), marketing (Basu, 
Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin, 1985) and sociology (White, 1985).  
Eisenhardt (1988) gave an agency theory overview of the self-
serving problem of the agent, which may be solved in a contract between 
principal and agent, created through control of the contract’s additional 
costs - the so-called agency costs. The key idea is that the principal and 
agent interrelationship should provide efficient organisation of information 
and risk-bearing costs. The unit of analysis is a contract between principal 
and agent. Eisenhardt (1988) examined three different types of 
assumptions, in which the principal and agent have partly different goals 
and risk preferences. The owner is often concerned with gaps within the 
contract with their agent. Reality demonstrates that it is almost impossible 
to describe all contingencies ex ante that could occur. The so-called 
relational contract, which was originally developed by the legal scholar Ian 
Roderick Macneil (1980), is characterised by a view of contracts as 
relations rather than as discrete transactions. It is also difficult to describe 
within a contract the exact concrete outcome ex ante that the CEO has to 
reach, hence contracts are based on promises. This involves a construct 
of relational norms, where transactions are more relational rather than 
discrete in order to create independence in behaving rationally and 
opportunistically (Huse, 1993). Independence in the owner-CEO 
relationship defines the degree to which the owner or the CEO is 
psychologically or financially independent of each other (Huse, 1993).  
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In the endeavour to hire an agent who is at the beginning 
contractually dependent and independent in his operational acting, an 
interdependence with the owner emerges over time. This paradox involves 
a situation where the importance of trust and interdependence (relational 
norms) occurs in the owner-CEO dyad. Hence, individual actions must be 
understood in a social context (Etzioni, 1988) and in a dynamic approach. 
In a lasting owner-CEO interrelationship it is possible that the original 
agreements lose content and substance. Macneil (1980) characterised 
rational norms within lasting relationships in different categories: role 
integration, preservation of the relations, and harmonising of relational 
conflicts. This suggests that both rational norms and independence are 
distinct dimensions (Huse, 1993) and influence the owner-CEO-
interrelationship dynamic.  
Family firms and MSEs do not always follow rational norms. 
Family firms also use contracts between family members but the personal 
relationship and tie toward the family agents may compromise the 
principal’s ability to realistically monitor and assess their performance. 
Family agents are sometimes hired for their ascribed, rather than their 
achieved qualifications. Casey and Henderson (2015) argue that 
stakeholders like owners and CEOs exercise only small bits of 
governance, and the whole of that governance exists in an indefinable 
space characterised more by market forces than by command and control 
of the executive individuals. Hence, hazardous activities such as shirking 
and free-riding cannot be ruled out (Chua, Chrisman and Bergiel, 2009). 
If dynamics of the CEO-board relationship (Shen, 2003) - like 
shirking - are revealed, a contract alone is frequently not able to manage 
the agency problems. More importantly in an interdependent dyad 
emerges the need for communication (Saunila, 2017a; González-Roma 
and Hernández, 2014) and the volition to understand the role of the other 
side (Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli, 2007) in order to bridge contractual 
gaps. Often, rational behaviour only touches the surface and does not dive 
deeper into the emotional relationship level, and partly ignores owner-CEO 
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dynamics. To understand the owner-CEO interrelationship and their 
mutual influence on the performance of the enterprise, both concepts of 
independence and interdependence (relational norm) are crucial. 
To attempt to limit all agency problems in a contract could also 
lead to an overestimation of the contract trustfulness (Agarwal, Goel and 
Vashishtha, 2014). Different situations need different attention, whilst not 
all problems can be discussed in a contract. The personal interrelationship 
beyond rational behaviour between principal and manager, owner and 
CEO (Pettigrew, 1992) (father and son, mother and daughter, father and 
daughter, mother and son, deeply interested principal and less interested 
principal in relation to managers), including cognitive conflicts (Huse, 
2005a), should be under examination, as well as the entrepreneurial 
orientation between principal and manager, which could be interesting 
(Covin and Slevin, 1991). 
Most governance research in big public enterprises focuses on the 
growth stage in a managerial environment along the enterprise life cycle. 
Zahra and Filatotchev (2004) refer to the applicability of agency theory in 
an entrepreneurial context in an early stage of the enterprise life cycle, 
especially in planning and managing growth, and recognise the 
importance of strategic context and the relevance of different types of 
knowledge at different stages. They suggest a “straightjacket” for the 
founder´s opportunism in order to establish managerial skills by an agent 
CEO. Audretsch, Lehmann, and Plummer (2009) support that agency 
theory could, under special conditions, also be appropriate for enterprises 
that are in an entrepreneurial stage. 
 Different points of criticism and limitations occur regarding 
agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Most of the past examinations were realised 
in big capital companies in the USA. MSEs are less observed, despite the 
fact that substantially more MSE companies exist and that here the same 
problems under different assumptions and base conditions probably occur. 
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Contextual factors like social and cultural differences within the owner-
CEO interrelationship need more attention, which this study is focused on. 
The view of rational problems in agency theory, like conflicts of interests 
and asymmetric theory, show a lack of another problem, the qualification 
of the agent (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, Buchholz, 2001). Is the qualification 
sufficient first to manage the operational problems of the enterprise 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), and second of the requisite social skills to 
bring crucial employees, teams, and stakeholders behind the agent to lead 
the enterprise to lasting success? The latter question is not answered by 
agency theory and is examined in the study at hand, and hence looks for a 
model beyond the agency context. 
Even if agency theory is today the dominant paradigm in 
principal/manager relationships, several researchers (Hirsch, Michaels and 
Friedman, 1987; Perrow, 1986; Agarwal, Goel, and Vashishtha, 2014) in 
psychology and sociology have attested to a number of limits of the 
theory. While Argyris (1973a, 1973b) worked at his concept of the rational 
man model, he pointed out the lack of operationalism and precession 
about how the theory could enhance the quality of life within organisations. 
He pointed out the problem-solving and decision-making processes, which 
are necessary in organisations to move from X to Y theory (McGregor, 
1967), from inauthentic to authentic behaviours, and operationalise in this 
way a more human dimension in organisations (Donaldson, 2008). He was 
convinced that with agency theory, with its technical and rational aspects, 
a focus on human dimensions would not occur, and so laid the foundation 
of stewardship theory.  
Managerial self-interests, which are typical for the agent, 
conceptualise exclusively what happens in the case that the owner and 
the CEO have different interests and what happens if the agent has not 
the ability, the benevolence, or the integrity to carry out the stipulated task 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Problems like this could emerge in different 
governance constellations and this is frequently the case in family-involved 
MSEs, venture capital environments, as well as in strategic and financial 
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invested MSEs, where the processes and dynamics between the owner 
and CEO follow individual constructs beyond professional tasks, which will 
have the potential to influence by their interrelationship the innovation 
capability and are therefore part of this study. My main critique in agency 
theory is that the separation between ownership and control is not as clear 
in MSEs as it is in large enterprises. The owner has more input in the daily 
business, as the analysis indicated in all three cases. This circumstance 
implies social dynamics and tensions between owner and CEO and 
reveals emotions that for the most part in the current theories are ignored. 
A further critic is the unilateral consideration of the self-serving agent. 
Agency theory assumes that an agent will act in a self-serving manner but 
it could also be possible that the agent is not self-serving but the owner is. 
Also, the agency likely has a collective platform through which they can 
elect to support their individual interests. Under the assumption that the 
agent and the principal’s interests do not diverge from each other, 
stewardship theory has emerged as a means of defining relationships, 
based upon other behavioural premises.  
 
2.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory also describes the relationship between two 
parties, the principal and the steward manager (Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997), and explains this relationship from a behavioural and 
governance perspective, similar to agency theory (Madison, Holt, 
Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016). Agency theory depicts CEOs as 
individualistic, opportunistic, and self-serving, whilst stewardship theory 
describes the CEO as a pro-organisational, trustworthy collectivist (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). 
In general, stewardship theory assumes that managers should be 
reputable as good stewards and promote the board roles as collaborative 
and mentoring (Huse, 2005a). It follows the principle of the self-actualising 
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man, who has an ethos of pro-organisational and collective serving and 
who is not only rational and determined but rather psychological with a 
humanistic background (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Madison, Holt, 
Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016). The steward behaves more socially in a 
self-actualising manner (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks, 2001). No financial 
motivators are prominent where individuals are motivated by the need to 
achieve, to be recognised by bosses, to exercise responsibility and 
authority, and to gain satisfaction by the performance of duties (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). Enterprises serve the collective goods of their 
organisation by a more social emotional involvement (Goméz-Mejia, 
Núnez-Nickel and Gutierrez, 2001; Goméz-Mejia, Hynes, Núnez-Nickel, 
and Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). 
The theory depicts managers as stewards, whose behaviour is 
based on an intrinsic desire to serve the enterprise and is aligned with the 
principal’s interests (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson 
and Davis, 1989; 1991). Other researchers like Hernandez (2012) add 
socio-economics and ideological behaviour as further sub-categories. 
Davis, Donaldson and Schoorman (1997) assume a strong relationship 
between the success of the organisation and the principal´s satisfaction. 
Stewards often believe that by working towards organisational and 
collective ends, personal needs are met and their interests are aligned 
with that of the cooperation and its owners. Empowering, governance 
structures and mechanisms are appropriate if the executive´s motivation 
fits the model of man underlying stewardship theory (p. 25) and lies 
mandatorily in the hands of the owner (Kammerlander, Sieger, 
Voordeckers and Zellweger, 2015). Against one of the basic functions - 
control - of the agent theory, Argyris (1964) argues that the control 
mechanism can be counterproductive; it undermines the pro-
organisational behaviour of the steward by lowering his or her motivation. 
Hence the stewardship theory is more focused on the use of trust than on 
control systems to manage risks (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007). 
Particularly in family firms, where a stewardship approach is often 
practised (Corbetta and Salvato; 2004), there often lies a strong focus on 
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trust and hence on psychological factors, because they are more 
committed to each other (Eddlestone, Chrisman, Steier, Chua, 2010). 
In a social context, trust is characterised by the aspect that one 
actor (trustor) is willing to rely on the actions of another actor (trustee) 
(Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 
2007). Trust is believing that the individual who is trusted will do what is 
expected. In the context of this study the owner has to rely on the actions 
of the CEO and vice versa. Trust acts as a reducer of social complexity, as 
described in the relational contract theory (Macneil, 1980; 2000), and 
allowing for actions that are otherwise too complex to be considered. Trust 
is a possible method to reduce dependency between owner and CEO 
(Möllering, 2005) and could act as a supporter for the CEO to enhance the 
organisational performance. DeNeve (1999) argued that trust increases 
subject well-being because it enhances the quality of one´s interpersonal 
relationship. Individuals that are in relationships characterised by high 
levels of trust are more open with information and are more likely to act in 
a caring or benevolent way than those in relationships that lack trust 
(Goddard, 2003). Höhmann and Welter (2005) state that entrepreneurial 
behaviour cannot be understood without appreciation of the phenomenon 
of trust. 
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) propose that the level of trust 
and the level of perceived risk in the situation will lead to risk and has 
impact on the creativity of the actors. “Trust is the willingness to assume 
risk” (Mayer, Davis, Schoorman, 1995, p. 724), which is a requirement to 
innovate and evolve as the parties interact. Hence, higher levels of trust 
could lead to greater risk in taking in a relationship, depending on the 
situation, on integrity, and benevolence (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 
1995). Previous actions of the owner or the CEO will have a significant 
impact on future trustworthiness, independent of which government 
system he/she acts. Trust is also not necessarily mutual and is not 
reciprocal (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007). In a relationship it is 
possible that the owner trusts the CEO, but the CEO does not trust the 
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owner. The owner does not know how the CEO is dealing with risk in 
general and needs verbal confirmation, hence trust is a dynamic concept 
with different development stages with specific characteristics (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996). Practically, both actors need a period of successive 
approximation and to experience how the other side is acting individually 
and situationally. A trust relationship is based on knowledge and 
experiences of past interactions among the actors, where a mutual 
understanding of the other actor’s preferences and motives, mutual 
empathy and identification create a collective identity (Tassabehji and 
Elliman, 2006). Hence, the level of trust could be an indicator for the 
quality of the owner-CEO interrelationship. Stewardship theory, in its risk 
orientation, focuses on trust rather than on controlling mechanisms 
(Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007). The entire governance approach is 
focused on trust (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016), which 
encourages cooperation and involvement to facilitate the natural alignment 
of interests. Welchman (1999) argues that benevolence and loyalty are 
crucial for good stewardship relationships and less vulnerability (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) provide a systematic 
examination and theory of psychological factors like motivation, 
identification and use of power, differentiated by situational factors such as 
management philosophy, culture and power distance. They did not 
observe the theory under interpersonal relationships and different 
ideologies. Hence, in stewardship theory it is assumed that stewards are 
intrinsically motivated, and ally their emphasis to intrinsic rewards like 
opportunities for growth, achievement, affiliation and self-actualisation. 
Corbetta and Salvato (2004) confirm that intrinsic non-financial motivations 
promote stewardship behaviour and, oppositely, a more extrinsic financial 
motivation promotes agency behaviour. Hence, this results in an increase 
of internal work motivation, which in turn can lead to a higher level of 
performance and satisfaction in the organisation (Manz, 1992), and 
supports the generation of innovation (Hotho and Champion, 2011).The 
outcome in stewardship theory tends in general to a pro-organisational 
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focus to enhance the firm performance by wealth maximisation (Madison, 
Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016), which is more affine to 
entrepreneurial interest in family businesses (Kotlar, Signori, De Massis 
and Vismara, 2017, De Massis, Frattini and Lichtenthaler, 2012). 
 Stewardship theory follows a pro-organisational serving 
mentality under a collectivism approach (Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997; Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016). 
Stewardship and agency theory follow a vertical hierarchy (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1994). The critical aspect is the applicability of each of the theories 
in practice. Under dynamic aspects, a totally different approach could 
occur when a company is heading towards market or financial problems, 
like rehabilitation or a pending loss, such as an insolvency or bankruptcy 
or a generation change (Davis, Allen and Hayes, 2010), which would 
severely test the relationship. This influence is also described in the study 
of Eddlestone and Kidwell (2012), who studied the relationship between 
the parent-child situation in family businesses and concluded that this 
relationship has a more significant influence, rather than the opportunistic 
or stewardship behaviour of the management. Westhead and Howorth 
(2006) argue that a stewardship approach is more applicable when 
owners focus more on non-financial objectives or family agendas, and not 
on the financial targets of the enterprise. Welsch et al. (2013) argue that 
each generation exhibits different perceptions of entrepreneurship 
concerning family offices and integrate a model of organizational 
entrepreneurship in stewardship-dominated enterprises. Stewardship 
theory has been used to explain the culture and relationships within 
entrepreneurial family businesses (Davis, Allen and Hayes, 2010) and is 
hence appropriate to use for entrepreneurship. Madison, Holt, 
Kellermanns and Ranft (2016) argue that family-involved firms have the 
potential to create both agency and stewardship governance environments 
that are unique. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) argue that the stronger 
the direct family influence as a function of family directors or votes, the 
less likely is a stewardship setting and vice versa, and this underlines the 
impact of family involvement in MSEs. Schillemans (2013) confirms that 
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good intra-personal-relationships between owner and CEO stimulate 
effectiveness and efficiency and point out follow-up questions that need 
separate empirical attention. A point of criticism in both theories is the 
nature of the relationship (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). Goal congruence 
and the development of trust in both theories seem to be unclear in the 
management practices. The owner-CEO-interrelationship influences are 
currently not well examined and are focused on the study at hand.  
 Whilst both theories have the same focus on optimising 
shareholders/owners’ value through a different approach, agency theory is 
focused on the minimisation of costs (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and 
Ranft, 2016), while all the stakeholders’ interests and stewardship theory 
are focused on enhancing firm performance to maximise share value 
(Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016). In both theories the owner 
stands alone in the focus of wealth formation. The involvement orientation 
of stewardship theory, harmony and togetherness, low power distance, 
and cooperation on work level could help to investigate and understand 
the degree of trustfulness in the owner-CEO relationship, and help to 
analyse and consider the nature of the sort of interrelationship that would 
contribute a certain format of governance. The main critique is the non-
financial motivation in stewardship theory. Economic oriented enterprises 
are - through their pragmatic behaviour - interested in earning money and 
hence have financial interests. Wealth maximisation by the activities of the 
CEO in industrial enterprises is motivated by a financial focus, and this 
financial focus is also in the interest of the owner, similar to agency theory, 
which is definitely also the case in German family enterprises. I argue 
further that a segregation between control and trust in a pragmatic 
approach is likely difficult. Trust and control are, in my experience, 
intertwining. Stewards also need clear business reporting, where 
monitoring is the reason and this is not only based on trust. Team 
production theory has its focus on all stakeholders inside and outside the 
enterprise, and this will be discussed in the next section. 
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2.2.3 Team Production Theory 
Team production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999) is noticeable for 
understanding the incomplete contracting between a larger group of 
stakeholders, not only shareholders, and describes the enterprise as a 
“nexus of firm specific investments”. Team production theory has its 
origins in economic as well as in property rights theory (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972) and corporate game theory (Aoki, 1984). It perceives the 
board as a collective team of individuals that creates long-term welfare for 
all participating stakeholders (Blair and Stout, 1999; 2001), where the 
interests of internal and external actors like employees, suppliers, 
customers, investors, owners and CEOs, etc. are in the focus and not - as 
in the shareholder approach - only concerned with the interests of the 
owner. All stakeholders contribute with different types of knowledge and 
firm-specific resources to cooperate in production in a horizontal hierarchy 
of a long-term relationship and long-term perspectives (Huse, Hoskisson, 
Zattoni and Viganò, 2011), representing the team´s interests and 
allocating rewards among team members. The owner´s aim to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth should not be the only goal, but rather the CEO 
should seek to maximise the joint welfare of all the enterprise stakeholders 
(Blair and Stout, 1999) by a collective conceptualisation. In team 
production theory, Blair and Stout (1999) suggest viewing a corporation as 
a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts. Blair (2012) argues that whereas 
the principal-agent framework provides a strong focus on share value, 
team production can be seen as generalisation of the principal-agent 
problem that is more symmetric. All participants in the entire enterprise 
have reasons to want all of the other participants to co-operate fully, as 
they hope to benefit from everyone’s involvement.  
 A team describes a system of two or more people working 
together (Weiss and Hoegl, 2015). The basic hypothesis is that through 
team production, enterprises are able to achieve yield, which is higher 
than the sum of the individual productivities of the resources involved 
(Blair and Stout, 1999; Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli, 2007). An 
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individual self-employed person receives the fruits of their effort alone. In a 
team, each team member will receive a part of the additional earnings 
generated by their extra effort. This tempts individual team members to 
shirk, or put in a lower level of effort, which can lower the team output. If 
shirking by one team member can easily be detected by other team 
members, then shirking can be minimised. Shirking in teams is a problem 
and rises as the team increases in size (Blair and Stout, 1999), though it is 
less likely in an owner-CEO dyad. If the team size is too big it could be 
less efficient, more complex and support shirking with different relationship 
influences. With an increasing number of different stakeholders arise 
different interests and this emphasises different performance measures, 
which could complicate team efficiency (Meyer and Züger, 2007) 
While considering the enterprise downside risk due to agency 
problems, team production theory focuses on the importance of value-
added investments that create the enterprise´s upside potential (Huse, 
Hoskisson, Zattoni, Viganò, 2011). The team production approach 
emphasises how the board, as a team, can effectively coordinate firm 
activities together and create value. Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli 
(2007) argue that no board member is likely to possess the full 
complement of knowledge and information that is essential to achieve the 
desired goals. Different interests, backgrounds and perspectives of the 
team members will assist the enterprise in creating value in general and 
delivering innovations in particular. Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni, Viganò 
(2011) added that a team of individuals are also more likely to bring 
different values, norms, goals, and identities as single individuals, 
provided that the team is organised effectively and professionally in order 
to avoid shirking and free-riding behaviour. The team production theory 
will help focus the use of team member knowledge and skills to create 
value for the enterprise, which implies an understanding of board task and 
accountability, team dynamics and team culture (Gabrielsson, Huse and 
Minichilli, 2007). 
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Entrepreneurial teams are groups of related individuals who 
engage in entrepreneurship (Discua Cruz, Howorth and Hamilton, 2013) 
and distinguished from founding teams and top management teams. 
Teams are social systems that perform one or more tasks within an 
organisational context (Bettenhausen, 1991). These teams merge 
individual resources that members bring to the team. Chandler, Honig and 
Wiklund (2005) concluded that entrepreneurial teams perform better than 
ventures founded by individuals and Davis, Allen, and Hayes (2010) argue 
that family members may bring trust, altruism, stewardship, common 
values, and shared understanding that provide a competitive advantage 
for the team. Carney (2005) argues that family teams, with their long-term 
perspectives, make it easier to establish and maintain fruitful stakeholder 
relationships. Members provide support with their technical, managerial, 
entrepreneurial or human capital, and justify their individual importance to 
the entrepreneurial team approach and underline the importance of 
heterogeneous teams that may be more effective at solving complex 
issues by using their access to ideas, opportunities, and resources 
(Discua Cruz, Howorth and Hamilton, 2013). Neergaard (2005) submits 
that entrepreneurial teams may prefer more experienced entrepreneurs 
who can bring their former experiences to the team, like a former CEO 
who is now in the position of an owner of an MSE, which is different than 
big public enterprises. 
Many important aspects of corporate law in (public) enterprises 
reveal much more robustly than their alternatives like agency and 
stewardship theories, premised on the notion that shareholders own the 
corporation. This shareholder control is based on two aspects of American 
law (Blair and Stout, 1999) and British law: derivative suits for breach of 
fiduciary duty and shareholder voting rights, and hence the CEO is more 
externally controlled by the capital market, whilst in Germany the CEO is 
more controlled by other stakeholders like unions and banks (Jürgens, 
Rupp and Vitols, 2000). The CEOs are largely left free to pursue whatever 
projects and strategies they choose, with the one limitation being that they 
do not use their positions for their own sake. Attempts to avoid shirking, 
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rent-seeking duties and rewards through explicit contracts can be difficult, 
especially when the team production process is complex and uncertain 
(Blair and Stout, 1999). In respect to the upcoming problems of team 
production dynamics, Blair and Stout (1999) posit a horizontal hierarchical 
team that governs the economic enterprise and suggest a mediating 
hierarchy approach to capture the fundamental contracting problem in 
corporate governance. Criticism of this has come from Casey and 
Henderson (2015). They argue that for many of the most important 
governance decisions there is no hierarchy and no team, and rather the 
enterprise is controlled by a series of relationships. 
This team consent within the dyad is driven by two rational effects: 
the costs of organising activities and the benefits of organising activities 
(Coase, 1937), which could have a significant impact on the team 
dynamics of owner and CEO. Casey and Henderson (2015) argue that 
stakeholders like owners and CEOs exercise only small bits of 
governance, and the whole of that governance exists in an indefinable 
space characterised more by market forces than command and control of 
the executive individuals. They suggest that the best way to enforce the 
governance of the enterprise is to focus first on a topic like creativity and 
innovation that all stakeholders desire, and then focus on a nimbler, 
shape-shifting organisation or team. They highlight the importance of 
understanding the real sources of power in modern enterprises to provide 
a better suit of governance options for firms and to understand barriers to 
the enterprise performance that exist. One of the barriers could be the 
owner-CEO interrelationship and the pair’s relational dynamics among 
each other, as well as the interrelationship’s influence on the 
organisational performance. We need a more foundational understanding - 
that the dyad is dynamically influenced by social and rational effects rather 
than only by rational requirements. We need more data on how these 
interrelationships are structured (Casey and Henderson, 2015), and how 
rational dynamics shape the situation.   
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Agency, stewardship, and team production theory provide a useful 
way of explaining relationships where the parties´ interests are at odds 
and can be brought more into alignment through suitable monitoring, an 
incentive system, and organisational serving objectives on shareholder 
interest. Agency theory seems to be more suitable to enhance the 
enterprise profit, while stewardship theory underlines more the social 
togetherness based on trust, which the team production theory shares with 
the addendum of a stakeholder value. However, although empirical 
evidence and well-developed theoretical models for both shareholder and 
stakeholder-oriented views exist (Laplume, Sonpar and Litz, 2008), 
stakeholder and shareholder interests are likely competing in theory. 
Corporate governance seems more of a dealing process within alternate 
dynamics. What is today competing could be tomorrow complementary, 
and this seems to be a task of the enterprise strategy that is mostly 
dominated by the owner and the CEO in German MSEs. The witting or 
unwitting focus of a theory is interesting, because the interplay between 
owner and CEO is believed to have the potential to stimulate or constrain 
innovation, particularly in smaller (MSEs) enterprises where owners have 
more input, which is less observed in the current literature.  
 
2.2.4 Comparison and Conclusion 
Previous research on corporate governance has tended to look at 
the rational working of the owner and the CEO in the enterprise and 
ignored the influence of the owner-CEO interrelationship, which could 
have the potential to stimulate or constrain innovation, particularly in 
MSEs, where owners have more input than in large enterprises. The 
individual, social, relational, and situational conduct of the owner and the 
CEO are less observed. Interpersonal conflicts and relational dynamics 
are seldom highlighted. Further important contextual factors are national 
48 
 
and cultural settings8, the size of the enterprise, the firm´s life cycle, the 
firm´s industry, individual characteristics, and the ownership structure 
(Huse, 2005a; Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). All these dynamics 
and factors bear potential to influence the innovation capability and reveal 
gaps in the current literature. 
Corporate governance is an entrepreneurial basic duty and a 
challenge to promote, and requires technological and organisational 
innovation (Miozzo and Dewick, 2002; Stevenson and Lundström, 2001). 
Tylecote and Ramirez (2006) examine British corporate governance and 
conclude that high novelty technologies and markets require high industry-
wide expertise by the owner and CEO, and hence a close cooperation 
between the actors. Belloc (2012) points at the process through which 
individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the 
enterprise as a central issue for corporate innovations. Aguilera (2005) 
confirms the importance of corporate governance in respect to the 
innovation capability. Sapra, Subramanian and Subramanian (2014) 
examine how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms 
affect the innovation capability, and focus in their study on the tension 
involved in corporate governance from external take-over pressure and 
private benefits. They confirm a significant innovation influence through 
too much pressure from the ownership and CEO. The way in which the 
owner and the CEO in MSEs work together tends to be crucial. Agency 
theory, stewardship theory, and team production theory discuss different 
approaches of how the owner and the CEO could work together and 
improve value creation (Huse, 2005b).  
 
 
                                            
8 For example, CEO pay in German MSE (a two-tier system) is much less and 
closer to that of lower level employees (Kakabadse et al., 2004) than in the UK and USA 
(a one-tier system). 
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Table 1. Comparison of corporate governance theories 
 
All three theories and characterisations have validity in theory and 
practice with different centres of gravity, and are revealed in the individual, 
social, relational, and situational (Table 1) conduct within the owner-CEO 
interrelationship; they are reflected in the potential to stimulate or constrain 
innovation capability.  
In its individual conduct, agency theory describes self-serving and 
individualistic agent behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1988b; Etzioni, 1988; Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016) by an 
50 
 
agent who is performance-oriented, competing, and searching for his own 
opportunities and rewards with an individual, egoistic engagement in an 
environment where ownership and control is separated. In contrast to the 
agent is the steward, with his/her altruistic cooperative involvement and 
harmony and togetherness orientation (Davis, Allen and Hayes, 2010), 
pro-organisational in his/her self-actualising behaviour (Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson, 1997). The behavioural assumption is more 
complementary. Team production theory focuses on team members with a 
strong team-conducing behaviour (Blair and Stout, 1999; Gabrielsson, 
Huse and Minichilli, 2007) and an implicit network participation beyond 
their own enterprise with skill contributions from each stakeholder and a 
selfless transaction of knowledge to the team specific investments (Blair 
and Stout, 1999; Blair, 2012). Team members are willing to cooperate, 
particularly a team-oriented owner who accepts his team role and moves 
more down to a face-to-face interrelationship, where the principals in the 
other theories have more restrictions against them. Profit maximisation is 
one of a broader range of targets. Corporate life, respect, and human 
satisfaction are further targets. The team approach fosters the stakeholder 
transaction at eye level, which reduces the CEO’s dependency from the 
owner. The team approach fosters the independence of the CEO and 
takes into team production theory a counter position to the agency and 
stewardship theories. Hence, team production theory could likely optimise 
the owners’ input into the execution in MSEs. If the two actors have 
different attitudes in respect to the above-mentioned behaviour, 
interrelationship dynamics will occur and could have significant potential to 
stimulate or constrain the innovation capability of the enterprise. 
Social conduct differentiates the stewardship theory and the 
agency theory less. The same is true for the affiliate concentration. Both 
have as their main objectives the shareholders’ interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989b) by enterprise wealth maximisation 
(Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016) and can be seen more as 
complementary theories. The team production theory focuses on the 
interests of all stakeholders by boosting value added investments in the 
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interests of the team (Blair and Stout, 1999; Blair, 2012; Jürgens, Rupp 
and Vitols, 2000; Carney, 2005; Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni and Viganò, 
2011) and is hence more a competing theory in respect that the generated 
wealth will be more collectively distributed. Control (monitoring) is the 
dominant governance mechanism in agency theory (Argyris, 1964; Davis, 
Schoorman and Mayer, 1997; Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007) and 
trust in stewardship theory (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007; Madison, 
Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 2016). In stewardship theory, the contract 
and the empowerment for the CEO are built on trust. Team production 
theory is conceptualised by a nexus of symmetric contracts (Blair and 
Stout, 1999; Goddard, 2003, Blair 2012), trust and benevolence being 
practised among the team members. Whilst in stewardship theory and 
team production theory, trust is a rule that is focused on, agency theory 
sees it more as a negligible factor that has no influence on rational man 
behaviour. The “with each other” in stewardship theory (Eddlestone et al., 
2010; Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007) and the “for each other” in 
team production theory support trust more rather than the “against each 
other” conduct in the agency theory, where the principal belief is that all 
facts are rationally recorded. In the direct owner-CEO cooperation in 
agency and stewardship theory the influence is more arbitrary and 
depends on the behaviour of the owner, whereas a mediating hierarchy 
approach (Blair and Stout, 1999; Casey and Henderson, 2015, Blair and 
Stout, 2001) in the team production theory limits shareholders’ influence 
and hence strengthens the independence of the CEO. Control signals a 
sign of high-power demonstration, trust the opposite, while elevated on the 
other side is the owners´ dependence on the CEO. Dependences can 
generate tensions between the actors and depend, among others, on the 
team size and the relational dynamics. The discussion regarding 
shareholder/stakeholder value in this study is difficult and unidimensional. 
The same is true in respect to trust versus control. No shareholders, no 
money to finance growth, no content stakeholders, means no resources 
for growth. Rational and emotional dynamics together in an 
interdisciplinary approach need balance and openness to change. Trust 
and control are immediately important and could not be justified 
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unilaterally. These two main points in respect to the social conduct in the 
three discussed theories deserve to be critiqued. The realities are more 
dynamic than in the rational world of these theories and often need 
situational behaviour. The current literature neglects the fact that emotions 
can influence social conduct within the owner-CEO interrelationship and 
its effects. In a pragmatic approach, the examined theories are viewed as 
more complementary than competing, and challenge the owner-CEO 
conduct. 
The nature of the owner-CEO relationship in agency theory is 
predominantly rational (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eddlestone et al., 
2010) and functional, dominated and controlled and monitored by the 
owner (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Shapiro, 2005; Hill and Jones, 1992).  
Stewards tend to behave more collaboratively and in a mentoring way 
(Huse, 2005a) in their relationship to their principal; they are less rational 
and more social (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Madison, Holt, Kellermanns 
and Ranft, 2016), and are more committed to each other (Eddlestone, 
Chrisman, Steier, Chua, 2010), but in a comparable manner functional, 
rather than team production theory, where the team members have a 
disposition to behave social-professional, where everyone brings their 
core competence and knowledge to the team and follows a common team 
spirit (Blair, 2012; Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli, 2007; Huse, 
Hoskisson, Zattoni, Viganò, 2011; Cruz, Howorth and Hamilton, 2012). 
This team spirit is revealed in the interrelationship modus (Neuberger, 
2014) in the team production approach as an exogenous cooperation, in 
the stewardship theory as a more endogenous cooperation, and in agency 
theory in conflict and competition modus between the participants that 
separately challenge the owner and the CEO. Team members are 
seemingly aware about their interaction to improve the collective team 
approach and tend to act independently, but with awareness to act 
dependently (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Bettenhausen, 1991), because 
they likely know that only together is it possible to add value. Agents and 
stewards tend to interact more dependently to their principal in their 
vertical hierarchy approach and less on eye level, whilst the steward 
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search tends to look for a nearing dyad (Cruz, Howorth and Hamilton, 
2012). It seems that an agent interacts in a clinical egoistical manner, 
which has significant impact on the interrelationship quality (Schillemans, 
2013). The principal-agent relationship seems to be more vulnerable than 
the steward-principal relationship, where the actors endeavour to improve 
the quality of the interrelationship. On the other hand, it seems that the 
relationship among the team members in respect to the team production 
theory in their vertical hierarchy structure is more resilient (Cohen and 
Bailey, 1997), and in its intended period, longer lasting (Huse, Hoskisson, 
Zattoni and Viganò, 2011), similar to agency and stewardship theory but 
with conditions. The interrelationship conduct is a social conduct and 
should not only be seen as an economic nexus of contractual relationships 
(Macneil, 1980; 2000; Huse, 1993). I argue that the contractual contents in 
an owner-CEO dyad are quickly forgotten and that the daily, common 
situations dictate the dynamics in the dyad, which the above-mentioned 
theories focus on less. The vulnerability and dynamics of relations are not 
to be underestimated, whereas the three theories ignore this, and hence 
emotional influence is pushed aside. The desire in team production theory 
of a horizontal hierarchy stays as a desire in practice. The owner in an 
MSE is the boss of the CEO. He or she decides about the continuance in 
the enterprise and this circumstance is not neglected, which is also more 
different than in big enterprises, where the ownership has less influence 
on the daily operations. All three discussed theories have less focus on 
long-term interrelationship influences on intra-personal-attachments and 
their dyad dynamics inside the owner-CEO-interrelationship. Potentially, 
this needs the CEO in the dyad to have future viability. He/she needs 
perceived safety to act. To get an insufficient feeling from the owner is 
counterproductive for the performance of the CEO and could constrain the 
innovation capability.  
The situational conduct in respect of innovation-near approaches 
also differs among the three reviewed theories. While agents tend to 
reduce the cost of the organisation (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and 
Ranft, 2016), the steward is inclined to enhance the firm performance 
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(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Madison, Holt, Kellermanns and Ranft, 
2016), which could have financial objectives, but also non-financial ones 
(Westhead and Howorth, 2006). On the other hand, focusing the team 
production economic approach on long-term welfare for all stakeholders 
(Blair and Stout, 1999; 2001; Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999) 
demonstrates a more positive increasing innovation propensity 
(Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli, 2007). The agent tends to innovate 
within a financial background. While innovation supports the enterprise’s 
profit in the long term (Miozzo and Dewick, 2002), it is welcome in the 
short- term to reduce costs, and hence innovation activities can become 
victims of cost-cutting in agency theory. Often, family involvement in a 
stewardship environment supports and recommends enhancing the 
innovation performance (Liang et al., 2013; Craig and Dibrell, 2006; Dibrell 
and Moeller, 2011). These situational challenges of innovation test the 
owner-CEO interrelationship and hence have a potential to stimulate or 
constrain the innovation capability. If there is no common attitude within 
the interrelationship to necessary investments to improve the innovation 
capability, tensions are inevitable, and this could lead to desperation by 
the CEO, which may end in demotivation and frustration and thereby have 
a significant potential to influence the innovation capability. 
The interests of owners of MSEs’ are not limited to control and 
conflicts minimisation with their CEO in order to enhance their wealth. The 
sustainable preservation of the enterprise and their competitiveness are 
also immensely important. Consequently, the competence of the CEO to 
lead the enterprise in this situation is a big concern (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, Buchholz, 2001) for the owner. On the one hand, it is the objective 
technological competence of the CEO and the industrial specific 
knowledge, and on the other hand the interpersonal skills to lead the 
enterprise successfully that is vital. The latter is revealed as a huge 
challenge and seems to me more complex than the technological 
competence. The interpersonal corporation, with its interrelationship 
dynamics with key employees in the organisation, is quite important and 
contains conflict potential, which could possibly influence the innovation 
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capability. This interrelationship quality will transmit into the whole 
organisation and find its roots within the owner-CEO interrelationship as a 
role model. A pure rational owner-CEO dyad seems likely to be an illusion. 
A consciousness of emotional skills and an empathy occur as essential in 
a solid interrelationship and open space for further interrelationship 
influences that are not observed in the three corporate governance 
theories. 
Agency theory, stewardship theory and team production theory 
highlight different interests of top managers in large public enterprises and 
depict how interests may diverge from those of their owners. 
Entrepreneurial commitment and family involvement as owners are less 
inquired about in the above-mentioned theories, as they are common in 
German MSEs. As a psychological as well as a cognitive approach, the 
family, management and entrepreneurship each present an ideology: 
paternalism, managerialism, and entrepreneurialism, which will be justified 
in the next section. 
 
2.3 Enterprise Ideologies 
Enterprise ideologies are a further variation in the owner-CEO 
dyad. Enacted ideologies in different business cases are positioned 
against an alternative approach to the study of corporate governance 
processes in order to analyse the owner-CEO interrelationship and its 
potential influence on the innovation capability. Agency, stewardship, and 
team production theory have examined the owner-CEO interrelationship 
under an individualistic, opportunistic, and collectivist pro- organisational 
approach, without any reflection on ideological differences like 
entrepreneurialism, managerialism and paternalism (Johannisson and 
Huse, 2000). These ideological differences are part of the examination 
and will be reviewed in order to present influences within the owner-CEO 
interrelationship on the innovation capability. The focus of this section is to 
56 
 
investigate the literature about how various ideologies have potential to 
influence the innovation capability in German MSEs.  
The section begins by a definition of ideologies in respect to the 
enterprise. The following section will then review differences in the 
contrasting ideologies: entrepreneurialism, managerialism, and 
paternalism, and will evaluate the differences between entrepreneur, 
manager, and patriarch in respect to the owner´s ideology. 
 
2.3.1 Ideology 
The Oxford Dictionary conceptualises an ideology as a system of 
ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or 
political theory and policy, and as a set of beliefs characteristic of social 
groups or individuals. An ideology is an “ism”, a belief system with a 
cognitive content held to be true, a shared set of common ideological 
beliefs and practices, and a set of ideas that constitute goals, 
expectations, and actions as a comprehensive vision and a way of looking 
at things (Locke and Spencer, 2011). An ideology may be distinguished by 
the extent to which it serves to maintain relationships of power and 
domination (Deem and Brehony, 2005). Broad consent in respect to 
ideology is that scholars tend to favour the definition that an ideology´s 
concern is with configurations of ideas. 
The basic condition of ideologies is subject to the owner-CEO 
interrelationship influences, and between different behavioural conditions 
of entrepreneurs, managers, and patriarchs. A CEO and an owner with a 
managerial, paternalistic or entrepreneurial behaviour have conceivably 
different conduct in the structuring of activities, resource control, business 
context, time perspective, core competencies and success criteria 
(Johannisson and Huse, 2000), and could have an ostensible impact and 
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relevance to the governance behaviour of an organisation and hence 
possibly to the innovation capability of the enterprise. 
Johannisson and Huse (2000) discussed ideology as a lens 
through which its members see reality and make it intelligible, and define 
ideology in their study as a consequent and permanent way of perceiving 
and appreciating the world that, accompanied by psychological 
commitment, generates a specific mode of conduct. (p. 5). Ideologies will 
be determined by the acting person. The basic condition of action has a 
twofold character of equality and distinction – as human plurality (Arendt, 
1958). To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to 
begin, to be proactive, to set something into motion, to innovate, and it is a 
trait of the human condition and derives from the individual behavioural 
approach. The approach to the study of entrepreneurship treats the 
individual as viewed in terms of activities undertaken to enable the 
organisation to come into existence or into renewal (Gartner, 1985; 1988; 
2001). This applies to entrepreneurial, managerial, and also paternalistic 
behaviour in any and every possible way. The current thesis defines 
ideology as a system of ideas and ideals which forms the basis of 
economic policy, as a set of characteristics and as a collective confidence, 
and supports self-enforcing norms that produce certain behaviour of the 
acting persons - the owner and the CEO - and which is dynamic over time. 
Different ideologies will be explained in the next section.  
 
2.3.2 Entrepreneurialism and the Entrepreneur 
The history of entrepreneurial research is close to 100 years old. 
The definitions, samples, and characteristics of entrepreneurs that occur 
out of the historical research are sheer and infinite (Gartner, 1988; 2001). 
The phenomenon of entrepreneurship is entangled with a complex set of 
contiguous and overlapping constructs. Ludwig von Mises (1940) declared 
the entrepreneur as a user of odds, Josef Schumpeter (1934) a few years 
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before as the innovator. Frank H. Knights (1921) defines an uncertainty 
bearing as the nature of the entrepreneur, whilst Mark Casson (1990) 
justified the entrepreneur as a coordinator. Hayek (1937) and Kirzner 
(1988) create the entrepreneur as middleman and arbitrageur. These are 
only some static definitions of economics of the last century in respect to 
the “Dasein9” of the entrepreneur (Gartner, 1988). Reality depicts an 
entrepreneur in practice more in a hybrid function than in one particular 
definition, and in a more dynamic situation. From this reasoning, Gartner 
(1988) recommends further studies: research on entrepreneurs should 
focus on what an entrepreneur does and not who the entrepreneur is, and 
should be focused more on a dynamic approach with a pragmatic impact. 
Current researchers like Fauchart and Gruber (2011) pointed out in their 
study in respect to the role of founder identity in entrepreneurship, that one 
of the most remarkable characteristics of entrepreneurship is that it 
provides individuals with the freedom to pursue their own goals, dreams, 
and desires in a new creation.  
The social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; 2004) serves 
equally as a platform to analyse and conceptualise the entrepreneur’s self-
conception, self-perception and how they affect their enterprise. The 
human self-conception and self-perception is generated out of social 
interaction. Social identity deals with the structure and function of identity 
as it relates to an individual´s social relationship, and to his/her 
membership in groups or social categories applicable to the owner-CEO 
interrelationship and their common enterprise. Several key elements are 
essential to contemporary understanding of the social identity. First, the 
personal symbolic interaction with other, second, levels of inclusiveness, 
the relation between acting in terms of individual goals, ambitions and 
acting in terms of social motivations associated- and third, making 
predictions about behavioural choices and human actions (Fauchart and 
Gruber, 2011) are related to the enterprise ideology. The entrepreneur 
takes over an inventor role (a passion for activities such as exploring new 
opportunities), a founder role (a passion for activities related to 
                                            
9Philosophical terminology: “Dasein” means being, existence 
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opportunities exploitation), and developer role (a passion for activities 
related to growing an enterprise) identity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1994; 
Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018). In respect to the innovation capability, all 
three roles could bear the potential of influence. 
 Johannisson and Huse (2000) justify entrepreneurialism as 
organic organising of internal and external resources with visionary 
abilities and spontaneous actions, where willpower and intuition guide 
product and market development. Networking is based on trust, which 
reduces transaction costs and enhances learning and access to business 
prospects. The structuring of activities is realised in flat organisations and 
self-organising groups, including customer ties. External events are 
amplified by their own internal and synchronised actions, whilst time is 
perceived as a continuous flow. Short-term planning and frequent follow-
ups are the order of the day. To generate the cash that is needed to 
maintain the venturing process reveals the success criteria of 
entrepreneurialism ideology. To create new lines of business emerges as 
the actual business context. Zahra, Neubaum and Huse (2000) underline 
that entrepreneurialism embodies an enterprise´s innovation activities and 
the importance for organisational renewal, creation of new business, and 
improved performance.  
Carland, Hoy and Boulton (1984) define an entrepreneur as an 
individual who independently owns and actively manages a small business 
and stands in coherence with the German civil law code (BGB §14), which 
defines an entrepreneur as an individual or legal entity in execution of their 
commercial purpose or independent activities. An entrepreneur will be 
defined as a risk-taking, innovative person who establishes and manage a 
business for the purpose of profit and growth. In this thesis, the 
entrepreneur is defined as an individual who is primarily business-oriented 
and hence focused on profit or growth in an industrial environment, and is 
an acting person, in contrast to a manager, who is more an administrative 
person. An entrepreneur in a German MSE takes over the model role in 
respect to innovation activities in order to force the organisation to relate to 
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these activities. He/she is a risk-taking, proactive, innovative person who 
establishes and manages an enterprise for the purpose of profit and 
growth, which delivers quantifiable results out of defined and realised 
activities. 
 
2.3.3 Managerialism and the Manager 
A manager is a person who is responsible for controlling or 
administering an organisation or group of staff (Oxford Dictionary, 2014), 
whilst managerialism is an ideology that believes that commercial 
management principles have the answers to all organisational problems. 
Locke and Spender (2011) argue that managerialism is grounded in the 
practical mechanics of Tayler´s (1911) “Principles of scientific 
management”, as a new form of instrumentality premised on numbers and 
generated as internal operation, financial, and cost data, which produce a 
special kind of efficiency as a utilitarian conception (Trank, 2014). 
Managerialism resides in managers’ self-conception, who believe that they 
are a professional caste (Locke and Spender, 2011), in the sense of being 
a division of society based on differences of wealth, rank of privilege, 
profession, and occupation.  “Managerialism justifies the application of 
managerial techniques, mostly gained through training in a business 
school, to all areas of society on the grounds of superior ideology, expert 
training, and the exclusive possession of managerial know-how necessary 
to efficiently run corporations….” (Klikauer, 2014, pp. 2-3).  Current 
managerialism representatives (managers) generalise a common, special 
business language to clarify their class and status (Deem and Brehony, 
2005). The manager type was born in the USA and stands in the USA in 
close relation to agency theory, in comparison to Germany, where trade 
unions fight for their right of co-determination and stewardship theory is 
more evident. For example, in German MSEs the enterprise is multiply 
viewed, not simply as a bundle of shares with a market valuation but as an 
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entity that owes commitment of continuity of family ownership, employee 
contributions, and community embeddedness alike (Trank, 2014).  
 Managerialism means the structuring of the activities of 
various functional areas, as well as separating design and execution in 
time and space. The role of the board is formalised and mediates planning 
routines with professional management skills (marketing, finance, 
production, and human resources) as core competencies in managerial 
technology and relevant experiences. Internal and external dependences 
are controlled by contractual agreements. Systematic outsourcing of all 
non-core competences is permanently an opportunity. Uncertainties in the 
environment are reduced by way of several institutional arrangements, 
such as adherence to industry and professional norms and the adoption of 
a management vocabulary. Managers try to imagine that the environment 
is knowable, which means that superior technology is assumed to deliver 
needed competitiveness. A clear focus on market segments and time 
management is mandatory to reach a status with a significant potential 
and influence in the segment. Current activities are structured in order to 
build a platform for future offensives. They continuously have to prove 
themselves by providing owners with reviews containing numbers and 
figures showing returns on investments, and generally adopt the norm that 
quantitative growth is the indicator of success (Deetz, 1992; Johannisson 
and Huse; 2000, Johannisson, 2000). Klikauer (2014) defined that 
“managerialism justifies the application of managerial techniques to all 
areas of society on the grounds of superior ideology, expert training, and 
the executive possession of managerial knowledge necessary to efficiently 
run corporations and societies…” (p. 2).  
 Administrative managerial action in respect to the innovation 
capability of German MSEs seems to be definitely essential. A manager is 
hence a person who is leading and controlling a company with an 
administrative assignment and professional management tools in order to 
generate profit and a return on investment for shareholders. 
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Managerialism is hence the belief that commercial management principles 
have the answers to all organisational problems. 
  
2.3.4 Paternalism and the Patriarch 
Paternalism is conceptualised as the policy or practice on the part 
of people in authority of restricting the freedom and responsibilities of 
those subordinate to or otherwise dependent on them in their supposed 
interest (Oxford Dictionary, 2014). The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (2014) defines paternalism as the interference of an individual 
with another person against their will and is defended or motivated by a 
claim that the person whose will is interfered with will be better off or 
protected from harm. At a theoretical level, it raises questions of how 
persons should be treated when they are less than fully rational. 
Paternalism involves some kind of limitation on the freedom or autonomy 
of some agent and it does so for a particular class of reasons. In a 
business setting, paternalism appears in clan structures where the 
hierarchy is structured by seniority and kinship ties, restricted by traditions, 
and reflects basic property rights (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). The 
meaning of the business life is the creation of a safe basis for the family, 
which implies claiming a controllable niche for the operations of the firm. In 
this, everyday life becomes as important as maintaining traditions and 
building a future for generations to come. The competences needed for 
this kind of endeavour are embedded in the personal histories of the family 
member and of further confidants of the firm (Johannisson and Huse, 
2000). The dominant objective of the family is to keep the business within 
the family. The activities are structured by seniority and equality between 
different parts of the extended family basis for functional organisation, and 
the core knowledge is socialised into the extended family members. The 
ownership of the company area is the major symbol of resources. The 
approach to new markets and technology is slow and hesitant. There is a 
dominant anxiety to not lose the current status and wealth, which should 
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serve the family members and future generations and establish their 
prominent role. The time perspective is long-term oriented, with as much 
concern for the heritage from the first generations as for coming 
generations. Hence, the success criterion is to ensure that the family 
business remains in the family (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). 
 Paternalism is conceptualised as an ideology and a leadership 
style in which a male10 leader uses his power to control, protect, punish, 
and reward in return for obedience and loyalty from his employees, 
followers, or subordinates. The leader acts like a father towards those who 
are not their children in order to promote their well-being or protect them 
from harm. As a behavioural pattern, it may or be may not justified under 
the circumstances and may be a violation of a moral rule of conduct when 
it limits an adult´s right to self-determination (Business Dictionary, 2014).  
 In the Western hemisphere, the notion of paternalism was 
created at the end of the 19th century and discussed, in respect to 
business structures, the understanding of hierarchal dimension. The 
owner of the enterprise is the “absolutistic” sovereign in the enterprise and 
provides indirect relationships in a private and professional social context. 
The principle and practice of paternal administration, government as by a 
father or mother, is the claim or attempt to supply the needs or to regulate 
the life of an enterprise in the same way as a father or mother does to their 
children (Pfeiffer, 2011). 
 In this study, paternalism is defined as an ideology where the 
leader of an enterprise stands on top of the enterprise hierarchy with 
absolutistic scope of action, with the superficial success criterion of 
keeping the business in the hands of the family for the succeeding 
generations. The leader uses their power to control, protect, punish, and 
                                            
10 Traditional male leaders represent paternalism. In a contemporary world, 
more and more females take over this role and do this, too. The literature shows no 
significant studies in respect to maternalism. When the researcher in this study justifies 
paternalism, there is no difference if a woman or a man is the leader. The notion of 
paternalism stands here for an ideology which is not gender specific.  
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reward in return for obedience and loyalty from their employees, followers, 
or subordinates, in order to reach their own goals. 
The owner’s and CEO’s behaviour are influenced by the three 
different ideological conducts - entrepreneurialism, managerialism, and 
paternalism - and could have potential to influence the innovation 
capability in German MSEs. Johannisson (2002) pointed out that having 
just one ideology is only possible in theory and that a plurality of ideologies 
in a pragmatic approach is more realistic, while a separation of these three 
ideologies seems to be an illusion. It is more likely that organisations have 
multiple competing ideologies in practice. A mix of two or maybe all three 
ideologies seems to be possible and likely; this can change over time and 
underlies situational and social dynamics, and it is only imaginable to 
speak about one dominating ideology with its interpenetration in adjacent 
ideologies. It is obvious that the interplay between owner and CEO is 
influenced by the ideological orientation of the actors and bears potential 
to stimulate or constrain the innovation capability of the enterprise. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter was divided into three main fields of literature. In the 
First Section, the current status of science in respect to innovation and 
innovation capability depicted the necessity of innovation in German 
MSEs. It shows that owner and CEO have a significant influence on the 
innovation capability of the enterprise and reveals the dyad as the nucleus 
of creativity. Individual characteristics and behaviour of the owner and the 
CEO have a significant potential to influence the innovation behaviour of 
the entire enterprise. In the Second section, the chapter moved on to 
explore current knowledge in the owner-CEO dyad as part of corporate 
governance research. It focused on the agency theory, stewardship 
theory, and team production theory, highlighted differences in the three 
examinations and focused on a comparison between the three theories.  
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Individual, social, relational, and situational conduct were discussed. The 
owner-CEO relationship stands under observation and shows potential of 
influence. The three major theories frameworks do not focus on dyad 
dynamics and on emotional influencing factors (Etzioni, 1988; Bohmann, 
Hofbauer and Schülein, 2014; Hedtke, 2015; Mikl-Horke, 2015), which this 
thesis is focused on. Whether the theories are applicable in MSEs in the 
same way as in big enterprises remains debatable. The Third Section 
was the theory of the various ideologies reviewed, where I expected 
variations within the owner-CEO dyad. Differences between 
entrepreneurial ambition, investors’ involvement and family participation 
were discussed, which have an ostensible potential to influence the 
innovation capability through the owner-CEO interrelationship. 
Characteristics of the three possible enterprise ideologies were debated 
and reveal different structures of activities, resource control, business 
context, core competencies, time perspectives, and success criteria of the 
CEO and owner within the enterprise. 
This research has the objective of developing a theoretical and 
pragmatical contribution that reveals potential influences of the owner-
CEO interrelationship on the innovation capability of German MSEs. The 
three above-listed main literature fields of interests indicate a presumable 
rational influence of the owner-CEO interrelationship on the innovation 
capability. Consequently, the overarching research question that this 
thesis seeks to answer is: How does the owner-CEO interrelationship 
potentially influence the innovation capability of medium-sized technology 
enterprises? The main focus of this research will examine the owner-CEO 
interrelationship and identify potential entities that stimulate or constrain 
the innovation capability of the enterprise through the owner-CEO 
interrelationship. The interrelationship could also contain, beyond rational 
factors, emotional influencing factors and dynamics that are less examined 
in the above reviewed literature.  
The next chapter will focus on the methodology of how attempts to 
find answers regarding the conceivable owner-CEO interrelationship 
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influence the innovation capability in German MSEs. The method focuses 
on identifying different cases where I was expecting variations in the 
owner-CEO interrelationship in German MSEs. 
 
2.5 Scientific Implication 
The results of this study have implications both for the CEO´s and 
the owner’s interpretational role in the management and ownership of 
organisational innovation challenges and corporate governance, and for 
further research on such innovation influences.  
First, this research provides a new perspective in respect to the 
influences of the owner-CEO interrelationship on the innovation capability 
of German MSEs. Previous researchers have had their focus more on the 
behaviour of the top management (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997), focused on psychological and situational mechanisms, and have 
tended to look at the internal workings of the enterprise and ignored the 
influences of the owner-CEO interrelationship. Governance researchers 
and researchers in psychology and sociology have extensively studied 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), and team production theory (Blair and 
Stout, 1999),which depicts top management, particularly in large modern 
corporations, under different motivational (Hall and Lindzey, 1957; Procter 
and Vu, 2006; Gregory, 2004) aspects, never with the emphasis on 
innovation capability and interrelationship influences. 
In this thesis, I propose different psychological, sociological, and 
situational interrelationship influences. An interest of the study is to bring 
agency theory, stewardship theory, and team production theory face to 
face with varying ideologies. This research has its focus on the owner-
CEO interrelationship and opens up for further research additional 
research windows of influence into the organisation. 
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 The current study secondly examines the potential influences of 
various ideologies on the owner-CEO interrelationship in a different aspect 
than other scholars (Johannisson and Huse, 2000) have done, and 
reveals that the personalised embodiment in the enterprise, the owner-
CEO interrelationship, has a significant influence on the innovation 
capability of the entire organisation through interrelationship influences. By 
examining various ideologies under different owner structures, using 
qualitative approaches in real business cases and involving owners, CEOs 
and area managers, we can better understand the conceptions and 
misconceptions that owners and CEOs hold about their interrelationship 
support in German MSEs. This should generate interest in further 
research under a more dynamic approach.  
Third, of further interest to enlighten the individual pattern and 
procedures are the differences of psychological and cognitive distinction 
between owner and CEO. These differences are not to be underestimated. 
Business is mostly rationally oriented. Numbers stand in the foreground. 
Individual interests are often conceptualised as rational or moneyed 
interests. The emotional influences of interests are rarely considered. This 
study is primarily focused on the social and situational interrelationship 
influence factors that shape the owner-CEO interrelationship and thus 
seeks answers and contribution to knowledge. 
  
68 
 
Chapter 3 
3 Methodology 
This thesis develops an in-depth description and analysis of the 
three cases in respect to the owner-CEO interrelationship influences on 
the innovation capability and identifies whether social and situational 
influences have potential to influence the innovation capability of the 
enterprise. The chapter begins firstly with the general philosophy and 
methodological paradigm statement underpinning the research. The 
second section moves on to present the researcher’s social situation to 
the phenomena under examination and moves on then to present, in 
Section Three, the research design. In Section Four, I explain the data 
collection methods in detail and provide in Section Five an overview of the 
kind and the nature of data and the interviewing strategy. Section Six then 
moves on to consider the analytical approach of this study. Section Seven 
offers the ethical consideration of this study, which is aligned to the ethics 
of the University of Bradford. This chapter ends, finally, in Section Eight, in 
the conclusion section. 
Research design should take account of epistemology and should 
understand the philosophical concern, and hence formal research design 
needs to focus on different issues (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 
2011): a methodological research strategy linked to the nature of 
knowledge, the research question formulated and the context of the 
research (Silverman, 2005).  
 
3.1 Philosophical and Methodological Perspective 
This section offers an overview of the applied principal 
epistemology and ontology that is primarily used in this social research 
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and how the epistemology and ontology lead to, and are expressed in, 
different ways of conceiving and undertaking the present study. 
 
3.1.1 Ontological Standpoint 
Pragmatism ontology is my predominantly adopted ontological 
standpoint for this thesis. It was established in the late 19th century by 
Charles Sanders Peirce (Gronow, 2011). Essentially, practical 
consequences or real effects are the important components of meaning 
and truth. Truth is determined by context and interpretation. Pragmatism 
views knowledge as transitive: what is true will shift over time. Our social 
constructions are bounded by the tolerance of an external reality that 
exists independently of our cognitive processes (Johnson, and Duberley, 
2010). Reality exists and acts independently of human activities, and 
therefore reality is not endlessly submissive in respect to the vicarious play 
of the transitive language games, metaphors and paradigms deployed by 
human agents (Johnson and Duberley, 2010, p. 157).  
The more contemporary pragmatism scientist Richard Rorty 
(1979, 1983) argued that knowledge is not and cannot be the result of the 
mind´s eye, looking at a reflection of the world in a mirror located in the 
mind. Instead he advanced the idea that knowledge will be socially 
justified if it is supported by the pragmatic consensus of people in mutually 
intelligible linguistic communication within a specific community (Johnson 
and Duberley, 2010). Rorty (1979, 1983) came to the final position that 
truth is a changeable artefact. 
William James (1994) considered thought as an instrument for 
problem solving and action, and was convinced that knowledge, concepts, 
meaning, and science are best viewed in terms of their practical use and 
success. The concept of truth follows a process of verification, direct or 
indirect, and finds reality in results from practical acting and not from 
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visions and missions. Hence, success defines what is true and what is not 
(James, 1994). James intimates that communication is an important 
mechanism to evaluate thoughts and realities, and is a crucial instrument 
for action (Gronow, 2012). In the context of business generated out of a 
concept by verification, a performance and hence a result is revealed in 
the outcome, which will enable me to evaluate the owner-CEO potential 
influence on the innovation capability.  
 
3.1.2 Researcher´s Epistemology 
The epistemology behind this study is focused on practical applied 
research and integrating different perspectives to help interpret the data 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2011). Observable phenomena 
and subjective meanings can provide acceptable knowledge, depending 
upon the research question (Gill and Johnson, 2010, p. 191). Knowledge 
under the pragmatic consensus will be socially justified of people in 
mutually intelligible communication within a specific community. The idea 
is that reality is determined by people rather than by objective and external 
factors. Reality is verified by its pragmatical success (James, 1994). Social 
scientists do not measure how often certain patterns occur but appreciate 
the different constructions and meanings that people place upon their 
experience. The focus lies on what people, individually and collectively, 
are thinking and feeling, and attention should be paid to the ways they 
communicate with each other, whether verbally or non-verbally (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2011). 
A multiple case study research was chosen because it helped to 
be understood through interactions with others in the social process 
(Starks and Brown Trinidad, 2007), and tried to develop an in-depth 
understanding of different single cases or to explore an issue or problem 
using the case as a specific illustration (Creswell, 2013). Multiple case 
study research involves the examination of different cases within a real-
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life, contemporary context or setting (Yin, 2009), and stands in close 
consensus to the pragmatical approach, which has enabled me to find in 
three different cases with different ideological orientations an answer to 
the research question. This methodology will generate an in-depth 
understanding through data rather than through prior hypotheses, and it 
will be identifying no single site at the outset, but will rather use a process 
of theoretical cases of successive sites’ sources, selected to test or to 
refine new ideas as they emerge from the interview and observation data 
(Silverman, 2013, p. 73).In this thesis, three real-life, contemporary 
bounded cases are explored over time, through detailed, in-depth data 
collection, involving multiple sources of information, interviews, 
observations, audio-visual material, documents, and reports. 
 
3.2 Researchers´ Social Situation 
The particular research questions being explored in this thesis 
arise directly from my own experience of almost fifteen years as an owner 
and manager of MSEs. This started with eight years’ responsibility for a 
strategic investment entity in the airport construction business as CEO, 
with no shares in the company and with a varyingly responsible board of 
director members who represented the ownership structure. This was 
followed by a spell of six years as a minority owner and CEO of two 
German MSEs in a machine tool building enterprise and automation 
segment, with different financial investors and changing approaches after 
a switch of the majority owner. Today I am the owner of a few financial 
and trade interests in different segments of German MSEs, and the CEO 
in an engineering office. It would be naive to believe that my experience 
does not bring many inevitable biases, prejudices, and stereotypical 
perspectives to the phenomena under study (Silverman, 2013; Creswell, 
2013). While the research question and the interest of this study emerge 
partly from these interests and experiences, I am aware of the need to 
ensure the findings and theoretical contribution are exclusively manifested 
out of the generated data from the involved participants. 
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3.3 Research Design 
The multiple case study design of three different enterprises 
seems to be the most appropriate method to analyse the potential owner-
CEO interrelationship influences on the innovation capability in MSEs 
under three different dominating ideologies and enabled me to find 
answers to my research question. Hence, cases were selected that 
provide differences in the dominant ideology. Three cases provide data to 
examine and illustrate the interrelationship complexity (Creswell, 2013). A 
theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989a) approach is used with the aim of 
developing inductively an in-depth understanding of three single cases 
through qualitative analysis of the data. 
The qualitative research design is led by the main research 
question, specified in Chapter 2, and by the scope of the thesis (Figure 1): 
interrelationship, ideologies, and innovation capability. Agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), stewardship theory (David, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997), and team production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999) 
provide a solid scientific basis for the study. Contrasting ideologies of the 
ownership structure (Johannisson and Huse, 2000) within family firms, 
investor-owned entities and other ownership constellations in German 
MSEs could also likely influence the conduct and togetherness between 
owner and CEO.  
 
3.3.1 The Participants’ Profile 
Interviews were conducted with one owner and one CEO from 
each case. Additional interviews were held with individuals (advisors, 
second tier managers11, and persons in close contact) who might provide 
                                            
11 Second tier managers are persons who report directly to the CEO in the 
enterprise and could have direct relations to the ownership and have strong interrelations 
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an alternative perspective on the specific phenomenon being explored. 
Table 2 provides a list of all the interviewees. 
 
Table 2: Participants’ profile 
 
 From the ten interviewed individuals, there was one female and 
nine males. The low number of female participants could result from the 
technological focus in the selected enterprises (IfM, 2014; 2016). The 
female participant enriched this study. The owners were all over 50 years 
old, with the median age being 62 years. The youngest was 50 and the 
oldest 74 years old. The youngest CEO was 42 and the oldest 50 years 
old, hence the average CEO age was 46 years old. The oldest advisor 
                                                                                                                       
with the CEO, and so are able to give an opinion on the owner-CEO interrelationship and 
thereby help to give a more objective view of the description of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship; this helps the researcher to get a triangulation on the examined 
phenomenon.   
 In 
enter-
prise 
since 
Current 
position
since 
Age Gender Qualification of 
the field expert 
Entrepreneurial 
owner (Case A) 
1999 2005 50 male Information 
scientist 
Entrepreneurial 
CEO (Case A) 
2001 2001 50 male Engineer 
Entrepreneurial 
advisor (Case A) 
2005 2005 56 male Master of 
business 
Managerial 
owner (Case B) 
2000 2009 62 male Management 
expert 
Managerial  
CEO (Case B) 
2010 2010 46 male Master of 
business 
Managerial 
advisor (Case B) 
2007 2007 57 male Master of 
business 
Managerial 
2ndtiermanager 
(Case B) 
2007 2007 58 male Master of 
business 
Paternalistic 
owner (Case C) 
1980 2008 74 male Master of 
business 
Paternalistic  
CEO (Case C) 
2008 2008 42 female Master of 
business 
Paternalistic 
advisor (Case C) 
2013 2013 56 male Engineer 
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was 57, the youngest 56, hence they were a similar age, like the owners. 
Consequently, the youngest participant was 42 years old and the oldest 74 
years old, which was the management team of the paternalistic dominated 
enterprise. The average age of all participants was 55 years.  
The CEOs had been around nine years, on average, in their position, 
whilst the owners had held their position for eight years in the examined 
enterprise, and so for a relatively equal period of time. The longest stay 
(35 years) was by the paternalistic dominated owner in the examined 
enterprise. The owners had stayed for 22 years in the medium, while the 
CEOs in the medium had stayed for eight years. On average, all 
participants had stayed for ten years in the enterprise and eight years in 
their current position. Seven of ten participants had an economics 
education and only three participants had a technological graduation. Two 
of the three technology educated participants belonged to the 
entrepreneurial oriented enterprise. The third one was an advisor in the 
paternalistic oriented enterprise. Nine of the ten participants had a high 
school graduation, one participant had professional training. The majority 
of the participants were male, had education relating to economics, and all 
participants were older than 42. Younger people were not represented in 
the three cases under examination in the top management. Principally the 
participants were male, mid-fifties, business people in the examined 
technology-related enterprises. 
 
3.3.2 Case Selection 
In qualitative research, case selection depends on five effects 
(Morse, 2000), namely the scope of the study, the nature of the topic, the 
quality of the data, the study design, and the use of shadowed data. The 
approach involves the use of purposive case selection methods to recruit 
cases and participants who have experienced the phenomenon under 
study. It relies on (theoretical) sampling, recruiting participants with 
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differing experiences of the phenomenon so as to explore multiple 
dimensions of the social process under study (Starks and Brown Trinidad, 
2007, p. 1374 – 5). I chose three cases finally, out of more potential cases 
that I knew from my professional life, which I observed over a longer time 
and who could fit the preferred cases with contrasting dominated 
ideologies that potentially might have different perspectives on the 
interrelationship and innovation capability (Creswell, 2013).  
On the basis of my many years of experience I had a relatively 
wide knowledge of German medium-sized technology enterprises. 
Sometimes I knew the CEO, the owner, advisors, or senior managers. I 
contacted them in a personal meeting or on the phone and explained my 
endeavour; I interviewed them shortly after to find out if they were 
interested in the study. Various potential participants had no real interests, 
no time, or other reasons to join, and not all enterprises fitted the 
parameters. The finally selected cases had a clearer orientation towards 
one dominant ideology and an available owner-CEO dyad (Yin, 2009).I 
aimed to avoid cases that might have a confusion of ideologies because 
this would over-complicate the analysis. In the beginning there were seven 
enterprises and initial meetings were held with each of them. Four 
enterprises had a more managerial dominated ideology, two a dominant 
entrepreneurial ideology, and one a paternalistic dominant ideology. The 
selection of the entrepreneurial enterprise was easier in respect that one 
of the selected enterprises was not willing to support the whole 
examination, because of too big a workload. The selection of the 
managerial enterprise was more difficult. One enterprise was busy with a 
merger project, another lacked chemistry in the interview and was difficult 
and in a third, I doubted that the owner would take the project seriously 
enough. Finally, three cases were selected (Asmussen and Creswell, 
1995): a typical family enterprise with a paternalistic oriented structure, a 
managerial oriented enterprise, and an entrepreneurial oriented 
enterprise. Two of the three cases I knew before, one came from the 
suggestion of another owner. These three selected cases did help to 
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explore the real-business dynamic and the owner-CEO interrelationship, 
involving multiple sources of information, as detailed below. 
 
3.4 The Data Collection Method 
The objective of this study is to contribute to a theoretical 
understanding and hence a conceptual model of how the owner-CEO 
interrelationship potentially influences the innovation capability, particularly 
in MSEs. The intention is to develop or discover a theoretical relational 
model or abstract analytical schema of the phenomenon (owner-CEO 
interrelationship) that relates to a particular situation, -rather than the 
description or application of existing theories (Silverman, 2013, p. 67). 
Data collection needed to be extensive and draw on multiple sources of 
information (Creswell, 2013; Yin 2009). The intent of this qualitative 
research is not to generalise the information, but to elucidate the particular 
and the specific (Pinnegar and Daynes, 2007). I followed Yin (2009), and 
in addition to interview data, I collected observations and secondary data 
on the case studies. I was interested in eliciting the participant´s definitions 
of terms, situations, and events, and trying to tap into his or her 
assumptions, implicit meanings and feelings, and tacit rules (Silverman, 
2013). This study reflects the developmental experiences of majority 
owners, minority owners, CEOs, business advisors and second tier 
managers. Interviews were held with ten individuals in total (three to four 
in each case), accompanied by observations and document analysis 
(Creswell, 2013). The qualitative data were collected under the best 
practice of gaining permissions, case selection, recording information, 
storing the data, and anticipating ethical issues that may arise (Creswell, 
2013, p. 145), as detailed in the section below (Ethical Considerations). 
Each individual participated in one to three interviews with the same 
interviewer. A structured interview protocol was designed to ensure 
continuity across the interviews. Through constant comparative analysis 
(Creswell, 2013), the researcher modified questions in order to explore 
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emerging issues that related to the research question. Field notes were 
maintained during each interview.  
During the selection of the cases, and in getting to know the 
participants, pilot interviews were initiated to convince the participants and 
also to test the right interview structure. The beginnings of the first semi-
structured interviews were quite confusing, but this helped me to 
concentrate on the essentials. These ‘getting to know interviews’ were not 
used for the analysis, but just to help with the structure. These meetings 
were quite different, and differentiated by a brief discussion between two 
meetings and an invitation for lunch; they took from 10 minutes to more 
than two hours. The final interviews ranged from one to two hours each 
and were conducted as semi-structured interviews, recorded and 
transcribed. The structure of the interviews followed five different 
categories, all according to how the owner-CEO interrelationship could 
potentially influence the innovation capability: social interrelationship 
conduct, individual owner-CEO interests that affect the interrelationship, 
exogeneous influences within the interrelationship, ideological differences, 
and individual and collective actions that support innovation capability. In 
connection with the semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire was 
necessary to characterise and specify social, psychological, and 
situational interrelationship influences. The interviews were guided by field 
notes and observational protocols to identify emotions that have potential 
to influence - by the owner-CEO interrelationship - the innovation 
capability. Especially through enterprise sightseeing tours and closer 
examinations of the structured interview questions, field notes about the 
real-business observations were quite revealing and substantiated the 
evidence of participants’ statements in order to identify the impact of 
everyday mutual emotions. Emotions are an integral and inseparable part 
of organisational life (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995), and in respect to the 
research question are likely functional. The fieldnotes supported the 
recorded interviews by providing data on the interviewees’ actions and 
behaviours (Ngonyo Njoroge and Yazdanifard, 2014). Mainly, the 
interviews followed their pre-structure except for one interview, which 
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started quite confusedly and unstructured. In this case, it was quite difficult 
to get the given structure back. After transcript and analysis of the data, 
ambiguous statements were checked with the interviewee. But generally, 
the given structure was open enough to allow the interviewees to provide 
in–depth answers and explanations that expanded on the original research 
question. While some interviews might have started cautiously, after a 
period of time the interviewee-researcher relationship got deeper and the 
interviewees became more open. 
 
3.5 The Nature of Data 
Transcripts, field notes, and, if available, documents like annual 
reports, strategic documents, enterprise brochures, and internal strategic 
action plans were examined. A set of reliable data was necessary to 
generate a theoretical model from the evidence (Creswell, 2013) of the 
owners, CEOs, advisors and second tier managers. The intent in this 
study was to elucidate the particular owner-CEO interrelationship that 
might potentially influence the innovation capability of the enterprise and 
not to generalise (Pinnegar and Daynes, 2007). An ongoing interaction 
between researcher and data was necessary (Suddaby 2006) and 
practised progressively. 
 
 
3.6 The Analytical Approach 
Field notes, documents, observations and interview pages were 
analysed. Many questions were revealed in respect to the mountain of 
paper and data: How can you make sense out of the data to create a 
useful theory? Did you get it right? How can you combine all the empirical 
social realities reflected by the collected data into a theoretical 
interpretation? Are the data and interpretations of emotions and feelings 
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reliable and valid by the chosen standard? How can you manage the 
unavoidable biases, prejudices, and stereotypical perceptions? How is it 
possible to bring all analysis together to create a theoretical model of the 
area under research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990)? How is it possible to 
analyse the participants under agent, stewardship, or team production 
theory? 
The data analysis procedure followed Yin (2009) in terms of tools, 
processes and recommendations for actions to help analyse the collected 
material in order to create a systematic development of an in-depth 
understanding and a theoretical contribution to the phenomena under 
study. Potential variations in how the owner-CEO interrelationship 
influence the innovation capability were qualitatively analysed and 
interpreted in different measurement areas:  owner and CEO innovation 
input and their inter-communication and collaboration behaviour, 
information flow, strategic orientation and leadership to innovation, culture 
and structure of corporate governance (Adams, Bessant and Phelps, 
2006).The systematic approach provides confidence that the study is 
reliable and valid in respect to the cause-effect reality (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2010). At the completion of the data collection, each experience 
description was thoroughly and systematically examined and, with the 
support of assisted/aided qualitative data analysis software (NVivo12), 
evaluated in German. In general, the researcher let the data speak. Data 
were analysed through three phases of coding: open, axial, and selective 
– as advanced by Strauss and Corbin (1998). In this method, a theoretical 
model: a “relational model of the owner-CEO dyad” (Figure 2) was 
developed.  
During open coding, each transcript was analysed in sentences or 
groups of sentences reflecting single ideas. These units were given a code 
to reflect that idea or concept (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In axial coding, 
52 codes in German were worked out and selected. In selective coding, 
                                            
12 NVivo is a qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software package 
produced by QSR International 
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the concepts were ultimately organised into one central category or “What 
the research is all about” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 146). Selective 
coding ended in a concentration of 13 groups of codes (first in German 
then translated into English). These groups of codes were finally 
separated into three categories: social interrelationship influences with five 
sub-influences, psychological interrelationship influences with four sub-
influences, and situational interrelationship influences with four sub-
influences. Properties, as attributes of the categories, were identified for 
each of the categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). By constant 
comparative analysis, each participant´s response compared and 
connected to others as categories, properties, and dimensions emerged 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Finally, out of the 13 selective codes, six 
social interrelationship influences emerged: action, communication, 
autonomy, power, responsibility, and support (Table 9), which have 
significant impact potential on the innovation capability of the studied 
German MSEs. The 13 selective codes were translated into English and 
discussed over a long time with the supervisors to find a translation from 
German to English that was very close in meaning.  
 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
 This research agrees to conduct empirical research involving 
human participants in line with the university ethical research guidelines13 
(Ethics Checklist EC1897). The researcher ensures that participation in 
this research activity is based on an informed consent. The researcher is 
honest in all relationships with research participants and is transparent as 
to the context and purpose of data collection. It is guaranteed that the 
researcher will be respectful of the confidentiality of the collected 
information. Equally, the researcher respects the rights and well-being of 
all individuals and organisations affected by this research. It was and will 
be ensured that respondents are not harmed or adversely affected by their 
                                            
13 http://www.bradford.ac.uk/rkts/documentsandforms/resources-
category/ethics-resources/ 
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research activities. The researcher respects the needs of participating 
individuals and organisations and the requirements of the University of 
Bradford in meeting the academic requirements. The results of the 
research, design, and its operationalisation have been discussed with the 
supervisors prior to conducting the research, to ensure that the above 
principles have been adequately considered (Howorth, 2014). Ethics 
approval has been granted by the Chair of the Humanities, Social and 
Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 
5th June 2015. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out in clear stages the influence behind the 
research design and the methodological research strategy. It has explored 
the nature of reality and knowledge as well as the context of the research 
and the research question (Silverman, 2005). It started by discussing the 
philosophical and methodological perspective, the ontological standpoint 
and the research epistemology. Section Two presented the researcher’s 
social situation and the research approach. Finally, the chapter set out the 
method of data collection, included the kind and nature of the idea, the 
analytical approach and the itemisation of the audience of the research. All 
this provided the methodological foundations to answer the research 
question: “How does the owner-CEO interrelationship potentially influence 
the innovation capability of medium-sized technology enterprises?” 
             The following chapters start with the description of the 
three different cases and the ownership structure of each, segmented in 
different ideological orientation. Originals and rationales are discussed, 
followed by an individual description of the acting persons, owner and 
CEO and their interrelationship structure, and finally by their plans for the 
future - to identify interrelationship influence potential in respect to the 
innovation capability of the enterprise.     
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    Chapter 4 
4 Description of Cases 
This chapter has been divided into three main areas, providing an 
overview of each of the three cases. Table 3 identifies the ownership 
ideology of each case and presents further information about the CEO and 
owner’s perspective. These themes will be explored further by using a 
narrative for each enterprise. In-depth case descriptions are separated 
into four sections.  
Table 3: Owner´s and CEO´s characteristics 
 
Section One of each case provides the origins and rationale of the 
enterprise, explaining the history and the chronology of the events. This is 
followed by Section Two, where the key actors14 of the interrelationship 
                                            
14Advisors and 2nd tier managers are not key players and act mainly behind the 
scenes; they advised the owner and the CEO of the enterprise and were able to give 
clear references to the owner-CEO interrelationship. According to that, these actors are 
not the main actors and so this is not described in detail. However, the data they provided 
is very insightful regarding the owner-CEO interrelationship. 
Owner’s enterprise 
ideology 
Case A 
Entrepreneurial oriented 
ownership structure 
Case B 
Managerial 
 oriented ownership 
structure 
Case C 
Paternalistic oriented 
ownership structure 
Ownership Structure Strategic Investor Finance Investor Family Investor 
Predominant CEO Model 
of Man 
Steward/Agent/Team Agent Agent 
Predominant Owner 
Model of Man 
Steward/Team Agent Agent 
CEO’s Ideology Entrepreneurial / 
Managerial 
Managerial Managerial 
Owner’s Ideology Entrepreneurial Managerial/ 
Capitalistic 
Paternalistic 
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are evaluated, in terms of the role, make-up, and function of the actors. 
Section Three moves on to explain the owner-CEO interrelationship in 
each enterprise in order to provide a basis for more detailed analysis in 
later chapters. Section Four, finally, offers a view into the plans for the 
future of each enterprise in order to understand their approach to 
innovation.  
 
4.1 Case A: Entrepreneurial Oriented Ownership Structure 
 Case A was selected because prior observation and my initial 
interview indicated that the dominant ideology appeared to be that of an 
entrepreneurial oriented enterprise. The owner, the CEO and an advisor 
were interviewed and internal strategic documents and the web-page were 
analysed. 
 
4.1.1 Origins and Rationale 
The entrepreneurial oriented enterprise is a trailblazer in European 
nanotechnology and was founded as a spin-off from a university institute.  
It has established itself as a leading international integrated systems 
provider for high-performance surfaces since it began operating in 1999. 
Right from the start, the enterprise pursued the goal of turning scientific 
visions and the benefits of new materials into commercially successful 
products and positioning itself as a strategic innovation company. The 
entrepreneurial oriented enterprise moved through its start-up and 
foundation phase through all conceivable periods: from the dream to 
change the world through to great disasters and close to insolvency before 
it was able to position itself as a leading, international integrated system 
house for high-performance surfaces and as an established innovation 
partner in the automotive, transport, machinery and plant engineering, 
building and interior, sport and leisure industries.  
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 One of the current owners is still the main driver and decision 
maker in the enterprise. His strategic and visionary intention has changed 
many times, and according to their own statement, the enterprise moves 
now to “Phase5” together with him.  “The current vision is to develop the 
enterprise as a leading international integrated system provider for high-
performance surfaces that is able to enhance materials and surfaces with 
new properties and make the benefits of nanotechnology accessible for 
companies and consumers” (owner’s statement) and follows the short 
slogan: “Touch us every day”. The main written (internet presence, 
strategic documents, marketing brochure) and verbal articulated meanings 
by the owner, CEO and 2nd tier staff in the enterprise are the words 
“innovation” and “growth”. They carry out quite coherently the intention of 
the enterprise and also of the owner and CEO of the enterprise in order to 
transform this vision to other partners, customers, employee investors and 
shareholders.     
  An R&D department is integrated with a budget of more than 
fifteen percent of the turnover, which surpasses the average of German 
MSEs (PwC, 2016). New technologies, ideas, and innovation were 
promoted out of this budget and purposefully applied. The R&D 
department is instructed to generate new applications for existing 
customers and new potential partners in the market to fulfil the strategic 
target. 
The enterprise is flatly organised with self-organised internal 
groups, including customer ties. Trust is the major relationship basis in the 
enterprise and the company also, amongst other things, favours the use of 
detailed qualitative information as the basis for new venture creation. The 
successive emergence of new lines of business conforms to the vision of 
the enterprise. The time frame of the acting players is long-term and is 
guided by the spontaneous action of the CEO. Core competence is 
wrapped in willpower and intuition generation, and enforces market and 
technology development, guided by a huge portion of market and 
technology knowledge. The main success criterion for the owner is to 
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internally generate enough cash to finance the expansion of the 
enterprise. The main challenge is to finance all these innovations. “We are 
not primarily profit oriented” pointed out the owner. With that argument, 
and characteristics of the business, the enacted ideology in this case is 
near instant entrepreneurialism (Johannisson and Huse, 2000), and this, 
hence, depicts the ownership ideology. 
The owner and the CEO of the entrepreneurial case study are 
convinced that there is only one successful and sustainable way for a 
profitable growth of the enterprise to move into strong customer loyalty - 
by innovation partnership (owner´s statement).  With a common view to 
make the enterprise successful there has evolved a strong business 
friendship between the owner and the CEO.  
 
4.1.1.1 Entrepreneurial Owner´s Characteristics  
The entrepreneurial owner was one of the founding members of 
the enterprise in 1999, is 50 years old at the time of study, male and since 
2005 in the current position; he currently holds around five percent of the 
enterprise shares (95% are in diversified holdings). He is an educated 
computer scientist and became a master of business administration. After 
his university education, he started his career in a big international 
company in the consulting business and soon became the head of the 
strategic department. After a few years in this position he realised that he 
had no chance of effecting change in a big enterprise so he sought to 
follow his impatient and alterable individual compulsion and decided to 
change to a small start-up company, where postgraduates tried to 
establish a new idea of surface technology that was copied from nature 
(the lotus flower effect). In his clear and target-oriented character he 
structured the start-up in such a way that an entrepreneurial enterprise 
with tradable attributes could emerge. Fellow campaigners from this time 
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told me about the enthusiasm and passion of the current owner, which, it 
seems, has not changed in general since this time.  
In the interviews, the owner was perceived to be a confident 
strategic investor and driver with a sociable character towards employees 
and partners, open to new experiences and endowed with a structured 
conscientiousness and cooperativeness in contact with other people. The 
entrepreneurial owner has much enthusiasm, concern, and exhibits 
empathy in his daily environment to his employees and partners, which 
could have significant positive effects on individuals’ creativity (Mumford, 
Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002) and hence to the organisational 
innovation capability. The owner appeared to stand behind the CEO and 
his employees and support them if necessary. He stood still in his position 
as a founder of a start-up but developed his own personal ability further, to 
be an enterprise driver with professional skills, enough to lead a current 
big MSE into the next step of a technology corporation without losing 
contact with his followers or with his ideas and visions. The owner appears 
to be a team player and acts predominantly as an entrepreneur who is 
aware about the importance of running interrelationships. Analysis 
suggested that the owner is willing to take risks, is proactive and is the 
main innovation driver in the company (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011). Trust is 
the advance base to control resources and to generate the growth of 
successive emergence of new lines of business, which is mandatorily 
flanked with a professional portion of educated managerial skills, routine 
and professionalism (Johannisson and Huse, 2000; Johannisson 2000; 
2002). 
The owner’s model of man follows self-actualising interests and 
seems to be guided by collective serving (Davis, Donald and Schoorman, 
1997). The enterprise, with its organisation, culture and people, is a 
source of success for the owner. On the basis of the intrinsic growth 
achievement and the self-actualising interests, the motivation of the owner 
seems to be on higher order needs associated with a high value 
commitment to the enterprise interest. On that basis, the involvement 
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orientation of the owner-as-management philosophy is accepted and 
requested by the CEO. A similar objective for the owner and the enterprise 
is performance enhancement and profitable growth. The leadership style 
as a part of the cultural alignment is more collective, transformational 
(Bono and Judge, 2004) and based at a low power distance in the 
direction of the CEO and also to the management level and, with the 
increasing size of the enterprise, steadily less to the employees (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). This analysis indicated that the owner 
is acting predominantly according to stewardship theory and hence as a 
steward (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). 
 
4.1.1.2 CEO Characteristics  
The CEO, a 50-year-old (at the time of study) male engineer who 
received his degree as a process technician at a German university and 
worked till he switched from a big technological enterprise two years after 
the start-up period in 2001 to the examined enterprise and became CEO 
at the same time. He started his career with the development and product 
introduction of complex polymer systems and was later in control of the 
overall activities in plant engineering for an MSE, where he was an 
authorised signatory and member of the management board. At the time 
of study, the CEO holds less than one percent of the shares of the 
enterprise. 
In the interviews, the CEO came across as a confident and calm 
person who has the same ideals as the owner. The CEO´s mind-set, and 
also the conviction, together with the owner, were astonishingly similar in 
strategic topics. The CEO appeared to be less extrovert than the owner. 
He appears more reserved without losing his clear leadership aspirations 
but steps back into the second tier in the direct contact or presence of the 
owner, but alone he took his responsibility proactively. The analysis 
indicated that he acts quite effectively and in a direct and organised way 
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by his individual structure. In the contact with employees he appears 
factual, predictable, listens seriously to the arguments and decides in a 
common and comprehensible sense, and appears friendly and 
empathetic. The CEO appeared to act comprehensively in the interests of 
the enterprise in a close connection and synergy with his owner. The 
direct owner-CEO interrelationship is revealed as complementary, 
symbiotic and mutually beneficial, and each one of the two players knows 
what he has with his counterpart. The CEO leads his employees with 
power, trust, respect, loyalty, and admiration, which is accompanied by a 
transformational leadership style (Bono and Judge, 2004).  
In interviews the CEO indicates that he is power and responsibility 
oriented in the daily business and is aligned with enhancing the 
performance of the enterprise and focuses on a collective way of thinking 
and acting to achieve business growth. The motivation of the CEO seems 
to be intrinsically flanked by higher order needs, combined with 
technological and factual responsibility and power. His social comparison 
seems to be quite compatible with his owner.  The preceding analysis 
presents the CEO as a team player with psychological and situational 
factors that predispose the individual with an approach aligned to a 
stewardship relationship (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). In 
comparison to the owner, the CEO appears to be more management 
orientated and market oriented with potential and possible influence, is 
quite structured and systematic in his activities (Johannisson and Huse, 
2000, Johannisson, 2000). 
 
4.1.2 Owner-CEO Interrelationship 
The entrepreneurial dominated enterprise owner describes the 
fundamental interrelationship with his CEO as more and more open 
(owner´s view). This was not always like this, apparently. The owner 
mentioned that his interrelationship experiences with other people started 
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non-committally and grew more and more over time. “For a dependent 
employed person, it could be critical to argue to open your interests and 
intentions at a too early stage, because no one likes to place his own 
career in jeopardy” (owner). For this reason, the owner claims that he has 
become increasingly “softer and down to earth” in dealing with his CEO in 
order to reduce the inhibition level and take on more of his opinion. He is 
interested to meet face to face in a horizontal hierarchy and is aware that 
an innovation-driven company can only grow together. He mentioned that 
everything is in dynamic flow and growth in the enterprise, and this, 
incidentally, signifies the importance of communication and the willingness 
to change. What is right today could be wrong tomorrow, and this 
operational situation has also to be reflected in the interrelationship 
between the individuals. “It is important to set your employees an example 
of cooperation and demonstrate how to create a culture of trust” (owner). 
Trust, respect, care and communication play a crucial role between owner 
and CEO. “Do one step more than necessary and do it with more honest 
and respectful effort than expected and reveal your responsible 
leadership” (owner). The CEO and the owner discuss intensively how it is 
possible to cede power. “I like to cede power, I disempower myself” (owner 
and CEO, equally worded). The interviews with both actors indicate that 
they are aware of the importance to share power and responsibility and 
delegate it to the bottom of the enterprise (Avolio and Bass, 2004), and 
both are willing to transform this idea into the daily operation.  
Even though the owner and the CEO stand in specific competition, 
the exercise of power is successful and focused on the opportunity of 
action.  On the human side, the two actors are working confidently in the 
same direction, whilst at the factual level, competition is existing and leads 
to an atmosphere of constructive debate, guided by a corresponding 
information exchange. This appears in the way that the owner is able to 
lead the wishes and volition of his CEO. The owner transmits his desires 
to the CEO, who has to shape the enterprise in the owner´s interest. The 
owner defines the frames and the rules of acting, whilst the CEO is the 
seeming co-creator and implementer (Bernardy, 2014). Thereby the owner 
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leads the enterprise to a collective thinking and displaces individual 
interests (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). The owner raises the 
entrepreneurial influence of the CEO, elevating him in comparison to his 
own position and imparting the CEO in this way with a greater scope of 
action. The power of the owner to his CEO is impressionable by the 
intensification of the interrelationship (Bernardy, 2014).  
It remains unclear if the owner acts in this way consciously or not.  
The fact is that the CEO feels confident in the hands of the owner. Both 
actors experience the feeling of “I decide what we do here”, and this is 
achieved despite a parallel reduction of their own autonomy. It seems that 
both actors have found a common volition and have merged their 
particular volition to one common cause. Everybody takes a part of the 
responsibility to handle it well and both actors realise within their 
interrelationship that this is only possible if everybody takes one step back 
if it is required and tempers their own individual obligation of acting and 
finds explicit expression in the small and not standardised offices of the 
owner and the CEO. 
The analysis indicates that over the years of cooperation, they 
have become friends and know a lot about each other, even away from 
the daily business together. Operational tasks and private interests 
intermingle and are of common interest (Gallese, 2013). Beyond this 
action affinity I also perceived a coming together of foundational values in 
respect to the owner-CEO interrelationship. Ideology and social 
understanding in respect to the business and its environment are almost 
perfectly aligned and respectively complementary. The two actors have 
the feeling and desire to cooperate in one and the same direction, which 
leads so far to the position where both actors feel that they are at one with 
each other and able to “change the world a little bit” (owner). 
 
91 
 
4.1.3 Plans for the Future 
The owner and the CEO aim to push the existing entrepreneurial 
enterprise further - to becoming a leading international integrated system 
provider for high-performance surfaces and are intent on working to 
enhance materials and surfaces with new properties. The owner is willing 
to reach this goal: “even if I (he) have to turn everything topsy-turvy”, 
which is called “Phase 5” within the enterprise and is the fifth middle-term 
strategy since 2001 in the enterprise. The ownership is searching, 
together with the CEO, for new strategic investments, and wants to take 
over some established enterprises that fit into the strategic frame of the 
enterprise. The focus lies in the intention of new lines of business, new 
markets and the extension of the existing market position. “We go where 
our customer is and help them to innovate new products and technologies” 
(owner). There was a significant R&D budget of approximately 15% in 
2014, and this was expected to be stabilised for the next few years in 
order to secure the technology status by continuous sustainable 
innovation. 
The next middle-term target of the enterprise is notified by a 
turnover of €100 million (2014, €68,5 m), which should be reached by an 
extension of organic growth, increasing internationalisation, expansion of 
the technology portfolio, mergers and acquisitions and an internal 
excellence program (internal strategic document).  
 
4.1.4 Summary of Case A 
The interviews indicate that the owner-CEO interrelationship is 
based on a partnership guided by mutual trust, respect, and a 
togetherness through shared interest and collective serving (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997) and an entrepreneurial heterogeneous 
team approach (Discua Cruz, Howorth and Hamilton, 2013). Analysis 
92 
 
indicates that this could be positively related to the innovation capability of 
the enterprise (Johannisson, and Huse, 2000; Monge, Cozzens and 
Contractor, 1992; Amabile, 1996; Cotgrove and Box, 1970; Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997).  Individuals stand in the foreground. 
The analysis indicates too that the owner and the CEO like people, and 
are protective towards each other, which assisted the innovation theory of 
Van de Ven (1986). Furthermore, it supports the interest to share power 
(Avolio and Bass, 2004), and the innovation activity in the enterprise. The 
interviews indicated that the owner is the pacemaker in respect to 
innovation activities in the enterprise and the CEO is the implementer 
(Bessant, 2014). A crucial factor is the willingness to change and 
communicate: to change themselves and change processes and finally the 
entire enterprise. This interrelationship behaviour appears to have an 
important influence on the innovation capability and will be further 
evaluated in the next chapter. 
 
4.2 Case B: Managerial Oriented Ownership Structure 
Case B was selected because prior observation and my initial 
interview indicated that the dominant ideology appeared to be that of a 
managerial oriented enterprise. The owner, the CEO, an advisor and a 2nd 
tier manager were interviewed and internal strategic documents and the 
web-page were analysed. 
 
4.2.1 Origins and Rationale 
The managerial oriented enterprise is a leading player in the area 
of gas tank and radiator closure technology and was founded in 1920.It 
was family-owned and was later sold, in the year 2006, to a private 
financial investor group. The enterprise described itself as an innovative 
solution-oriented entity and in selected areas as a global market leader. 
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The operational know-how is focused in the area of plastic injection 
moulding and the assembling of system components. In the year 2015 the 
enterprise bought two other small European enterprises in order to 
generate a more comprehensive product portfolio in the automotive gas 
tank area, and is endeavouring to establish the enterprise in a long-term 
view as an innovative system solution player. The enterprise also 
supplemented its firm´s name with the ancillary: “Innovative Closure 
Technology”, demonstrating an intent to signal an innovative technology 
enterprise. 
The analysis indicates that the enterprise is today more sales-
driven, whilst it was more directed in the past by the influence of the 
former family owner. Since the takeover, a more active global acquisition 
of the sales markets is recognisable, as well as an expansion of local 
assembly entities in the main important automotive production countries 
around the globe. An R&D department is integrated into the design 
department and generates new products associated with the daily 
business. A numerical financial budget is not defined for the R&D 
department and is generated by defined projects initiated by the CEO. 
The study indicates that activities in the enterprise are structured 
by the formalisation of the role of the owner and evident installed planning 
routines. The business context is defined in the strategy to a focus on 
market segments with potential, and success is measured as an increase 
of market shares. The time horizon is short term and less structured (CEO 
statement) to present activities in order to build a platform for future 
offensives (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). The success criteria are 
obviously economic result driven and the ROI is emphasised. The volume 
of significant dividends is the main success criterion in the enterprise for 
the owners. The CEO and the second management level realised that the 
owner is waiting for the right profitable offer for the enterprise in order to 
sell it to the next investor (CEO’s statement). Due to these findings of the 
analysis, the enterprise is identified as having a dominant managerialism 
ownership ideology (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). Strategic investor 
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interest is marginal. There is no significant cooperation or turning to 
advantage of synergies with other group entities (CEO’s statement). 
  Both the owner and the CEO pursue an increase in the profit 
and expansion of the market position in the automobile and commercial 
vehicle tank closure systems. Growth is the main target. The owner-CEO 
interrelationship is reduced to monthly meetings and votes by phone. A 
personal relationship with the acting persons could not be realised. The 
interrelationship is exclusively business-related (CEO) for a specific 
purpose. 
 
4.2.1.1 Managerial Owner´s Characteristics 
The managerial ownership structure includes two main investors, 
who hold around one third of the holding structure shares each, and two 
investors with minority shares. The two minority investors were investors 
when the business was founded and are more actively involved in the 
business, whereas the major shareholders are mostly silent investors. Of 
the two involved owners, one is the leading investor and most active, 
therefore this was the person interviewed and identified as the managerial 
oriented owner. The other minority investor is recognised as his deputy. 
The owner is a 62-year-old (at the time of study) Austrian business 
man with a focus on marketing and sales, with significant experience in 
brand management in the sectors of consumer goods and assembly 
goods for the building sector. For more than ten years he has been 
working for the financial investor group and enjoys absolute trust from the 
main shareholders. Currently, the owner’s interest is to replace himself 
within the next three years by his deputy (owner’s statement). He was 
defined by his CEO and second tier management as a calm, self-confident 
and reserved person. The risk orientation bias has shrunk over the years 
and currently, openness to new experiences is considered and careful. 
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Occasional mistrust reveals that whilst he is in other opportunities 
cooperative and friendly to the CEO, he is quite distanced from the second 
management level. Most activities are driven by controlling and cost-
cutting support. More precise budget adherence is the main focus. Critical 
questions occur directly when the monthly report reveals deviation from 
the budget.  
The owner appeared to be predominantly extrinsically motivated 
by lower economic needs: “Only profit counts!” (CEO’s statement). An 
element of risk adversity is prevalent, whilst the increasing value of the 
investment is superficial, as the target is to gain enough profit to pay out 
dividends as much as possible and to reach the ROI as soon as possible. 
Financial targets are in the foreground and extremely short-term related 
(CEO). Identification with the enterprise, the industry and the technology is 
marginal (CEO). It seems that the owner has less interest in 
understanding the products and the markets. The owner’s power is only 
taken by his institutional legitimation and is coercive. The analysis 
indicated that the owner compares his social status with other owners in 
the financial investor group and outside who have comparable functions. 
His management philosophy seems control-oriented, including his risk 
orientation, which is also risk-assessing, with the background of not 
endangering the budget target and hence the expected profit. The time 
frame and the acting horizon is predominantly short term and the objective 
is dominated by cost control, cost reduction and profit enhancement 
(CEO). The study indicates that the leadership culture is controlled by an 
imbalance in power and is driven to support the owner’s interest to 
generate profit and dividends. In general, it becomes clear that the 
owner’s behaviour follows individual economic interests and is self-
serving, even if verbally, collective targets were avowed (Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). Hence, it appeared that the owner in 
the managerialism enterprise acts mainly in accordance with principal 
agent theory. 
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4.2.1.2 CEO´s Characteristics 
The CEO of Case B is 46 years old at the time of study, male, has 
a German MBA, and has been working since 2010 in the current position. 
He worked before in other different holding companies as controller and 
consultant before he acquired his first position as CEO. His priority focus is 
the market and finance. Predominantly, product innovation and 
improvements are driven by the market, and so far, mainly by the CEO, 
even though he is no technician (CEO). The CEO is quite interested to 
explore the world in the area of the selected industry and tries to push the 
market and sales in new regions, and is following the big automobile 
manufacturers.   
Analysis indicated that the CEO is acting in his position confidently 
and tranquilly. There is no doubt that the CEO is the leader of the 
enterprise and the majority of decisions emerge only under the 
contribution of the CEO (second tier manager). Apart from that, the CEO is 
quite reserved and complains that employees are not independent and 
autonomous in their decision making. I perceived that he was on edge with 
this situation and likes to have employees who are able to work 
independently in his own sense. He vents that he is an inquisitive person 
but on the other hand he is also careful and scrutinising, and hence 
restricted in his openness to new experiences. In his daily business he 
appears quite effective and organised. When it comes to how he is acting 
in the direction of the organisational effectiveness, he is not that well-
structured. Cooperative and friendly on one hand, but also distrustful and 
condescending on the other hand, means that it is quite difficult for an 
employee to evaluate the CEO (Sand, 2012). 
 The motivation of the CEO appears as a mixture between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. On one hand he likes to make a 
difference and on the other hand he is interested to earn good and fast 
money. “I have also proposals from other enterprises. In the case that the 
payment is lucrative I will not exclude to terminate my job here” pointed 
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out the CEO.  In the interview he indicates that his interest in the history of 
the enterprise as an entity is marginal. The true picture seems quite 
incoherent. He is more interested in growth and as a salesman he 
evaluates his success through growth and result figures. Obviously, he is 
less interested in individuals and in interrelationships and has only limited 
team player skills. The analysis indicated that his social comparison is 
more with other managers than with his owner. He did not keep secret that 
he has a personal problem with his owner and is not satisfied in this 
relationship. “The owner is tired and not really interested in the future of 
the enterprise. This is in my eyes not enough; it is not sufficient” (CEO). 
He is full of hope that the existing owner will be replaced by his successor. 
The CEO takes his power and responsibility directly from his legitimate 
position. Deep interest in the enterprise and the acting person at second 
tier level are marginal, which he expresses directly and consciously.  
 The CEO’s risk orientation is limited but existing, especially for 
new markets and customers with clear risk estimation. His management 
philosophy appears similar to that of the owner, control oriented by 
numbers and figures, certainly with a middle-term timeframe. With this 
controlling mode he is able to be aloof with employees. The CEO 
articulates precisely that he does not like to have a too close connection 
and nearness to employees. “Let us have a distance in this relationship,” 
he is quoted as saying. He is more the economic and self-serving man in 
his behaviour and due to these factors, the CEO’s position could be 
theoretically defined as an agent (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 
1997), as indicated in the analysis.   
 
4.2.2 Owner-CEO Interrelationship 
The owner-CEO interrelationship appeared on the surface 
professional and inwardly taut. The owner is focused on controlling the 
CEO and controlling seems to be the basis of the interrelationship. The 
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CEO noted: “I have not to report each quarter. Currently it is each month 
and, for example, I have to present and to discuss my own travel costs 
each month”. The interrelationship appeared rational, less emotional and 
is formally limited by the two months’ meetings and by a monthly 
telephone call in respect to the monthly result and eventual deviations 
from the budget. A significant interest by the owner is denied by the CEO 
and also by the second-tier management. Innovations that force the 
competitiveness are welcome but are not driven by the owner. “The 
owner’s interest is limited to commercial output, not into our 
interrelationship” pointed out the CEO. 
The CEO argued that he is more or less autonomous in deciding 
within the limits of the budget, but on the other hand he knows that he has 
to deliver the owner’s standards, otherwise the owner will put a question 
mark over him. “You feel permanently the power in your back that you 
have to deliver the numbers,” said the CEO. A communication of the basis 
of the daily business is undesired and also only of limited usefulness. The 
owner has not got the product and market competence to give operational 
support. “My owner is less anticipatory, more controlling. We do not 
change responsibilities. He uses management by scrutiny. I mean there is 
no innovation, no progress, no new market ideas, etc., coming from my 
owner” (CEO). Consequently, the quarterly meetings were dominated by 
number crunching and by small talk, which is guided by the years of 
cooperation. Communication within is more one-way. “We also speak 
about emotions” pointed out the CEO, referring to a relationship that is 
based on long-term cooperation in different positions with the holding 
company. “Whilst we had huge problems with the cancer disease of my 
son, the sympathy of my owner was astonishing. I got enough space to 
stay at home and support my family in this difficult time” (CEO). Despite 
this occasion, the owner-CEO interrelationship seems largely superficial, 
though, and mainly economically related. Social competence is less 
pronounced. “I have not the interests to explain everything to my 
management. It is too exhausting and makes me nervous. The people are 
not able to follow me at my own speed” (CEO). The CEO is running far 
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ahead, is not able to listen and no one is able to follow him. The CEO´s 
willingness to invest into an interrelationship seems to be less. The CEO 
argues that the owner is less empathic and doesn’t know exactly what he 
is doing. The same seems true for the CEO. Both actors gave the 
impression that they are more a solitary rather than a team player. 
This objective stage also underpins the extrinsic motivation of the 
owner and the CEO (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). The 
owner-CEO interrelationship seems to be mandatorily self-serving, control 
and power oriented and profit focused. Support for the CEO and also for 
the enterprise is tertiary and uttered only in extreme situations. Actions are 
less collective, which is likely the basis for an ineffective interrelationship 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). It seemed in the interviews that a direct 
collective serving and the volition to support does not exist in the words of 
the CEO. “I like…., I have to do…., I am responsible for….,” rarely did I 
observe the word we will, or we have to do in the enterprise this, that and 
the other. It appeared that the actors live in their own environment, which 
could conceal counterproductive potential for the innovation capability. 
Even if the CEO is arguing that targets were collectively worked 
out, the second-tier management perceive this in a totally different way. 
“Leadership and communication are not taking place” argues the CEO in 
the direction of the owner, and this also justifies the owner-CEO 
interrelationship. No one knows where the company wants to be in five 
years. This uncertainty has likely significant potential of influence from the 
owner-CEO interrelationship to the innovation capability.  
Unconsidered in the owner-CEO interrelationship are the positions 
of the two main investors in the background. These two persons stay 
hidden in the background; they are not involved in the daily business and 
pull the strings in a way that is difficult to analyse. No significant decisions 
were implemented without the approval of a minimum of one of the two 
main owners. All this is more or less hidden in the background. One of the 
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minority owners said that the owner is only a “marionette” of the “big” 
owners.  
The analysis indicated that the interrelationship is mandatorily 
rational-oriented and based on objective behaviour and individual 
opportunism, because everyone is interested in indicating their own 
interests. The owner´s interest is focused on improving his own wealth and 
his ownership structure wealth. Hence, the CEO has only a chance to 
survive if he is focused on his agent role. The interrelationship is more 
economically driven and less proactive and socially driven, but it is 
influenced passively and shapes the situation more as required. The future 
plans of the enterprise will be guided by this impersonal and superficial 
interrelationship, which likely has a significant potential to affect the 
innovation capability. 
 
4.2.3 Plans for the Future 
The CEO and the owner in the managerial oriented enterprise 
both stated that in the next few years they want to push the expansion of 
the market position by working closely together with other relevant system 
partners, and they want to prepare the next step - to change from a 
product supplier to a system supplier. In this further context, foreign 
enterprises should be taken over to provide a greater participation in the 
system supplier market. Into this initiative the expansion in the Chinese, 
Indian and Mexican markets is promoted and further new customers in this 
market should be captured. A continuous collaboration with key OEM 
(original equipment manufacturer) customers like Volkswagen (VW) is 
intended by a simultaneous extension of market shares.  
Production locations will be reconsidered and restructured under 
cost and efficiency aspects. One production location will be closed and 
rebuilt in a low-wage country. Product innovations will be generated by the 
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planned acquisition of the two enterprises to offer complete tank systems. 
With the takeover of the mentioned enterprises they open the door into the 
white goods market. Particular innovation steps into new markets or 
substitute products are not explicit in the strategic scope. The budget for 
the R&D department remains untouched (CEO’s statement).  
 The next growth step, with a planned €50 million turnover, is by 
support of new markets and an extension of existing customer revenues, 
guided by the interest to leverage the profit over the two-digit target of ten 
percent. The ownership is interested in merging the business into a bigger 
unit in order to increase the value of the enterprise. In the possible case 
that another investor is interested in the business and shows intentions to 
take over the enterprise, the owner will evaluate the conditions and 
through the assumption of a good deal, the owner will sell the business. 
The interviews indicated that the owner-CEO interrelationship serves the 
owner’s rational interests to improve their private wealth and shape the 
social situation. 
 
4.2.4 Summary of Case B 
The interrelationship in the managerial enterprise as revealed from 
the data is characterised by distance and dominated by profit and control-
oriented actions. The managerial owner and his CEO act as lone fighters, 
guided by self-serving behaviour. The outcome of the enterprise is 
performance and delivery oriented and appears limited in its ability to 
enhance the innovation capability. Waiting for the other to initiate activities 
characterises the interrelationship (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and 
symbolises missing leadership (Avolio and Bass, 2004). Finally, the owner 
and the CEO are only a puppet cabinet of the actual investor in the 
background, who has interest only in dividends and enterprise value 
enhancement, which is counter-productive for the owner-CEO 
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interrelationship and appears to negatively influence the innovation 
capability of the enterprise (Trantow, Hees and Jeschke, 2012). 
 
4.3 Case C: The Paternalistic Oriented Ownership Structure 
Case C was selected because prior observation and my initial 
interview indicated that the dominant ideology appeared to be that of a 
paternalistic oriented enterprise. The owner, the CEO, and an advisor 
were interviewed and internal strategic documents and the webpage were 
analysed. 
 
4.3.1 Origins and Rationale 
The family-owned paternalistic oriented enterprise is an important 
player in the niche market of bowser vehicles in the area of road tanks and 
refuellers at airports, and was founded by the father of the current owner 
and grandfather of the current CEO in the year 1955. Since 1972 the 
enterprise has been operating internationally and has become, step by 
step, a key player in the international refueller market at airports and 
locally in road tank vehicles. In 1974 the current owner became the new 
CEO in the enterprise, leading the enterprise for close to 25 years before 
he handed over the responsibility to his daughter in 2008, the current 
CEO.   
The enterprise was for a long time reputed as quite innovative and 
technologically pioneering, especially in the founder’s years and the 
generation after. Since a few years ago, the enterprise has had to manage 
a significant downturn in the market for the traditional road tanks business, 
accompanied with a global growing of the airport refueller market. Visible 
distribution problems, different market structures and globalisation 
tendencies pose challenges that the enterprise is still fighting (CEO and 
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owner’s statement). Local customers and low-price vendors offer 
adequate technological substitutes with a better price. The enterprise has, 
in these recent years, not been able to assert itself in the market by 
pioneering new, relevant and technological innovations as it did in the past 
(CEO’s statement).  
The enterprise was at the time of the study in a restructuring 
phase, while the former CEO and current owner had let the enterprise be 
simply reactively participating in the market and not realising present 
chances and opportunities. It seemed that market and production 
challenges and needs were postponed and the proximity to the customer 
was not realised, based on a weak sales and product management by this 
time. At the time of analysis, the CEO was trying to close the gap in the 
mentioned area and had made significant progress but, by her own 
admission, this progress had been slow. With around 160 employees and 
a €36 million turnover, plus an export quota of around 60%, the enterprise 
in the last year had been roughly stable and producing approximately 300 
vehicles a year. The analysis indicated that the examined enterprise was 
currently more cost-cut driven, with visible progress in the process 
organisation of the production. To be an innovative producer of tank 
vehicles is part of the vision, but it seemed only in theory. An R&D 
department has been installed as part of the design department but has 
been mostly occupied by other activities and has been acting more as a 
problem solver and a stopgap than as a creative cell.  
In interviews the CEO indicated that the approach to the market is 
rather slow and hesitant to new markets, rather than vigorous and 
progressive. The enterprise is strongly driven by an ownership and 
individual respect of people rather than by profitability or growth. On this 
basis, activities are structured by seniority and equality between the family 
players. This restricts the talent pool. It intends to use the best availability 
of people within the family. “My father thinks in endless dimensions and 
does not realise that life is not endless,” argued the CEO. She gave the 
impression that the owner is not interested in developing the enterprise 
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significantly into the next decade. The major target is to survive and 
preserve the enterprise’s existence. Significant investments have been 
stopped. Avoidable recruitments have been postponed or cancelled. The 
CEO mentioned that she has no chance to hire consultants from outside to 
bring new ideas or fresh blood by recruitment into the enterprise. Her 
father and owner denies the need. The articulated success criterion of the 
owner seems more the ensuring of the family business remaining in the 
family and the creation of an adequate old-age provision (CEO) for the 
current owner. Hence, the ownership ideology appeared to be paternalistic 
oriented. 
The advisory board and the CEO are aware that a new COO with 
a deep technological background is necessary and desirable. Currently it 
seems that the pressure from the market and the banks is not strong 
enough to convince the owner to approve the recruitment. “I know what 
the enterprise is looking for, new jobs, nothing else” (owner). 
  At the time of interviews, the analysis indicated that the owner 
and CEO of Case C were not at one with each other in respect to the 
strategic direction and hence to the operative action base to move the 
enterprise into the next generation cycle. The CEO appeared to be 
distancing herself from her parents’ influence rather than to lead, as CEO, 
the entire entity. The interrelationship appeared incoherent, tense and 
quasi-intimate and emotionally dependent. 
 
4.3.1.1 Paternalistic Oriented Owner´s Characteristics 
The paternalistic oriented owner is male, 74 years old at the time 
of study, with training in business management and as a business 
economist. He holds the majority of the enterprise shares, but has 
transferred some minority shares to the daughter, who is now acting as 
CEO. Operationally he is still the ongoing boss of finance and the 
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bottleneck for all crucial enterprise decisions. In his jovial mode he is 
present on a daily basis in the enterprise and does not like to lose contact 
or control of the enterprise and his daughter. Like a landlord, the owner 
gave the impression that the guides visitors and partners through the 
enterprise and likes to talk about ancient times and his classic cars.  
The analysis indicates that the owner has a confident and 
reserved attitude. He is by nature friendly and courteous, has style and an 
airy manner. To stand in the social hub is what he likes and he tries to 
reach this by being hesitantly cautious. His lax and carefree attitude is 
noticeable, and he signals in his environment his mitigating 
conscientiousness. His trust in employees and in people in general 
appeared reduced due to experiences in the past (observations and 
advisor statement). Her team player skills are marginal. The openness to 
experiences that he had “in the old days” has changed over the years into 
an attitude of retaining and fixing. It seemed that he became a quite 
careful personality with age.  
It looks like the owner has changed his behaviour over the years 
from a more collectively serving, entrepreneurially orientated person 
(CEO) to a self-serving patriarch. His extrinsic motivation stands in the 
path of the actual progress of the enterprise. The interviews indicated that 
the growth orientation yields, the security thinking, and pension plan for 
himself and his wife are his concerns. Still ongoing is his interests in the 
survival of the enterprise and the transfer into the next generation, but in 
his acting, he is preferably active and not what the enterprise is looking 
for: a proactive owner (CEO). His social comparison is reduced to the 
option-forming of his direct social environment, accompanied by a high-
value commitment to the family firm. Past experiences and the fact that he 
is the majority owner gives credence to his power and responsibility. He is 
still involvement oriented but not to give support. He likes to stand in the 
first row and does not want to give up his traditional standing in the 
enterprise (advisor’s statement). The reason could be that he likes to 
control decisions and behaves narcissistically, which has potential to 
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influence the interrelationship with his CEO accordingly. His risk 
orientation has been reduced over time, according to himself, and he likes 
to deny the necessary truth and resist advice. Necessary decisions are 
postponed and mandatory actions partly stop. The analysis indicated that 
a short-term time frame dominates the daily operations and actions are 
accompanied by strict cost control. His authoritarian and less autonomous 
culture is today combined with displacement.  
The analysis indicated that on the basis of these individual traits 
and behaviour the owner is acting in a self-interested manner in line with 
agency theory (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). It revealed that 
the owner and father do not accept strong partners at the daughter’s side 
who might reduce his power, and hence he fits the attributes of a patriarch 
(Johannisson and Huse, 2000). His approach has changed over the years 
from an entrepreneurial emphasis to the current paternalistic attitude and 
conduct. 
 
4.3.1.2 CEO Characteristics 
The 42-year-old (at the time of study) CEO is female, studied 
business administration and has been in the current position since 2011 
and is the daughter of the current owner. Today she holds a minority 
shareholding and together with her father, 100% of the entire enterprise. 
After her study she acquired a position with a big German automobile 
producer, and soon gained responsible positions in the marketing 
department. Afterwards she acquired a leading international marketing 
position in Asia. Following the refusal of her brother to step into the 
footprints of her father she also rejected the initial interest to work in the 
family firm, but after multiple solicitations from the father she caved in and 
moved from Bangkok back to Germany, on the landside of north Hessen, 
to start her career in her father’s firm as CEO. It seemed that in the first 
few years the entrepreneurship was collaborative together with her father. 
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The responsibility was focused on marketing and sales and production 
and technology. Beyond her activities in the firm she also started several 
social activities around family businesses and female successors in family-
owned enterprises in different organisations. 
The analysis indicated that the CEO is neither self-serving nor 
self-actualising. She was urged by her father’s desire and her family 
affinity, is more extrinsically motivated with initial higher order needs and is 
currently under huge emotional pressure. Her social comparison (Amabile 
et al., 1996) is dominated by other female managers in her local business 
women’s club environment (CEO). Her standing in the enterprise after a 
few years is increasingly difficult, partly founded in her weak technological 
competence (advisor). Hence, her power and responsibility is 
predominantly reduced to her institutional legitimation. The backing in the 
enterprise has been reduced over the years (advisor). The targets are 
long-term in their timeframe, accompanied by cost-cutting and controlling 
mechanisms. “I have to stay till my pension in the enterprise” (CEO). 
Potentially, the CEO has difficulty in making direct contact with employees 
and hence a high-power distance has emerged (Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997). The CEO is not meeting her employees every day, 
which is grounded in the weak technological competence but also in the 
personality of the CEO. She is concealing herself in the retreat area of her 
office (advisor). The interviews indicated that the CEO is not socially 
accepted in the enterprise. On the basis of these attributes the CEO 
appeared to be acting in line with agency theory as an agent to her owner. 
It seemed that the CEO is partly isolated in the enterprise because 
of the dominant position and dominant conduct of the owner and the weak 
assertiveness of herself, and is hence easily vulnerable. Her capacity for 
enthusiasm is limited and her openness to new experiences extremely 
careful. “She has not the courage to decide alone” pointed out the advisor. 
Hence the CEO is in a position of negligence. She is in a competitive fight 
with the father, which dominates their interrelationship. Considering that 
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the father gave her the whole responsibility for the operation, it is difficult 
for the CEO to develop her own active personality in the enterprise.  
 
4.3.2 Owner-CEO Interrelationship 
The interviews indicated that the owner-CEO interrelationship is at 
a more mature level than the father-daughter interrelationship. The father 
retains the original role as “bread-earner in the family” (advisor). The 
owner acts as the patriarch and believes that he is managing everything in 
the right manner and in the best possible way. That the CEO is assessing 
this differently is denied by the owner. The CEO and the advisor, both in 
the same way, justify the current role of the owner as a blocker. The owner 
has not realised that he is not sitting in the “pilot’s chair” anymore 
(advisor). He likes to maintain the old-time attitude and is quite dominant 
in the way in which he is cooperating with his CEO, and he believes that 
he gives support for the CEO. His dominance in the interrelationship with 
the CEO goes so far that he thinks he knows it all, as in the past. That he 
has implemented his daughter as CEO, who has to work the next 30 
years, and that she likes to change the world within the enterprise he 
ignores (advisor). It would seem that the owner leads the enterprise by 
“rear-view mirrors” (advisor) and generates a lot of conflicts with his CEO, 
who has future perspectives.  
The analysis indicated that the owner-CEO interrelationship is 
based on a contradiction. The CEO does not appear to demonstrate the 
strength, the courage, nor the power to counteract the decisions and 
procedures of the owner. The father does not like to lose the control of the 
daughter. Her resignation and demotivation are noticeable. She sits 
secluded and isolated in her office. In common meetings, the owner 
seemingly gives the CEO the advantage but you can feel that she would 
not decide without the owner. The conduct is respectful in the fact that the 
CEO is his own “flesh and blood” (advisor), but towards third parties it is 
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dominant and almost authoritarian. This conduct obviously makes the 
CEO uncertain because of being bounded in the paternalistic enterprise. 
The CEO and daughter appears safely bounded in the family but not as 
CEO, which has significant potential to influence the interrelationship 
(Bowlby, 1958). She does not exclude the possibility that the owner would 
fire her (advisor). 
Evasion and displacement are the prevalent feelings in this owner-
CEO interrelationship. The owner was protected by the CEO or the father 
was protected by the daughter, but on the other hand, and in very private 
moments, the whole burden of the situation breaks out. This was moving 
in so far as that the CEO began to cry when she told private details of the 
owner’s conduct. “I am not able to solve conflicts with my father and I am 
now so far that I need support from outside and I am searching for 
psychological support” pointed out the CEO.  
Unconsidered in the owner-CEO interrelationship is the position of 
the mother of the CEO, the owner’s wife. She acts in the background and 
it was not possible for me to get in touch with her, but intimations of the 
CEO and the advisor indicate a not negligible influence. The daughter told 
that in a private atmosphere in business-related discussions, the mother 
mostly supports the position of the owner. It would seem that the daughter 
stands alone against her parents, which is symbolic of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship. 
 
4.3.3 Plans for the Future 
The loss of market share in the main segment should be 
compensated by intensified sales activity in the second smaller sector, 
which is more international and placed in global airport facilities. An 
investment in this technology is planned and is part of the strategy, but is 
currently not structured and implemented. The acting persons realise more 
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and more in different quantities that it is necessary to spend money in an 
uncertain future market and segment to fix the annual turnover. In the 
case of non-success, a huge restructuring process is likely mandatory.  
The current sales force should be partly changed and partly more 
qualified. Sales, engineering and manufacturing department restructuring 
is planned. Basic tools like sales records have to be created and renewed 
respectively. “The enterprise needs to be more dynamic, like in the past” 
(CEO). In order to reach this, the CEO is interested in hiring a COO who 
can take over the whole technological responsibility, which is not 
supported by the owner currently. In respect to the international challenge 
in the global airport market, a local sales force should be installed and 
cooperation with local companies initiated. Process optimisation is 
necessary and initiated and under the control of the CEO.  
The acting person will step back in the enterprise from its further 
technological and growth strategy and will move into a more international 
market and use the “made in Germany” brand as a door opener at 
international airports (CEO). The CEO is willing to push the company and 
the employees into a more risk-orientated, visionary and enthusiastic age. 
Well-known customer relations should be enlarged and new relations will 
be established. The actual turnover should be stabilised under the 
influence of partly dropping market segments at around 35 million Euros, 
with concurrent increasing of the profitability. The innovation capability of 
the company is restricted by the dominant behaviour and of the owner and 
the weak support for the CEO, the result of which is that the 
interrelationship suffers because of this. A proactive focus to innovate 
appeared as marginal. 
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4.3.4 Summary of Case C 
Currently, as revealed from the data, the paternalistic oriented 
enterprise is driven by restructuring activities, which are practically blocked 
but verbally supported by the owner. The owner is using communication 
as a toll of conviction, not to inform. The analysis indicated that the 
enterprise and also the interrelationship live in contradiction. The owner 
influences, by his dominant, jovial, and retaining manner, the owner-CEO 
interrelationship that is seldom face to face and promotes with less 
potential the innovation capability. It is rational driven but burdened by 
serious emotional influences for the CEO. Within familiar commitments, 
control oriented, past oriented, based on mistrust, and an authoritarian 
and less autonomous leadership style (Avolio and Bass, 2004), the 
unsafely attached CEO (Bowlby, 1958) acts independently and uncertainly 
and transmits this behaviour from the owner-CEO interrelationship into the 
enterprise, which could have significant negative potential on the 
innovation capability (Van de Ven, 1997; Jeschke, Isenhard, Hees and 
Trantow, 2011).  As a consequence of the owner-CEO interrelationship, 
the enterprise has struggled for years and has not found any sustainable 
positive idea to influence the innovation capability of the enterprise 
continuously. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the three cases reveals obvious differences within 
the owner-CEO interrelationship and their characteristics. Rational 
economic expectations are dominant in all three cases, but in different 
characteristics. Emotional impact seems different. The analysis indicated 
that the managerial owner-CEO interrelationship tries to keep emotion on 
a low level. The same is true for the paternalistic case but with the 
difference that the CEO suffers under the lack of emotions of her CEO. 
The owner in the entrepreneurial dyad seemed to be aware in his 
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subconsciousness about the importance of a solid emotional 
interrelationship beyond rational facts.  
Whilst the innovation orientation within the interrelationship 
provides different emphases, the characteristics of the interrelationship 
also reveal contrasts. A face-to-face interrelationship is only given in the 
entrepreneurial oriented case, while in the managerial enterprise it is only 
pseudo existing and in the paternalistic oriented case it is implicitly denied. 
This perception and practice of the interrelationship has seeming influence 
on the communication and task sharing between owner and CEO, and 
hence with the individual responsibility. Either way, the different 
interrelationship dynamics also influence the autonomy and the power of 
the two actors. The entrepreneurial oriented owner supports his CEO in 
seemingly all activities if desired, and their close communication culture 
did not result in situations where the CEO fails with his activities. In 
contrast to this, the CEO in the paternalistic oriented enterprise retreated 
into her private domain with her owner in any case where there was failure 
or discrepancy. 
In the following chapter the examined individuals and their 
collaboration will reveal the influence of the owner-CEO interrelationship in 
the findings of thematic analysis and hence the potential to affect the 
innovation capability under social, psychological and situational influences. 
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Chapter 5 
5 The Social and Psychological Interrelationship Influences 
In this chapter, analysis is presented of social and psychological 
factors that might influence the innovation capability of the enterprise. This 
analysis builds on the explanation of varying owner-CEO interrelationships 
presented in Chapter 4. First, the social interrelationship influences are 
examined in relation to corporate structure, owner-CEO cooperation, 
corporate governance, as well as the conduct and methods of 
communication. Second, psychological factors related to the individual 
bias and interests of the owner and CEO are analysed in four areas: 
stimulus, expectations, motive, and owners’ support. Third, the conclusion 
compares the results of the analysis of the sociological and psychological 
interrelationship influences. 
Context specific factors that might mediate the influence of the 
interrelationship on innovation capability, such as the strategic philosophy, 
liquid assets, market orientation and innovation ambitions are analysed 
and evaluated in detail within Chapter 6under situational influences.   
 
5.1 Social Interrelationship Influences 
Analysis of the interviews indicated that social interrelationship 
influences revealed in the owner-CEO interrelationship are likely to act as 
antecedents to the innovation capability of the enterprise. The cases 
indicated that corporate structure, owner/CEO cooperation, corporate 
governance, conduct and communication were important factors with 
potential to influence the innovation capability in German MSEs. A 
summary of the primary differences between the three cases concerning 
these influences is shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Social Interrelationship Influences 
 
5.1.1 Corporate Structure 
Every inertial (self-contained) system follows a specific structure 
and culture. This culture gives the participants in the system orientation 
(Warnecke, 2013) and provides lifestyle, education and nurture. Hence, it 
is not surprising that the corporate culture has influence on an enterprise’s 
success in general (Heinen and Fank, 1997) and in particular on the 
innovation capability (Van de Ven, 1986). A kind of cultural complexity 
(Garud, Tuertscher and Van de Ven, 2013; Garud, Gehman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2011, Garud and Gehman, 2012; Buse, Tiwari and 
Herstatt, 2010) occurs in each of the three studied cases and will be 
 
Social 
Interrelationship 
Influences 
Case A 
Entrepreneurial 
oriented ownership 
structure 
Case B 
Managerial 
 oriented ownership 
structure 
Case C 
Paternalistic 
 oriented ownership 
structure 
Corporate Structure Constructive debate 
culture, decentralized, 
functional, horizontal 
hierarchical 
Conflict prevention 
culture, decentralized, 
vertical hierarchical 
Authoritarian 
displacement culture, 
central, vertical 
hierarchical 
Owner/CEO 
Cooperation 
Cooperative advising, 
bilateral, amicably 
commercial, face to 
face 
Directive supervising, 
unilateral, businesswise 
with class distictions 
Patronizing, 
integrative, unilateral, 
family relation and 
familial hierarchical 
Corporate 
Governance 
Task oriented, parity 
and complementary, 
trustful 
Key figure oriented, 
ambitious and reviewing 
Heritage oriented, 
autocratic and 
unpredictable 
Conduct Independent functional 
progress-driver with 
time restrictions 
Profit oriented conroller 
with competence 
limitations 
Patronized political 
blocker with signs of 
pride  
Communication 
Pattern 
Skilled and 
spontaneous 
Factual ritualized Jovial, bluffing and 
repectful 
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discussed to illuminate the potential interrelationship influences in respect 
to the innovation capability. 
The analysis indicated categorical differences between the three 
ideological enterprise cases within the owner-CEO interrelationship. Whilst 
in the entrepreneurial oriented case an atmosphere of constructive debate 
exists, in the managerial oriented case there is an overestimated conflict 
prevention and in the paternalistic oriented case an authoritarian 
displacement culture dominates. The organisation of the paternalistic 
oriented enterprise has a corporate structure, which is vertical hierarchical, 
organised by an imponderable owner and a CEO who has been recruited 
out of the domestic environment (advisor). The CEO in the entrepreneurial 
oriented enterprise has been recruited by a longer recruitment process in 
order to find the perfect team composition for this crucial enterprise 
position (owner), to act in a corporate structure that is decentralised, 
organised with a horizontal hierarchy, systemic, functional, and confident. 
The owner of the managerial oriented enterprise was interested in 
employing a CEO who was able to implement and transform his interests 
and objectives, and tried to hire a performing agent. This policy underlies 
the culture of conflict prevention and fits into the decentralised, vertical 
hierarchical and key figures oriented controlling organisation. “We took the 
CEO out of our network” (owner) to enable quick access to the right 
person, which would also serve to reduce recruitment costs.  
The entrepreneurial oriented owner claims that a culture of 
constructive debate reduces the inhibition level between him and his CEO 
and “likes to set an example of this conduct” (owner). In the operational 
manner the owner supports this claim through the existence of a 
decentralised, systemic, functional, and confident corporate structure. The 
owner claims that this is a culture that contains symbolic rules, and 
employees bring these rules and novelties into the enterprise, which defies 
individuality and the organisation (Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018; Hansen, 
Trantrow, Richert and Jeschke, 2011; Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). He is not 
willing to leave this (in his eyes) mandatory owner’s responsibility in the 
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hands of others and examines the contact with the organisation because 
he believes that the interrelationship between him and his CEO is related 
to the innovativeness of the enterprise (Dansereau, Graen and Haga, 
1975, Graen and Scandura, 1987). He takes over the supreme leading 
level in the enterprise and motivates his CEO to follow his way of thinking 
and acting. 
The analysis indicated that the CEO in the managerial oriented 
enterprise has to deliver exactly what the owner is expecting. “The owner 
is not telling me his vision. He is focused on profit and does not like to 
discuss this” (CEO). The CEO has to prove himself continuously by 
providing the owner with reviews containing numbers and figures in order 
to adopt the norm of quantitative success indicators. “The owner is 
preventing conflicts from the beginning” (CEO). His role is formalised, 
limited, autonomous and mediates planning routines with semi-
professional management skills. The CEO´s roadmap is the budget 
agreement and on this agreement, he will be measured. He has enough 
space and autonomy to do things in his own way but he has to deliver the 
owner’s objective. The CEO argues that his owner supports him if 
necessary, seldom by his initiative but always against the backdrop of 
reaching his monetary target. The CEO is interested to support the 
owner’s interest because of his incentive according to his salary 
agreement, which documents that the owner appraises his leadership role 
by defined standards and reward announcements through the 
achievement of objectives. The owner promotes the compliance of his 
CEO through rewards and punishments, and influences the 
interrelationship in a significant way. The CEO transacts this culture (Bass, 
2008) in the same way.  
The paternalistic oriented owner attempts to displace, by his 
authoritarian conduct, necessary and further changes. A strong leadership 
is not recognisable. The owner is not able to govern the enterprise into the 
next period. “I am restricted in my actions by the owner,” argues the CEO, 
and realises that she is not face to face within the interrelationship with the 
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owner; she is less autonomous and has limited responsibility. The 
authority of the owner is too strong, the power of the CEO too weak, and 
these two characters dictate the culture of the interrelationship. “The point 
is that we have to take respect of the oeuvre of the owner” (CEO); this 
respect and the interest of being financially secure in his declining years 
displaces all other actions (advisor). The central structure, with its 
authoritarian, vertical hierarchical owner, makes the interrelationship 
imponderable and difficult to figure out. The resilience of the 
interrelationship is weakened in the current situation. 
As long ago as 1957, Selznick pointed out how important it is to 
manage internal conflicts in an organisation’s structure and system in 
order to foster the creativity of the individual and hence the innovation 
capability, which was echoed in 1986 by Van de Ven. The innovation 
capability of the firm is likely to be increased if the owner-CEO 
interrelationship has a culture where individuals meet face to face and 
constructive communication is given. Hence, an atmosphere of 
constructive debate and a functional, horizontal hierarchic corporate 
structure, as present in the entrepreneurial enterprise, is likely more 
positive for the innovation capability. The next section provides the 
influence potential in respect to the owner-CEO cooperation. 
 
5.1.2 Owner-CEO Cooperation 
Innovation underlines the need for cooperation between 
individuals within an organisation, as well as revealing the relational 
complexity of organisational life (Garud, Tuertscher and Van de Ven, 
2013; Garud, Gehmann and Kumaraswamy, 2011; Garud and Gehman, 
2012; Buse, Tiwari and Herstatt, 2010). These definitions are also relevant 
for the CEO-owner interrelationship and not only for a single individual 
(Van de Ven, 1986) and applies mutatis mutandis to a wide variety of 
technical, process, product, and administrative kinds of innovations 
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(Casson, 2003). Hence, innovation is more a network and team building 
effort (Van de Ven, 1986) among people who, by transactions, become 
sufficiently committed, therefore innovation becomes a question of the 
team composition and the characteristics of the actors (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989; Amabile, Schatzle, Moneta and Kramer, 2006) and has 
potential to influence, through the interrelationship, the innovation 
capability of the enterprise.  
 The kind of cooperation between the entrepreneurial oriented 
owner and his CEO is revealed in a type of cooperative-advising 
behaviour. “I see me as an advisor. Everything is turning around the 
enterprise. It isn’t about vanity” (owner). This kind of bilateral approach is 
the basis for an interrelationship face to face and low power distance 
(Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), which is amicable, trustful, and 
at an honest level and full of mutual recognition (Donaldson and Davis, 
1989; 1991). This is aligned with the targets of the owner, which 
demonstrate a common thinking and acting. The analysis showed that the 
owner feels well, gets enough room for development, finds trust, and feels 
happy. In a joint meeting, the entrepreneurial owner and the CEO 
confirmed that since the beginning of this cooperation they have 
experienced everything “shit” that is possible and have jointly solved these 
problems. “I made also mistakes, failures, and wrong decisions but my 
owner stands behind me and psyches me up” (CEO). This behaviour is 
the basis on which to build confidence (Bowlby, 1958) and demonstrate 
the maturity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1994) of the interrelationship, forming over 
the year a cohesive team (Pelz and Andrews, 1966; Blair and Stout, 2001) 
at eye level. “How can I create a cooperation of confidence, build up on 
trust?” asks the entrepreneurial oriented owner himself, a question that 
has influence on the self-trust of the CEO to the power of the 
interrelationship and the assumption of responsibility. The statements 
demonstrate allegorically the owner-CEO cooperation, which is, in the 
practical cooperation of the power execution level, designed by harmony 
and togetherness, is based on a platform of collectivism and hence has 
positive potential to influence innovation ambitions. 
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In stark contrast stands the cooperation between the paternalistic 
oriented owner and his CEO. The analysis showed that this case perfectly 
demonstrates a paternalistic dominated behaviour (Johannisson and 
Huse, 2000) of an authoritarian family supreme head and his CEO. Trust 
is very limited, loyalty natural. “I am able to define my activities by myself, 
but in a quite limited way. The radius of operation is interpreted narrowly 
and always loaded”, pointed out the CEO. “If I have new ideas I have the 
feeling that my father freezes me” (CEO). This characteristic and individual 
trait of the owner has significant influence on the power execution and 
autonomy of the CEO (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002; Stein 
1974; Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin, 1993; Amabile et al., 1996). 
Emotions are marginal at a business level. The CEO is connected to her 
owner like a small girl to her father, which will have ostensibly negative 
implications for the interrelationship to the innovation capability 
(Eisenhardt, 1988; Fauchart and Gruber, 2011). The necessary 
acceptance of her status as CEO in the organisation by the owner is 
marginal. The owner always sees interrelationships as alliances of 
dependency, which has a significant influence on the CEO in respect to 
management actions, policies, and procedures (Kozlowsky and Doherty, 
1989). The CEO is demotivated and dependent and has thought “to chuck 
the whole business” (CEO). Currently, family ties and the blood 
relationship are stronger than any self-serving or collective serving 
interests. The charismatic father has an intimidating effect on the 
daughter; he lets her be awestruck and paralyses her in her daily activities 
and creativity. She is not able to express her emotions in the 
interrelationship with her owner, and feels utterly frustrated and 
unsatisfied, which leads to a reduction of communication (Menges, 2015) 
and likely of the innovation ambitions. 
It seemed that the CEO in the managerial oriented enterprise has 
found an arrangement with the directive supervising character of the 
owner and accepts the requested class distinction. “I do my own thinking 
in the time between the next meeting with my owner” pointed out the CEO, 
“and preparing all the necessary data for the next meeting…”.  The mutual 
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trust within the interrelationship is conditional and depends to what extent 
the goals were reached in the past and what kind of variance of the budget 
exists. The CEO pointed out, “In the case that my cost of sales quote is in 
the right frame we have an easy review.” The CEO feels the pressure to 
succeed, which could have a potential influence on the innovation 
capability (Jeschke, Isenhard, Hees and Trantow, 2011). The owner’s 
identification with the enterprise is not significant (Yuckl, 2002). The CEO 
is unilaterally dependent from the owner. Discussions are perceived to be 
fruitless. The owner’s only sorrow is how he can control his activities when 
he is not available in the enterprise. Other interests are only simulated. 
“My owner asked me about my family, but with no serious interest” (CEO). 
The CEO currently feels secure in the enterprise but is not bound to it.  
The analysis indicated that the levels of owner-CEO cooperation 
are manifestly different in the examined cases and bear potential to 
influence the innovativeness of the enterprise (Danserau, Graen and 
Haga, 1975; Grean and Scandura, 1987). While the entrepreneurial 
oriented owner seeks cooperation face to face with his CEO, the 
managerial oriented owner’s focus is on numbers and figures and the 
paternalistic oriented owner prefers cooperation within class distinctions 
and contributes technical experiences (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and 
Strange, 2002). The entrepreneurial oriented owner and his CEO are more 
equal and distinctive in their behaviour, which has influences on their 
action (Arendt, 1958). The opposite is the case in the other two 
enterprises. The most accordance and satisfaction were uttered by the 
CEO in the entrepreneurial oriented case about this owner, and equally 
about the degrees of freedom in their daily operations, which are 
significantly related to the innovation capability (Amabile, 1988; 1996; 
Amabile and Gryskiewicz, 1987). Hence, the innovation capability of the 
enterprise is influenced by relational behaviour like trust and mutual 
support rather than by pure rational facts. If the owner stifles this individual 
freedom, like in the paternalistic oriented case, the creativity of the CEO is 
more limited. The CEO of the managerial oriented case also feels quite 
autonomous in his operation, but with a significant difference. The CEO in 
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the paternalistic oriented case is formally blocked by her owner. Hence, 
the entrepreneurial oriented case generates likely the best conditions to 
foster the innovation capability - by the owner-CEO cooperation with 
similar biases that sustainably support the organisation (Stevenson and 
Lundström, 2001); this implies the interrelationship influence to this topic 
on a more similar basis than the corporate governance conduct could. 
 
5.1.3 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is one crucial factor that influences an 
organisation´s capability to manage innovation (Pfingsten, 1998; Smith, 
Busi, Ball and Van der Meer, 2008; Miozzo and Dewick, 2002; Aguilera, 
2005; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006; Belloc 2012) and will be among others 
that are discussed in the following section. 
The paternalistic oriented owner´s corporate governance revealed 
as undoubtedly heritage oriented, autocratic and in its execution 
somewhat unpredictable. Blood relationship is the most important aspect 
of her selection as CEO, not specifically leadership competence. The 
owner feels that he is the head of the family and the enterprise (advisor). 
The owner also acts in parallel as co-CEO, with negative impact to the 
CEO´s autonomy. Hence, the leadership structure is predominantly 
opportune and not open to criticism (“Criticism isn’t allowed”, (CEO)), is 
not forward-oriented, progressive, or proactive (CEO) and appears to be 
less innovation oriented. The owner emanates a narcissistic character, is 
“autocratic, and unstructured” (advisor). The leadership function depicts 
the owner’s eyes as being present but not his actions. He likes to sit in the 
decision hub and central checking point and believes this to fulfil his 
assumption of responsibility. The decision latitude and autonomy of the 
CEO plays a crucial role in the capability to generate an innovation 
atmosphere (Graen and Scandura, 1987). The CEO does not have the 
courage to take the responsibility. She is quite inconsistent and 
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unpredictable in her leadership style. Her self-statement is that she likes to 
“keep their employees on a short leash” but operatively expresses her 
style as arrogant. Respect, loyalty, admiration, which the CEO believes 
that she offers her employees, stand in direct conflict with reality. A clear 
leadership style is not recognisable, neither transformational nor 
transactional (Bass, 1990). The CEO herself hides behind the owner and 
seeks shelter (advisor) and symbolises a wait-and-see attitude. The 
innovation capability is likely to be impacted negatively by this 
interrelationship behaviour. 
The CEO in the entrepreneurial oriented enterprise appeared as 
competent, governed by an operational leadership style, and is able and 
entitled to act autonomously. The corporate governance is task-oriented, 
has parity and is complementarily distributed among the actors; it is based 
on a trustful interrelationship, which fosters creativity and organisational 
innovation capability (Monge, Cozzens and Contractor, 1992; Amabile, 
1996). The entrepreneurial owner sought from the beginning a CEO who 
was able to lead the enterprise with him in common interests and had 
social and functional competence. The owner believed that the individual 
makes the difference and is able to bring the enterprise into renewal. “We 
have the same values in our leadership principles and attempt to reach 
conciliation in our action. My owner trusts me in my actions. I have his 
respect and I realise also that he involves me in all his strategic 
reflections” (CEO). The owner collaborates with his CEO to identify the 
needed change, creates the vision, acts as developer to guide the change 
by inspiration and if necessary by support, and executes the change within 
the interrelationship, which is likely positively related to the innovation 
capability (Fauchart and Gruber, 2011; Bass, 1990). This conduct is 
revealed in a transformational leadership style and indirectly preferred 
traits of mostly intrinsically motivated creative people (Mumford, Scott, 
Gaddis and Strange, 2002). “I take myself back and control my visionary 
inspiration and intervene in a task-oriented way. We do it together” 
(owner). The CEO shares this transformational leadership style in an 
interrelation-oriented, authentic, communicative, and predictably preferred 
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way, which in this way operationalises a more human dimension in 
organisations (McGregor, 1967), with a positive influence on the 
innovation capability (Jansen, Vera, and Crossan, 2009). The owner gives 
his CEO enough power and autonomy, which serves, among other things, 
as a platform that enhances the innovation capability (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1997; Amabile, 1988; 1996; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018). 
The managerial oriented owner lets his CEO operate freely in the 
business on a day-to-day basis. The corporate governance is in general 
key-figure-oriented, ambitious and dominated by direct cooperation. 
Creativity and passion for the work is not a requirement. The owner claims 
a one-way loyalty and tolerates only marginal input from the CEO. Even if 
the owner has autonomy to act, the real authority and corporate 
governance in respect to strategy and vision takes place in the 
background between the two main shareholders and investors. The CEO 
describes the strategy and the vision, the owner “gives his blessing to it” 
and controls it. The idea is generated by the CEO and “the owner adopts it 
as his own idea and pushes it to success, which occurs in all reviews”, 
argued the CEO. The owner´s leadership style is focused on supervision 
and performance, not on autonomy and power delegation with a 
contractual reward system and incentives, which is in line with the theory 
of transactional leadership style (Bass, 2008), and has likely a crucial 
impact on the innovation capability through the owner-CEO dyad. The 
leadership operates top down, whereby the owner avoids taking 
responsibility (Hansen, Trantow, Richert and Jeschke, 2011; Mumford, 
Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002). The CEO is also number and control 
oriented and temporarily imperious. He is not a proactive manager, less 
able to lead and favours acting reactively (2nd tier manager). He has a 
vision but is not interested in whether people are able to follow him. The 
emphasis is always on the “I” in the foreground of the CEO´s 
argumentation. The interrelationship in this case is partly dominated by 
egotistic individuals and not by cooperative actors.  
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The dominant commercial interests and the lesser level of 
autonomy and power-granting behaviour of the managerial oriented owner 
seem to inhibit creativity and organisational innovation capability. This is in 
contrast to the entrepreneurial oriented owner, where the individual’s 
liberty and space to generate their own world and try to change the world 
a little bit is more apparent. The style and leadership between the owner 
and the CEO make a big difference in the nature and success of creative 
efforts (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002; Smith, Busi, Ball and 
Van der Meer, 2008), and this reveals that the mutual satisfaction of the 
interrelationship in the entrepreneurial case is supportive, especially in 
their bottom up and transformational leadership style (Bass, 1990; 2008). 
 
5.1.4 Conduct 
The analysis showed that the managerial oriented owner acts as a 
controller and is well organised in respect to their purposive behaviour, 
and profit oriented. Market and technology competence limit his 
operational cooperation. The conduct is not seriously task-oriented and is 
only a pseudo construct. The entrepreneurial oriented owner seems 
limited by time in terms of his active cooperation, as the enterprise is in 
continuous growth and needs his input at several places concurrently. He 
is an autonomous functional progress driver and is aware about his 
strategic importance for the enterprise. The paternalistic oriented owner 
has moved more and more over the years to being a patronising political 
blocker who lives in the past with overstated pride in past success and 
dominates the CEO in an absolutist way. 
The interviews indicated that pride, political thinking and the 
conduct of a blocker self-justify the role and the behaviour of the 
paternalistic oriented owner. “Our owner is an old patriarch who isn’t able 
to cling to office. He acts as a model dinosaur”, pointed out the advisor, 
which has significant impact on the innovation capability (Franke, 2014). 
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The enterprise reveals enormous reluctance to fix the actual status and is 
infected by the owner´s mentality of “wait and see”. The pride in the past 
dominates current actions. The owner is politically driven by a jovial kind of 
behaviour and attempts - by continuance of the enterprise - to secure his 
pension plan (advisor). The owner’s behaviour limits the autonomy and 
power of the CEO tremendously and expresses dictatorial behaviour. “My 
ability to act is seriously limited” pointed out the CEO. “I am only here to 
stamp out small fires. Strategic goals are not desired” (CEO). “One ought 
to think that the owner should not take his CEO for granted” (advisor). The 
owner is less protective towards the CEO. The motivation of the CEO 
reduces to a minimum under these circumstances. She feels isolated and 
alone and denies imitating a paternalistic standpoint but in practice she 
adopts the same habitus behaviour as her father (Bourdieu, 1987). The 
CEO/daughter is anxious to please the father and is visibly unable to step 
out of the father’s shadow. This behaviour secures the CEO’s job, hence 
innovation efforts are nipped in the bud (Eden, 1984), based on the owner-
CEO interrelationship. 
The CEO in the managerial oriented case has more independence 
and responsibility in his operations. He is quite secure in his position 
because of economic success, but with a higher moral hazard than the 
CEO in the paternalistic oriented case. This success is endangered by the 
CEO´s misconduct. Within this operation the CEO acts quite 
autonomously under provision of his contract details. “Autonomy and trust 
will be hard earned and measured by budget deviations” (owner). Through 
this behaviour the owner reveals the reality of his job description within the 
interrelationship: profit-oriented controller. Technological and market 
specific targets are welcome but need to fit into the short-term budget 
scenario. Short-term economic (Trantow, Hees and Jeschke, 2012) items 
build quasi barriers for the innovation capability in the enterprise (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990). “The owner´s lack of technological and market relevant 
competence” (CEO) has weak supporting influence on the innovation 
capability of the enterprise from the viewpoint of the owner (Mumford, 
Scott, Gaddis, and Strange, 2002; Halbesleben, Novicevic, Harvey and 
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Buckley, 2003; Howell and Avolio, 1993; Elenkov and Manev, 2005).  
Deductions in respect of quantitative values will be every two months 
(Deetz, 1992; Johannisson and Huse, 2000). A breeding ground for 
innovation is available and underlies the action readiness of the CEO 
(Weisberg, 2006). 
The scope of the CEO in the entrepreneurial oriented case to 
innovate and move into other ventures seemed to be larger. The chances 
to throw the operation into uncertainty are more limited. This opportunity is 
based on the extensive independence and autonomy of the CEO and is 
evidenced in the job security and the support of the CEO. The widely 
independent autonomy of the CEO is aligned with the interest of the 
owner, who actively drives strategic and innovative processes. “I am the 
driver. The CEO and myself work quite close together, have continuous 
communication, shared responsibility and concerted action. I am also the 
sounding board for the CEO and support him to find new markets to 
expand our system-character of the enterprise” (owner). The purposive 
behaviour of the owner is functionally driven and originates and promotes 
innovation, which is likely one of the key factors for the innovation 
capability (Franke, 2014; Amabile, 1986). He is always driven by this 
entrepreneurial spirit but is limited in terms of the continuous growth of the 
enterprise by the fact that time more and more restricts his cooperation 
with the CEO, and hence influences the interrelationship. The autonomy of 
the CEO to create new ideas and foster the innovation urge of the 
organisation allows room for manoeuvre, which is characteristic of the 
whole organisation and innovation friendly (Amabile, 1982). 
The higher-than-average autonomy of the CEO in the 
entrepreneurial oriented case, and the proactive support with similar bias 
(Stevenson and Lundström, 2001) of the owner (Eisenhardt, 1986), 
manifest a higher innovation capability. Similarly, the CEO is autonomous 
from the managerial oriented owner, but he does not find the same 
support and care by his owner that the CEO in the entrepreneurial 
oriented enterprise does. The managerial oriented degree of autonomy 
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does not limit him in the daily business. However, it seemed impossible for 
the paternalistic oriented owner to innovate before she is able to deliver 
herself out of the clutches of the owner. Only the entrepreneurial oriented 
owner can claim that innovation activities are able to be undertaken by his 
CEO (Stevenson and Lundström, 2001) to act and hence likely support the 
innovation capability of the enterprise through the owner-CEO 
interrelationship. 
 
5.1.5 Communication Pattern 
The communication pattern between individuals moves more and 
more to becoming a crucial factor (Luhmann, 1987) and diverges 
significantly in the studied cases. While the entrepreneurial oriented owner 
is quite communicative, skilled and spontaneous with his CEO, the 
managerial oriented owner is only factually communicative and ritualised, 
as revealed by constantly recurring review meetings with his CEO. The 
paternalistic oriented owner appears to be jovial and friendly in his 
communication and appreciated by his CEO; he maintains this image. 
“The direct reports are quite modest in communication towards the 
owner and act with reserve. They all demonstrate respect for the lifework 
of the owner” argued the advisor in the paternalistic oriented case, who 
also supports the authoritarian displacement culture. The final decision - 
and word - rests with the owner (statement of several employees and 
advisor), even if the communication gets more and more superficial and 
reactive, even the bluffing style that the owner affects. “Forward thinking 
and forward communicating is difficult for him, he is only telling tales from 
the past and success stories from a long time ago” (CEO).  In meetings, 
the owner is like a person who is only temporarily part of the discussion 
but switches on when decisions have to be made; he states the direction 
and no one has the courage to say something against him. The owner 
dominates the situation by non-verbal communication and supports a one-
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way communication that might be counter-productive for the innovation 
capability of the enterprise because only with active communication is an 
organisation able to develop innovations (Olson, 1987; Monge, Cozzens 
and Contractor, 1992; Van de Ven, 1986).Good communication between 
CEO and owner, in both directions, is an essential activity to improve the 
innovation capability (Amabile, 1996; Scott and Bruce, 1994). 
The managerial oriented owner is ritualised and less responsive in 
the meetings. All the time he follows the same procedure and it is easy to 
predict what he likes to know. “The meetings with him take the whole 
morning and we discuss only numbers. When I give a longer presentation, 
it can happen that he gives you the impression that he is uninterested, is 
not addressable, and temporarily falls asleep” (CEO). Visits are seldom 
punctuated by small talk and superficial conversation (2nd tier manager). 
The interest is marginal and is communicated by several gestures and 
actions. “There is seldom time for longer discussions with my owner. He is 
always under time pressure and we do not discuss future commercial-
related issues, which is a pity,” pointed out the CEO. The owner reveals in 
this communication behaviour his real interests and forgets that 
communication is always a transmitter and receiver issue. To know what 
the CEO is doing in the absence of the managerial owner is revealed only 
in communication sessions on the phone. Even if he knows how important 
communication is, he is not willing or not able to handle this part of 
operational management in an attractive and sufficient way. 
In opposition to the managerial oriented owner appeared the 
entrepreneurial oriented owner, who listens to his CEO and signals deep 
interest in the interrelationship, his problems, and sorrows, which is highly 
appreciated by the CEO. “You have to be authentic to your CEO. My 
words have to have equal actions” (owner). The CEO confirmed the open 
communication style of the owner and that one can feel that he acts 
honestly with much blood, sweat and tears for the organisation, and that 
finally that is what is most appreciated about the owner. “We both avoid 
building hurdles with our communication and we are an example of 
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communication and openness from the top” (CEO). On the other hand, the 
self-critical owner is never satisfied with his own communication style: “We 
need new communication tools because I believe we don’t reach all our 
employees and it gets more and more difficult to understand our vision 
and strategy” pointed out the owner, describing thus his current problems 
with the communication avenues available at present. The outcome may 
appear to imply that mutual communication in the interrelationship will 
likely have positive potential influences on the innovation capability.  
An open communication between owner and CEO is a key 
indicator for innovation capability (Monge, Cozzens and Contractor, 1992; 
Heide et al., 2018). The communication openness (Van de Ven, 1986) 
opens doors, and qualifies as a link to improve the innovation capability in 
the organisation (Scott and Bruce, 1994) under the condition of “one voice 
communication”. The smart communication behaviour of the 
entrepreneurial oriented owner is revealed as a paradigmatic method to try 
and reach the CEO´s ears further, and thereby further motivates his CEO 
through subsequent behaviour (Eden, 1984). This is a necessary 
interrelationship platform for creative people (Van de Ven, 1986) and 
hence for the improvement of the innovation capability.  
As we have seen, an ostensible influence on the innovation 
capability is revealed by the social interrelationship influences. On this 
basis, I may conclude that the corporate structure, the owner-CEO 
cooperation, the corporate governance, the conduct of the two actors, and 
the communication pattern between the owner and the CEO have a 
significant influence. To recap, it is obvious that an open social 
interrelationship is crucial. The best example in this research seems to be 
the entrepreneurial dominated case, where the owner is convinced about 
the need fora qualitative, well-working interrelationship with his CEO. The 
opposite seems to be the reality in the paternalistic oriented case. Father 
and daughter should have a good working togetherness on the basis of 
their blood-ties, which is definitely not the case. The analysis indicated that 
the owner dominates, and in many cases dictates, the social 
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interrelationship and stifles any upcoming creative activities of the CEO in 
a seminal state. The managerial owner seemed to be more open. He likes 
to dominate the interrelationship but only for the time of active 
togetherness in several meetings over the annual period. In the meantime, 
he is quite disinterested and lets his CEO work autonomously. The 
analysis showed that only the entrepreneurial owner is aware about the 
power and chances that an open and creative interrelationship behind 
rational affects with his CEO is able to generate.  
Certainly, the innovation capability is likely impacted by the social 
interrelationship influences if the owner and the CEO do have a sufficient 
corporate structure, a mutual cooperation willingness, and communication, 
and a corporate governance and conduct that finds mutual consensus 
within the owner-CEO dyad. As revealed in the section, there is a mutual 
communication between owner and CEO in a dynamic environment that is 
crucial for the innovation capability of the enterprise. Of further 
significance is the autonomy of the CEO to enjoy his/her creativity and the 
transmission of power and responsibility in the hands of the CEO within 
the interrelationship, and more thoughtful behaviour of the owner to 
influence the innovation capability positively.  
Further influences on the innovation capability by the owner-CEO 
interrelationship in another context are expected by psychological 
interrelationship influences, which is part of the thematic analysis findings 
of the next section. 
 
5.2 Psychological Interrelationship Influences 
Psychological interrelationship (Table 5) influences reveal the 
individual character of the owner and CEO within their interrelationship 
and act as antecedents to the innovation capability. The psychological 
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effects of the owner are therefore expected to be more influential than the 
CEO. 
 
Table 5: Psychological Interrelationship Influences 
 
The next section examines the individual psychological 
interrelationship influences with regard to the different ideologies 
(Johannisson and Huse, 2000). Diverse effects emerged from the 
literature and the process of the current investigation and the extract of the 
coding process, including stimulus, expectation, motive, and support of the 
actor. The summary of the primary differences between the three 
ideologies is listed in Table 5and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
5.2.1 Stimulus 
Stimulus conceptualises an individual conduct; it is related to 
stimulus-response theories of personality (Hall and Lindzey, 1957; Proctor 
and Vu, 2006) and is deemed to be the basis for individual behaviour, 
 
 
Psychological 
interrelationship 
influences 
Case A 
 
Entrepreneurial 
oriented ownership 
structure 
Case B 
 
Managerial 
oriented ownership 
structure 
Case C 
 
Paternalistic 
oriented ownership 
structure 
Stimulus Creative strategic 
driver, technology 
enforcement 
Result driver and 
problem solving 
Enterprise survival 
Expectation Create out of 
qualitative data 
proactive success 
Generation of 
commercial key 
success figures and 
profit 
Ensure the business’s 
continuity for the next 
generation 
Motive 
 
Enterprise success Profit earning Old age provision 
Owner´s 
Support 
 
High attachment to 
employees and 
company    
Significant interest to 
improve private 
wealth 
Conservation of 
assets and social 
power 
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constituting the basis for perceptions (Gregory, 2004). Stimulus helps to 
scrutinise what drives and motivates the owner and the CEO. 
The entrepreneurial oriented owner is revealed as a creative 
strategic driver who likes to enforce the surface technology basis in the 
market, whilst the managerial oriented owner is motivated to drive the 
result and the economic success and intercalates himself in the case of 
bigger, unforeseeable problems. Currently, the paternalistic oriented 
owner is predominantly interested in helping the enterprise to survive.  
The interviews indicated that the paternalistic oriented owner 
knows that he is a part of the strategic problem that is grounded in the 
omissions of the past (advisor). The CEO sees him in a blocking role for 
new ideas who gives no supervisory encouragement in terms of creativity 
and operational support. A renewable manufacturing process from an 
isolated manufacturing application to a flow manufacturing process, which 
was initiated by the CEO, is permanently criticised. The owner is 
seemingly not able to generate new ideas. He is no longer the inventor or 
developer of creativity (Fauchart and Gruber, 2011), which leads to 
stagnation. He likes to retain the present state (advisor). The CEO pointed 
out, “Forward-facing thinking is difficult for my father. He has not the 
motivation to support me, only his own interests”. This reveals that the 
CEO finds no acceptance of her creative efforts by the owner, she has no 
operational power, which could have negative influences on the innovation 
capability (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018). In 
discussion with the owner it was difficult to hear motivational reasons from 
himself. The CEO is too weak to offer opposition. She is predominantly 
motivated to please her father. Her past as “youth’s rebellious daughter” 
(CEO) has disappeared. To be still in denial about this fact she is currently 
in a status of trying to please the father. Father’s will be done! 
The analysis indicated that the CEO in the entrepreneurial 
oriented case is motivated to create something new. “I like to create 
innovations”, pointed out the CEO in revealing his stimulus, which 
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becomes confirmed in operative actions and is documented by a proactive 
transmission of responsibility from the owner to the CEO. “My owner is the 
real driver and is part of my motivation” (CEO). The owner and the CEO 
are motivated by the same stimuli and interests. They are similarly not 
interested in external things like big cars, big representative offices, 
secretaries, etc. They are equally stimulated to change the world in their 
technological environment. 
Status symbols stimulate the owner and the CEO of the 
managerial oriented case. Both are motivated to improve themselves and 
drive results to be better. The owner is financially stimulated and has this 
behaviour adapted by the main investor, who is acting in the background 
(advisor statement). The CEO is differently stimulated. He likes to solve 
problems. “He likes it when employees come to him and ask him for help, 
especially about sales-related problems,” (2nd tier manager). In this 
situation, he is more the power-seeking hero instead of the more 
thoughtful superior. “He likes to be the agent for the investor and likes to 
improve his current status step by step. He is a good henchman” pointed 
out the advisor, and he fulfils the rules of the domain to be successful and 
so reach the achieved target. Personal needs are met and the interests 
are aligned with that of the owner’s structure. The owner and the CEO can 
inspire an innovative environment to improve individual motivation and 
hence a platform for the innovation capability.   
In the entrepreneurial oriented case, both actors act as creative 
champions (Elenkov and Manev, 2005), which is important in creating new 
ideas and innovations (Van de Ven, 1986). Dissent followed by search for 
consensus is claimed to be the common approach within this 
interrelationship. The paternalistic oriented individuals are interested in 
protecting the status quo and the managerial oriented individuals want to 
stimulate an improvement in the profit, which reflects individual motivation 
and, in both cases, less togetherness in their interrelationship.  
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5.2.2 Expectation 
The entrepreneurial oriented owner is mainly interested in 
generating proactive success out of substantial data. The creation of 
innovation stands in the foreground. In the managerial oriented enterprise, 
the owner has the predominant expectation to generate profit out of 
commercial circumstances and increase his own wealth, whilst the 
paternalistic oriented owner seeks the chance to ensure that his enterprise 
survives for the next generation (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). 
The paternalistic oriented owner likes to preserve the status quo. 
The CEO suggests that the owner is ‘power-mad’ and is predominantly led 
by gut-instinct decisions. The analysis indicated that his willingness to 
change something is marginal. His risk exposure is close to zero and he 
demonstrates absolute passive behaviour (advisor). To guide the business 
into the next generation and secure his own retention plan is the dominant 
expectation of the owner. The CEO is his sidekick and not on an equal 
footing within the interrelationship.  
The analysis showed that the managerial oriented owner is 
believed to wish to increase his wealth and sees only economic key 
figures (advisor) as evidence success. The owner acts actively to reach 
his targets and is satisfied when he reaches the budget plan and gets his 
expectations confirmed (CEO). If the forecast gets out of hand over time 
he will actively attempt to correct the proceedings. The owner’s priority is 
hard fact oriented. To have an interrelationship with his CEO face to face 
does not enter his mind. Social or emotional influences are secondary. 
The study showed that the entrepreneurial oriented owner is highly 
interested in acquiring new knowledge, indeed he called himself “hungry of 
knowledge15”. He gobbles qualitative information as evidence 
characteristics to create his forward strategic vision and expects to change 
                                            
15wissbegierig in German 
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the world in his selected technology environment. He tries to control his 
expectation by proactivity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Sternberg and 
Kaufman, 2018), together with his CEO and the organisation, and 
attempts to transmit his own expectations to others. He is the example par 
excellence for renewable change organisations. “He knows exactly what 
he knows and wants,” pointed out the CEO. Likely, this owner expectation 
tends to be more innovation capability friendly than in the other two cases, 
but presumably the managerial owner expectations could also be 
positively related to the innovation capability and based on togetherness 
(Van de Ven, 1986; Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002). 
 
5.2.3 Motive 
Whilst in one case (the entrepreneurial oriented case) the long-
term enterprise success stands clearly in the owner’s focus, the 
managerial oriented owner´s focus is more on the profit-earning character 
in the foreground. The paternalistic oriented owner has the owner’s old 
age provision and the economic survival of the family in the motif 
foreground. 
Confidential, reserved, careful, and lax kind of behaviour stands in 
the foreground of the paternalistic oriented owner against third parties, and 
this also justifies the psychological traits and the openness in the 
interrelationship with his CEO, which appeared in the analysis. The 
advisor pointed out that “vital issues” stand in the foreground. Openness to 
experience does not (advisor). Thinking about strategic goals or the vision 
is undesirable. There is a huge gap between thinking, reading, and acting. 
Ostensibly it seems the owner is more considerate about the CEO and 
daughter, but he is profoundly more interested in handing over the 
enterprise to a person who is able and willing to lead the enterprise in his 
own interest. As long as he is able to lead the enterprise he will do it and 
he will not transfuse the power to his successor. The owner’s motive is to 
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have the power as long as possible in his own hands, which appears as a 
single motive to be less innovation oriented (Sternberg and Kaufman, 
2018).  
The interviews indicated that the managerial oriented owner´s and 
the CEO´s behaviour are self-serving and controlling, and close to an 
agent’s behaviour, with a clear rationale and opportunistic economic 
interests (2nd tier manager). In this behaviour, the owner unambiguously 
expresses his vision and model. His psychological traits are represented 
as target oriented and effective, and as long it is in the success area, he 
has a friendly approach. Outside the main target he is calm, reserved, 
consistent, and realised the owner to be a solitary man when in contact 
with his CEO, and as an agent when in contact with his main investors. 
This “weather vane” behaviour has potential to affect the innovation 
capability.   
The analysis showed that the entrepreneurial oriented owner is 
more a dynamic team visionary. In his action pattern he is selfless and 
smart. All the time he has the organisation in mind and generates out of 
this his own satisfaction and success. His psychological traits are 
characterised as confident, sociable, curious, organised and cooperative, 
and supportive of individual creativity (Matthews, Deary and Whiteman, 
2003; Ko and Buttler, 2007). He is well organised but at the same time a 
slob, as the CEO pointed out. “Sometimes I have a problem to understand 
him and I cannot understand his current vision, but over time when I 
realise the chaos I have to structure his ideas and then we find a common 
way of realisation”. He is convergent and divergent in thinking at the same 
time and has found a supplementation with his CEO, which is noticeable 
within the interrelationship. Awesomeness and genius in this case are 
siblings, and this justifies the action patterns of creative people 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1994; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018). The owner is 
totally open to experiences and has no fear of the future. He claims all this 
from his CEO, enjoys this for his own sake and defines these traits as 
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organisational goals and as related to the innovation capability (Scoot and 
Bruce, 1994). 
 The innovation capability is likely to be impacted positively if 
the owner expresses his motive in his behaviour and bias, with his smart 
openness to experience and his supportive character, which stimulates the 
CEO to be creative and to innovate (Stevenson and Lundström, 2001; 
Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018). 
 
5.2.4 Owner’s Support 
The support, estimations, and characteristics (Mumford, Scott, 
Gaddis and Strange, 2002) of the owners in the three examined cases 
diverge significantly. Whilst the entrepreneurial oriented owner has a high 
attachment to his CEO, the managerial oriented owner is significantly 
interested in improving his private wealth with a low interest in the CEO´s 
needs. The paternalistic oriented owner focuses on the assets of the 
family firm and the family members and of his social power. A depth of 
interest in the staff individual concerns is minimal and superficial. 
In the analysis it appeared that the paternalistic oriented owner 
has a quite high attachment to the enterprise: “In my enterprise….” is the 
standard idiom of the owner. He is the great guardian of the family 
interests and also the top bread-winner of the family. “The enterprise is his 
baby” (advisor). On the other hand, the attachment to the CEO is reduced 
to a jovial and superficial kind, which could have an influence on the 
innovation capability (Van de Ven, 1986). The owner’s appreciation is 
perceived to be fake and dishonest. His interrelationship with the CEO is 
in a way protective and dominated by the traditional father role. The owner 
is quite passive about how the current status can be transferred to the 
next generation. His support is to retain the current status to indemnify the 
family firm. His intuition, traits and empathy to understand his CEO is 
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weak, but when it is necessary to understand operational issues he is 
quick on-line adjustments. Currently he is controlled by fear and pride. 
Trust is not given, which has significant influence on the support and the 
innovation capability (Monge, Cozzens and Contractor, 1992; Amabile, 
1996). The CEO seems not to be unequivocally attached and this 
underlines that the owner´s support is more individual, which tends to be 
less innovation capability friendly. This missing owner’s support for the 
CEO likely conceivably influences the interrelationship negatively. 
Contrary to this it is revealed that the CEO in the entrepreneurial 
oriented case is definitely attached to his owner and deals with him face to 
face. “It was never a problem to discuss mistakes or wrong decisions with 
him and we attempted together to learn from the situation and find better 
solutions,” pointed out the CEO. The owner has a high appreciation and 
empathy for people and a social attitude that is supportive of the creativity 
of employees (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002). The owner-
CEO attachment in the entrepreneurial oriented enterprise is quite strong, 
but with increasing growth the direct attachment to employees gets more 
and more difficult to retain without losing the interested and fair conduct 
with regard to the employees, which is highly appreciated. “I realise there 
is a distancing between myself and my CEO with increasing growth of the 
enterprise,” argued the owner; he expresses his discontent in this point 
and reveals that the enterprise progress and the support of the CEO and 
the employees is his highest value. This supportive mindset and conduct 
within the owner-CEO interrelationship could have impact on the 
innovation capability (Van de Ven, 1986; Ko and Butler, 2007). This is 
positive in the case where the owner and the CEO are able to work 
actively against the alienation to the basis, negative if the alienation gets 
solid and occurs more significantly. It seems to be quite difficult for the 
owner to support the CEO in a continuous growing enterprise.  
By comparison, the analysis indicated that the managerial oriented 
owner’s attachment pattern to the CEO is perceived to be more marginal 
than sincere and honest. The CEO pointed out that the interests and 
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appreciation of the owner for him do not really exist and that he has less 
empathy and intuition. “Data and figures dominate his thinking and acting” 
(advisor), which has potential to influence the innovation capability 
(Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002). The owner is restricted by 
his number-crunching dominated activities. Communication between the 
CEO and the owner is mainly dominated by business-related items 
(Monge, Cozzens and Contractor, 1992; Amabile, 1996), with the 
consequence of less support. The owner’s conduct is less supportive over 
time and less appreciative, and points to individual interests and less 
interest in the CEO´s support. 
The owners’ support diverges in the three studied cases from “we 
the enterprise” to “I and my investors” to “our family”, and expresses 
clearly the owner´s support (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; 
Blair and Stout, 1999; 2001; Johannisson and Huse, 2000; Gabrielsson, 
Huse, Minichilli, 2007; Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). Hence, 
these types of support conduct demonstrate different effects on the 
operational process. The innovation capability is likely to be impacted 
positively if the CEO does have sufficient support from the owner, who 
takes care of the individual needs of the CEO, is empathic, and stands 
behind the decisions of the CEO. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Four interesting assumptions of this chapter can be drawn by 
comparing the results of the analysis of the sociological and psychological 
interrelationship influences: First, it reveals that corporate structure needs 
to go beyond organisational necessities to provide arenas for constructive 
debate where individuals bringing their ideas and thoughts open doors for 
organisational innovations by different communication patterns. Second, 
the acquired corporate structure and the owner-CEO cooperation needs in 
its modus operandi a transmission to corporate governance in order to 
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improve the innovation capability. A target-oriented leadership by the 
owner-CEO dyad and a power-granting behaviour supports the 
transmission of pro-innovative behaviour, which if implemented at the top 
level will infiltrate the organisation. Third, in the support conduct of the 
owner, creative behaviour and innovative adventures are essentially risky 
and need a supportive character from the owner, who must accept 
uncertainty and miscarriage of endeavours without burdening the 
interrelationship and the CEO´s stimulus, hence affecting the potential to 
influence the innovation capability. Openness to action by the CEO needs 
protection from the owner and a resilient interrelationship, and reveals the 
need of emotional intelligence. If the owner is protective towards the CEO 
it bears likely positive potential for the innovation capability. Fourth, strong 
operational interference of the owner could divert and weaken the 
responsible CEO from market needs. The danger of a bilateral adaption of 
behaviours and similar bias face to face could lead to a blindness to 
necessary changes and asking for continuous and recurring action 
changes within the owner-CEO interrelationship. 
This analysis suggests that studies of innovation capability need to 
consider emotions, thoughts, perceptions, actions, and conduct expressed 
in social and psychological interrelationship influences. Bold acts, 
courage, and support underpin a successful interrelationship that 
enhances the organisation’s innovation capability, paired with individual 
modesty and moderation and complementary traits of the owner and CEO. 
This comes likely together in proactive action and proactive 
communication within the owner-CEO interrelationships. However, it is 
important that we do not examine social and psychological factors in a 
bubble without considering the context within which they play out. The 
following chapter examines the findings of the analysis of situational 
interrelationship influences. 
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Chapter 6 
6 Situational Interrelationship Influences 
The analysis exposed indirect, exogenous factors that influence 
the owner-CEO interrelationship and thus have potential to influence the 
innovation capability of the enterprise. These are titled situational 
interrelationship influences and are summarised in Table 6.  
Table 6: Situational Interrelationship Influences  
 
A summary of the primary differences between the three 
ideologies is shown in Table 6and will be discussed within the next 
section. Four different, associated situational interrelationship influences 
emerged from the data: strategic philosophy, liquid assets, market 
orientation, and innovation ambition. 
 
 
Situational 
interrelationship  
influences 
Case A 
 
Entrepreneurial 
oriented ownership 
structure 
Case B 
 
Manageraial 
oriented ownership 
structure 
Case C 
 
Paternalistic 
 oriented ownership 
structure 
Strategic  
Philosophy  
 
Business development 
by proactive 
technological 
innovation 
Profit enhancement 
by active continous 
improvement 
Conservation of 
status quo by 
principle of hope 
Liquid 
Assets 
Application of cash to 
improve knowledge 
Cost cutting to 
increase profit 
Activities limited on 
the basis of low 
margins 
Market 
Orientation 
Innovation as door 
opener into new 
markets 
Creativity follows 
market demand 
Mutations succeed 
customer request 
Innovation 
Ambition 
 
Proactive  appliance to 
capture market 
segment leadership 
Active leverage to 
satisfy market needs 
and enhance  
enterprise value  
Imperative to  meet 
customer 
expectations and 
ensure continuity 
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6.1 Strategic Philosophy 
The strategic philosophy of the owner and CEO will be reflected in 
the operational strategy in medium- and long-term perspectives and is 
fundamental to the long-term vision of the enterprise (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand 
and Lampel, 2005). The analysis showed that the strategic philosophy 
diverges within the three observed cases. In the paternalistic oriented 
case the gap between reality and aspiration dominates the activity and the 
true strategic interests are revealed through the principle of hope. The 
conservation of the status quo dominates the profit enhancement by active 
continuous improvement in the strategic philosophy. The strategy in the 
managerial oriented case is dominated by growth and profit goals. 
Innovation oriented targets are less described, but are indirectly required 
in order to reach the main targets: profit and growth. The entrepreneurial 
oriented owner´s strategy is conducted through significant business 
development by proactive technological innovation, and reveals his clear 
goal. Strategy should include a set of goals toward innovation in order to 
foster the innovation capability (Amabile and Gryskiewics, 1987; Dodgson, 
Gann and Salter, 2008; Emsley, Nevicky and Harrison, 2006), and should 
come primarily from the highest level of top management (Amabile, 1996). 
The entrepreneurial oriented owner is fascinated in producing 
novel and useful ideas by creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934; 1942) 
in the area of technological surfaces. In order to develop new business by 
technological innovation, the main focus of the strategy and also the action 
of the owner and his CEO are justified thus: “We search for the best 
solutions for our customers and the interest to generate new products via 
their own platform” pointed out the CEO and the owner independently from 
each other. “We follow innovative processes continuously – from product 
design to market launch and beyond,” is the official description on the web 
page. “We have defined an innovation process as the basis of our strategy 
and the strategy by itself is the guiding process for the main process” 
(owner). More than 80% of all employees are aware and know their role in 
the strategy (former survey) driven by the owner-CEO dyad. Hence it is 
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not surprising that the success criterion is defined by technological 
advantages. “We have the technology in the foreground and not 
commercial figures” (owner). Renewal is just the motivational element of 
the owner and his CEO (Maslow, 1970; Manz, 1992) and both are anxious 
to transmit this beyond the owner-CEO interrelationship to the whole 
organisation. This is clearly and unambiguously described in the strategy 
with a long-term, clearly scheduled strategic horizon and comprehensible 
actions that foster the innovation capability of the enterprise (Amabile, 
1996) and promote the CEO and top management as being among the 
key factors (Franke, 2014) to promote the innovation capability.  
The managerial oriented owner’s strategic philosophy emerged as 
more unstructured and influenced by the here and now. The focus is 
rather short- and middle-term aligned. “Our strategic definition is structured 
top down and is part of our budget meeting. The owner likes the 
controllable “to do´s” out of the strategy but is not pushing, and ignores the 
possibility that his behaviour could be counterproductive to the motivation 
of the CEO. Innovation targets are not in the foreground (CEO), but rather 
profit enhancement. Task motivation is dominated by continuous 
improvements and the optimisation of existing processes or cost structures 
rather than the development of new technologies. Cash and profit figures 
are preferred success benchmarks for the owner, which could be counter-
productive in respect to innovation capability (Isenhardt, Hees and 
Trantow, 2011; Trantow, Hees, and Jeschke, 2012). Economic and 
financial interests are significant barriers in MSEs (Acs and Audretsch, 
1990). The strategy is used to control the CEO if he is able to reach the 
agreed “to do’s”, which is symbolic for this owner-CEO interrelationship.  
The paternalistic oriented case has had to fight hard for economic 
success in recent years (enterprise balance sheet). “Strategic interests are 
manifoldly described” pointed out the CEO, supplementing that between 
claim and reality stands a huge gap. “We have innovation targets in our 
strategy” explained the CEO. “We would like to be the most innovative 
enterprise in the market with the best educated employees who have the 
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skills to develop new lucrative business and markets,” she said, but 
deplored the reality and brought her disappointment to the surface. “We 
indulge in wishful thinking, a principle of hope,” she added. A very slow 
and hesitant approach to new markets is perceivable but paired with less 
endeavour to realise significant progress. The conservation of the status 
quo stands in the foreground, maybe in unspoken knowledge of the reality 
that the owner is not able to realise other current strategic goals 
operatively. The strategic definition is ancient, superficial, and more or less 
only a piece of paper that the interrelationship suffers under.  
Individual capabilities and wishes diverge sometimes under 
different circumstances and hinder the realisation of strategic intentions in 
general (Fish, 2016; Csikszentmihalyi, 1994). Particular innovation targets 
have to be clearly defined by the CEO and the owner in the strategy to 
underpin the agreed and purposed target, which will stimulate them to 
behave more entrepreneurially, and should be used in structuring, 
directing, evaluating, and rewarding creative work (Mumford and 
Licuanan, 2004), and hence the innovation capability.  
An innovation-related strategy was defined in the entrepreneurial 
and paternalistic oriented case strategy and vision, but only the 
entrepreneurial oriented dyad stands collectively behind the vision and is 
willing to transform the strategy into good currency (Mumford, Scott, 
Gaddis and Strange, 2002; Mumford and Licuanan, 2004) and sustainably 
foster the innovation capability. The innovation capability is likely to be 
affected positively if the owner-CEO interrelationship has sufficient similar 
biases and supports the organisation to the effect that subordinates feel 
understood and supported by the management (Stevenson and 
Lundström, 2001), which stimulates others to innovate. 
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6.2 Liquid Assets 
Cash and cash equivalents are in general limited, but are notably 
differently distributed in the three examined cases. While the 
entrepreneurial oriented case has cash applications to improve the 
existing knowledge and, hence, the innovation capability, the managerial 
oriented case is bounded by cost-cutting activities in order to improve 
annual pay-out. Another limit occurs in the paternalistic oriented case, 
where activities in the direction of an innovation orientation are limited by 
currently low margins and hence a gap of cash. 
Cash and sufficient liquidity is an obvious requirement - among 
others - to help generate innovation in an enterprise (Brown, Fazzari and 
Petersen, 2009; Audretsch, 1990; Guijarro, Garcia and Van Auken, 2009). 
This is the case in the entrepreneurial oriented enterprise. “Our owner has 
realised 100% that we need sufficient cash to obtain our innovation power 
to transform the enterprise into the next decade.” The enterprise is 
unambiguously knowledge oriented, which is clearly communicated 
internally. The aspiration is to focus on internal and external partnerships 
(open innovation) based on mutual trust to increase the innovation 
capability. The owner and also the CEO know that the goal “to change the 
world” cannot be done in a short time and needs cash.  
The analysis indicated that the managerial oriented case, in 
accordance with its dominating, profit oriented knowledge dyad, is more 
short-term focused. Long-term experience and traditions have revealed a 
lot of technology products in the past. This trend should be advanced by 
the acquisition of further market participants and by the development of 
new products. The strategy is clearly described but the realisation is not 
characterised by serious endeavour. Profit orientation is a barrier in 
respect to the innovation intentions. “My liquidity reaches its limits,” 
pointed out the CEO. This is a significantly unfavourable barrier to 
fostering the innovation capability in the enterprise (Jeschke, Isenhard, 
Hees and Trantow, 2011). The integrated “innovation force” in the 
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standard design department expresses the true intention and possibilities 
of the innovation willingness of the owner and CEO.  
The CEO in the paternalistic oriented case endures the same 
situation, with the significant difference that the enterprise is currently not 
earning the same profit as in recent years and has currently less liquidity 
for renewal. “The low margins limit us from spending that much money on 
new technology and innovation activities” pointed out the CEO. “Cost 
orientation stands in the centre”. The owner is driven by pending 
insolvency. This current situation dominates the owner-CEO 
interrelationship and influences the innovation behaviour. The situation 
forces the CEO to act short term, but the general thinking of the owner is 
infinite, which in the current situation is less conducive to innovation 
(Jeschke, Isenhard, Hees and Trantow, 2011).  Necessary liquid assets 
are available but the owner eschews the risk to invest and thus inhibits the 
innovation capability.  
The enterprise innovation orientation discovers - in all three cases 
- different liquid assets barriers, and this sometimes forces the owner and 
CEO into a dilemma when trying to push the innovation orientation 
significantly forward (Thielemann, 2009). In the paternalistic oriented case, 
the current difficult financial situation causes the CEO to struggle; in the 
managerial oriented case the owner makes untiring efforts to drag cash 
out of the enterprise as a paramount duty. On the other hand, the fast 
growth of the entrepreneurial oriented enterprise constitutes a huge barrier 
to generate sufficient cash to finance all the preferable technological 
progress and the strategic vision. Cash assets, as a major intra company 
innovation orientation key figure, are undoubtedly espoused by the 
enterprise in respect to the described vision, the provision of funds, and 
the sustainable actions of the management. This key dynamic figure 
creates tensions and dynamics between the owner and the CEO in 
respect of different targets and has potential to influence the innovation 
capability, presumably. Other external influences come from the market. 
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6.3 Market Orientation 
The market orientation of the owner and the CEO could have 
potential to influence the innovation capability within their dyad and the 
market itself is able to have an exogenous influence too. The 
entrepreneurial oriented case understands its innovation activity as a 
proactive door opener into new markets, whilst the managerial oriented 
case understands innovation as an answer to market and customer 
demands, and the paternalistic oriented case innovates only on customer 
request, and this is mostly limited to mutations of existing products. 
Currently, the risk orientation in the paternalistic oriented case 
reveals as marginal. Market orientation is restrictive. The owner’s passion 
for new markets and customers is significantly reduced. The demanded 
flexibilisation pressure is not available on the owner’s side and hinders the 
organisation from innovating. The traditional core market has got more 
and more weak in the last year. The owner is not willing to support a more 
international business with adequate sales power, where the market is 
growing. The risk to invest money into a global sales team is too uncertain 
and risky. Instead of forcing a way into this emerging market, the owner 
would rather sugar-coat the situation and struggle with the price politics of 
the competitors (advisor). The owner reveals as the bottleneck. “A growth 
strategy is not discussed. The dominant opinion that the market segment 
is quite traditional paralyses the whole enterprise in moving ahead with a 
new technology or breakthrough discoveries. Since 2006 no innovations 
have been published. The enterprise has been losing its particular product 
leadership in the niche market over the years. Marketing strategies of the 
marketing-educated and experienced CEO go unheard. The 
interrelationship suffers under the opposed market orientation, likely with a 
negative impact to the innovation capability.” 
The managerial oriented case focuses more on the active 
optimisation of existing products and applications and attempts by this way 
to hold the current market leadership in the lorry segment. The CEO 
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pointed out this statement and added that the enterprise has to do more in 
a segment where everybody knows that this market is finite. “An e-car 
does not need a petrol cap. In view of his age the owner knows that the 
end of the market will come when he is retired or when the strategic 
investment is ended.” (CEO) He indirectly limits the market orientation to 
its present core competence and cuts the CEO´s interests, which are 
apparent in different attitudes toward risk (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
Internationalisation and growth via new markets is driven by the owner. He 
pushes activities in the global automotive manufacturing markets and is 
also willing to spend limited money if it is generated out of the cash flow. 
The willingness to grow is tempered by a limited risk orientation, founded 
in the dominant profitability orientation, and reveals competing interests 
between the owner and the CEO (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997). “We did different acquisitions in the recent past and also spent 
money on two big companies to increase our value and protect our global 
market leader position, but we are less willing to acquire new development 
employees to foster our product portfolio,” pointed out the CEO. The 
owner and his investors have been quite economically successful in recent 
decades and they are sure to be on the right track, hence it tends to be 
necessary for the owner and the CEO to be open to market changes.  
The analysis showed that the owner and the CEO in the 
entrepreneurial oriented case think entrepreneurially and are aware of 
using opportunities and managing risks and are willing to take risks into 
new markets (owner). They continuously look for better ways to satisfy 
their customers, based on improved quality, durability, service and price, 
which come to fruition through innovation with advanced technologies and 
organisational strategies (Heyne, Boettke and Prychitko, 2013). Two 
enterprises were acquired in recent years. Additional acquisitions are 
planned to develop the market leadership. The enterprise is innovation 
and growth driven. “We are scanning and scouting the market and 
observing and deciding which chances we could realise to improve and 
innovate existing products” (CEO). “Our permanent process of continued 
development gives our customer a crucial competitive advantage” 
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(strategy extract). The enterprise is totally open to new products and 
market segments and likes to protect, with this strategic orientation, the 
current market leadership in Europe, and wants to extend it to a global 
market leadership. “We are quite organised and act with an aggressive 
rigor, and are market and technology driven to reach our target. Ultimately 
the customer decides our innovations” (owner), which justifies the 
aggressive approach to capture new markets and customers through 
innovations. 
The entrepreneurial oriented owner appeared to be proactive to 
new markets, technologies, products, and risks, and demonstrates his 
market orientation by being willing to spend resources on these 
challenges. The managerial oriented case is limited in its capacity to 
innovate through new technologies and markets and the interests to have 
R&D costs are continuously low, but it is open to increasing the value of 
the enterprise by an active market expansion. The paternalistic oriented 
case is currently in a dilemma, in that the reduced profit and risk 
averseness of the owner does not allow the enterprise to focus on growth 
activities and new markets. The risk awareness that the owner is willing to 
assume (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), in comparison with his 
CEO, makes the difference and the interrelationship vulnerable and 
demonstrates the weak innovation orientation towards new markets. 
 
6.4 Innovation Ambition 
Despite all three examined cases being innovation ambitious in 
theory and verbal statements, the reality in execution is different. Whilst 
the entrepreneurial oriented case uses innovation proactively, as an 
appliance to capture market segment and expand the technology 
leadership position by production of novel and useful ideas (Mumford and 
Gustafson, 1988; Van de Ven, 1986), the managerial oriented owner uses 
innovations as active leverage to satisfy market needs to enhance the 
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enterprise value. The paternalistic oriented case´s reactive attitude is 
driven by customers to meet their expectations and ensure that with this 
behaviour the enterprise’s continuity as a family firm endures 
(Johannisson and Huse, 2000). 
In the paternalistic oriented case the innovation ambition diverges 
from the vision to the execution and disembogues into a truism, which 
ignores the reality. Operative innovation-oriented behaviour or action is not 
realised and ends in lip service. “The owner believes that innovations are 
not necessary,” pointed out the CEO and added: “Actually, we do not have 
open space for ourselves and the employees and are not able to be 
creative and innovative.” The signals that the owner sends are prohibitive 
and counter-productive in respect to the innovation capability and stress 
the interrelationship with his CEO. The analysis indicated that currently the 
innovation source is the CEO but she is not really an innovation ambitious 
driver, and has not the power, not the autonomy, and finally not the 
support to push innovation activities. Obedience is counter-productive in 
the interrelationship (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011). “We are rather passive 
than active in respect to foster the innovation capability,” pointed out the 
CEO, disappointingly.  
The managerial oriented case, which is more actively oriented, 
primarily as a result of customer and market demands in respect to 
innovation ambitions, serves as a vehicle for success and a competitive 
edge. Innovations, as drivers in the market, are recognised and welcome 
but if possible without any cost. “I can do what I like to do if we do not 
damage the scope of the budget,” pointed out the CEO, which explains his 
relative operational freedom but also his limited resources and monetary 
scope to innovate. An innovation priority in view to the market is not fixed. 
“The CEO is seen as a proxy of the owner, who can only act with less 
autonomy, who has to get an approval for each bagatelle by the owner” 
pointed out the advisor. The CEO perceives his owner as someone who is 
“slow to implement innovation activities”. “My owner’s innovation 
orientation is not keen to bring significant product innovation to the market 
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and support the necessary market growth which I am interested in.” 
pointed out the CEO. The enterprise is in a mainly sales-related 
orientation (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011), not least because of the 
preference and core competence of the CEO to capture proactive new 
markets, and is partly innovative in the area of new products.  
The analysis indicates that the innovation orientation (Covin and 
Lumpkin, 2011) is more aggressive in respect to competitors and to the 
market, especially extramural, in the entrepreneurial oriented case. It is 
clearly technology driven and proactive in capturing new markets, new 
customers and in emerging new products. The innovation orientation is 
significant. “The core of the management team is operating 
entrepreneurially coherently,” pointed out the owner. The owner is at once 
the innovation source and driver in the enterprise, together with the CEO. 
“We push innovation activities in the enterprise as early as possible,” 
pointed out the CEO and “We support employees to realise innovations 
and support their creativity”. The owner does not forget to stimulate the 
CEO to continue to behave more and more innovatively and foster 
innovation ambitions in old established markets and in the same way in 
new markets, and this is seen as a team building effort (Mumford, Scott, 
Gaddis and Strange, 2002). 
Innovation ambition needs a long wind to end in a successful 
story. An innovation-promoting owner-CEO interrelationship is one of the 
key factors, besides innovation climate, innovation openness, and an 
innovation-committed organisation (Franke, 2014). This symbolises a 
situational effect, according to the innovation capability influenced by the 
owner-CEO interrelationship. The togetherness within their owner-CEO 
interrelationship as innovation drivers in the entrepreneurial oriented case 
underpins the sustainable theory of Amabile (1996), who defined the 
social environment of the dyad as an influential factor of the level and 
frequency of innovation ambition.   
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The entrepreneurial oriented owner and his CEO have the 
ambitions to innovate with new technologies deeply in mind, and 
symbolise this by their characteristic and individual traits (Mumford, Scott, 
Gaddis and Strange, 2002), by their communication and action, and 
further symbolise this by their sustainable physical and mental energy 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1994; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018). The collective 
equality of the CEO and owner of similar bias and the individual distinction 
by supplementary knowledge (Stevenson and Lundström, 2001) creates 
an innovation-promoting character through the interrelationship and has 
potential to foster the innovation capability of the entire enterprise. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This analysis shows that the organisational innovation capability is 
shaped by the context within which the owner-CEO interrelationship 
occurs. Three interesting conclusions can be drawn from the results 
analysis of the situational interrelationship influences: 
First, the analysis of the three examined cases indicated that an 
innovation-related market strategy is crucial and positively affects the 
innovation capability if the owner-CEO interrelationship has a sufficiently 
similar bias, and both actors transform actions and endow identity 
communication into the organisation. The articulated similar biases and 
goals of the top management in respect to the innovation ambition likely 
need a more entrepreneurial oriented conduct of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship in order to shape the innovation capability positively. 
Sustainable action towards innovation seems mandatory and needs 
comprehensive owner-CEO communication and an active market debate. 
Second, the innovation related strategic philosophy likely needs sufficient 
cash assets to be realised. Specifically, the opportunity to act as CEO 
depends on available cash in technology MSEs. If the CEO should realise 
a vision but not get the sufficient cash liquid assets, dynamic tensions and 
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social conflicts within the owner-CEO interrelationship are pre-
programmed and unavoidable and have potential to constrain the 
innovation capability. Strong individual short-term financial interests of the 
owner could stand in contradiction to innovation capability needs. To 
increase the innovation capability is an investment decision and hence 
needs a proactive action endorsement from the owner, innovation 
addressed goals, and sufficient liquid assets to realise the targets. Third, 
the owner-CEO dyad requests perseverance to realise the initiated 
innovative actions that find expression in a long-term oriented 
interrelationship with an innovation responsible and powerful CEO who is 
market interested and oriented with a significant ambition to pursue 
innovations. The collective, prompting, innovative character of the owner 
and the CEO within their dyad has a potential to stimulate or constrain the 
innovation capability. Likely, the owners’ technological competences and a 
taken-for-granted support for exogenous challenges stabilise the owner-
CEO interrelationship and erect the focus to the situational facts from 
social and psychological influences. This responsibility means clear 
assignments and scope of actions, which is revealed in a constructive 
interrelationship culture with face-to-face actors, and which is likely given 
in a more entrepreneurial ideology. 
The above-mentioned exogenous factors have a direct, rational, 
antecedent influence on the owner-CEO interrelationship and hence on 
the innovation capability of the enterprise. The social and psychological 
influence factors (Chapter 5) are revealed as moderators and manifest the 
coherence of the different analysed influences (Figure 2) to the enterprise 
innovation capability. The analysis indicates that, social, psychological, 
and situational influences have a potential to stimulate or constrain the 
innovation capability and substantiate an impact of emotional facts beyond 
rational facts in corporate governance. More rational theories like agency, 
stewardship, and team production theory have their boundaries when they 
focus primarily on rational influences. Nevertheless, the three theories also 
have their validity beyond the theoretical consideration in pragmatical 
applications. 
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Figure 2: Interrelationship Influence Process 
Control, trust, and sharing have complementary requirements in a 
pragmatical view in the dynamic daily business. The controlling owner will 
likely reduce the volume of control when he realises that the CEO is acting 
in his/her interests. When the CEO is acting in the interests of the owner 
the owner likely accumulates more and more trust of the CEO and control 
will reduce over time. If that happens, the owner realises that the right 
person for the CEO’s position is on board and then he/she begins to think 
about how it is possible to settle him/her in the enterprise and think likely 
about sharing of interests and success beyond the contractual agreed 
salary. Coincidentally, the CEO might realise that trust and respect from 
the owner support the CEO’s activities. Misconduct and disappointments 
will likely have a negative influence on the owner-CEO interrelationship on 
an emotional and rational basis, and will turn back the gained mutual 
expectations into a new loop and control will increase. If this process is 
going on, as analysed in the entrepreneurial oriented case, a 
complementary governance structure of agency – stewardship – and team 
production theory is merged into one structure and could be able to use all 
the positive effects of the three theories to form one dynamic corporate 
governance theory. The effects of how that could be possible will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7    
7 Discussions 
This chapter will build on the in-depth understanding of the three 
examined cases and will develop an interrelationship influence model of 
the innovation capability in respect to the research question: How does the 
owner-CEO interrelationship potentially influence the innovation capability 
of medium-sized technology enterprises? The chapter begins in Section 
One with a brief review of the research questions; Section Two 
summarises and discusses the findings to develop an interrelationship 
influence model and its potential impact on the innovation capability in 
medium-sized technology enterprises, based on interrelationship 
influences in Chapters 5 and 6. This section is separated into two sub-
sections: firstly, social interrelationship influences and secondly, situational 
interrelationship influences. Finally, Section Three concludes this chapter. 
 
7.1 Research Question 
This thesis has addressed the research question: “How does the 
owner-CEO interrelationship potentially influence the innovation capability 
of medium-sized technology enterprises? ” The findings show that the 
reality is more sophisticated than merely providing advice about new top 
management organisational structures and operational practice, or a 
strategic decision on the part of the owner-CEO dyad. A number of social 
(Section 5.1), psychological (Section 5.2), and situational influences 
(Chapter 6) have been analysed that disembogue in six influence factors 
that combine to influence the interrelationship in an interrelationship 
influence model. This thesis contributes to the knowledge and study of 
organisational governance by illuminating the owner-CEO interrelationship 
in a specific social context and it contributes to the understanding of 
innovation capability by conceptualising the influences of that 
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interrelationship, drilling down into different ideologies and going beyond 
existing knowledge. 
 
7.2 Summary and Discussions 
Two major findings were analysed, based on social (Section 5.1), 
psychological (Section 5.2) and situational influences (Chapter 6), which 
are grounded on corporate governance theories and are revealed out of 
the owner-CEO interrelationship and have their focus on emotional and 
rational aspects, rather than on sheer rational effects, like predominantly in 
the current theories. The analysis indicated that the interplay between 
owner and CEO within their interrelationship has the potential to stimulate 
or constrain the innovation capability of the enterprise and supposes a 
more human view on corporate governance than a purely rational one, 
based on the analysis on the owner’s and CEO’s innovation input and their 
inter-communication and collaboration behaviour, information flow, 
strategic orientation and leadership to innovation, culture and structure of 
corporate governance (Adams, Bessant and Phelps, 2006). First, 
social16influences within the interrelationship are dominated by the owner 
and the CEO in three different action windows (Figure 3, Interrelationship 
Influence Model). The innovation capability of the firm is likely to increase 
if the owner bears the conduct of action within the interrelationship in 
respect of innovation ambitions and the support for the acting person, and 
both actors carry the responsibility for the realisation of the strategic goals 
and have to communicate face to face. The innovation capability is likely 
to be impacted negatively if the CEO does not have sufficient autonomy 
inside the dyad or power within the organisation to lead the operations. 
This contribution is discussed in Section 7.2.1. Second, unsurprisingly, 
the entrepreneurial oriented ownership structure has the highest potential 
to stimulate the innovation capability. Beyond that indicates situational 
influences that a team production affine corporate governance conduct 
                                            
16Social influences also embedded the individual psychological influences that 
are intertwined within the owner-CEO interrelationship.  
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within the owner-CEO interrelationship has the potential to stimulate the 
innovation capability of the enterprise, rather than a stewardship or agency 
conduct. This contribution will be discussed in Section 7.2.2. 
 
7.2.1 Social Interrelationship Influences 
The social interrelationship influences capture the togetherness of 
the owner-CEO dyad and provide corporate governance procedures to 
potentially improve the innovation capability of medium-sized technology 
enterprises. Relational-pre-experiences of the individual lead to a 
behaviour of the two protagonists and follow a determined pattern, 
influenced further by relational dynamics whilst the owner and the CEO 
take their roles within the interrelationship. Thereby, the degree of 
horizontal or vertical hierarchy within the owner-CEO dyad impacts on the 
quality of the corporate governance, as revealed in the three real business 
settings. Likely, a trustful and authentic togetherness promotes the owner-
CEO interrelationship and supports the willingness to solve problems 
generated out of relational dynamics. Business- and relational-dynamics 
are uncertainties and move the dyad into unclear terrain; they guide the 
owner and the CEO continuously in a more and more dynamic world and 
are able to influence rational decisions. The quality of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship is dependent on the dispute-willingness of the two 
protagonists, among others, and hence is an investment into the 
interrelationship and in the same way a fight against their own comfort. 
The identifying of the interrelationship influence factors is presented in 
Table 7.  
The social influences are revealed out of the psychological and 
social interrelationship influences (Chapter 5 and 6) from the observed 
business cases. Table 7 describes the social interrelationship influences 
that have the potential to shape by the two main actors the economic 
situation in general and in particular the innovation capability. Hence, 
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situational dynamics and social dynamics have the potential to influence 
the innovation capability in the enterprise and are presented in the 
interrelationship influence model in Figure 2. 
 
Table 7: Social Interrelationship Influence Factors 
 
Influence Factor Factor Description 
Action Proactive vision by the owner to promote and require 
individual’s (CEO) creativity and organisational innovation 
capability 
Communication Varying viewpoints, dissent, cooperative experiment and the 
willingness for consensus face to face under the conduct of 
constructive debate  
Autonomy CEO needs autonomy to act operationally independent and 
self-responsibly inside and outside the enterprise  
Power Power of execution lies indisputably in the hands of the 
CEO and is granted absolute authority within the enterprise 
Responsibility Active responsibility, respect and trust to reach strategic 
goals and operational challenges must be a passion within 
the owner-CEO interrelationship 
Support Owner´s support, appreciation and care for the CEO and 
creative individuals is crucial in the fact that uncertain 
intentions fail 
 
In respect to the social influence factors in Table 7, this reveals in 
the analysis of the field study a dynamic coherence. The influence factors 
are not static but more a dynamic process, which influence the owner-
CEO dyad continuously in a more recurring improvement loop or at the 
opposite in a worsening loop. The dyad is focused on their social and 
functional structure to generate performance, creativity, and productivity in 
an economic environment that is usually associated with effective and 
poor decisions and interrelationship conflicts (Simons and Peterson, 
2000). Figure 2 illustrates how social dynamics can shape the economic 
situation within the owner-CEO interrelationship in German MSEs. The 
interrelationship quality is likely to be increased if the owner and the CEO 
have a proactive iterative process, which is described in the relational 
model of the owner-CEO dyad (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Interrelationship Influences Model 
The next section is divided into six sub-sections and reflects the 
social interrelationship influences (Table 7) within the corporate 
governance on the innovation capability beyond static environment and 
rational behaviour, and explains in detail the interrelationship influence 
model and how relational dynamics can shape the situation; it goes 
beyond previous studies like agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
stewardship theory (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007), and team 
production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999),which ignored and not explain 
that interrelationship influences have potential to influence the owner-CEO 
dyad and have primarily individual and situational mechanisms examined.  
I start by explaining the interrelationship influences by action, 
followed by communication, autonomy, power, responsibility, and support. 
The used colour in Table 7and Figure 3stands in an explicit coherence: 
blue for the owner’s main activities, green for the activities of the CEO, 
and yellow for the shared activities of the owner and the CEO.  
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7.2.1.1 Action 
An interrelationship influence model (Figure 2), as a continuous 
recurring approach over time, is required first for proactive corporate 
governance action derived out of the perception of the necessity to 
innovate, conditioned by enlargement of the enterprise and behaviour 
routine. Perception requires competent thinking, contemplation (Arendt, 
1958), acting, feeling, and interexchange, and is the source of action and 
needs. Hence, the knowledge to understand the current situation and to 
define a new situation and assume the courage to force the creative 
destruction (Schumpeter, 1934) of an existing equilibrium and be willing to 
bear uncertainty is needed (Knights, 1921). These seem to be basic in 
theory, but in practice they are sometimes just words, as seen in the 
paternalistic case, to foster positive effects to the innovation capability of 
MSEs.  
All three cases define and dominate the owner’s strategic ends, 
influenced in different characteristics by the CEO, even if the ends are 
profit, old age security, or innovation. No CEO is able to define his/her own 
strategic direction, he/she is more responsible to execute the strategy with 
different autonomy. Hence, it lies in the responsibility of the owner to 
decide (Kimberley, 1981; Siegel and Kaemmerer, 1978) on a sustainable 
action. This strategic action-intention, which has its origin from the owner 
or from the CEO in the German dual system/two tier system (Jungmann, 
2006), lies mostly in German MSEs in the hands of the owner, proactive, 
active, or passive, as seen in the inquired cases. A passive action17 
means a confirmation by the owner to strategic action suggestions by the 
CEO and depicts the reality in all three observed cases. Relational 
dynamics in this process are influenced by mutual interdependences, 
emotional and rational, and the owner-CEO interrelationship is seen as: 
emotional familistic in the paternalistic oriented case, rational impersonal 
                                            
17 Proactive action means the owner defines anticipatory strategic actions. 
Active is here defined as an active owner involvement, together with the CEO, in the 
strategy development. 
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in the managerial oriented case, and rational and also emotional in the 
entrepreneurial oriented case. It reveals that action needs a pragmatic trail 
of communication between owner and CEO and it requests a common and 
equal understanding of the situation and reality and the target to reach. 
The entrepreneurial case shows that the owner’s interests, founded in his 
initial action, desire further development between owner and CEO face to 
face in order to generate a common convergence. Its result - and hence 
the derived target - requests clear definition in the business model and in 
the enterprise vision and has to be a fixed part of the strategy (Emsley, 
Nevicky and Harrison, 2006; Gobble 2012), preferentially innovation-
related, as in the entrepreneurial oriented enterprise, in order to have a 
positive influence on the innovation capability. Initial action in a proactive 
vision needs a long wind and requires individual creativity to enhance the 
innovation capability. It needs a dynamic retrospection by the main actors, 
as practised in the entrepreneurial case. The paternalistic oriented case 
signalled a clear orientation toward innovation activities, but ultimately 
ended in lip service, which created adverse consequences and 
incredibility.  If action is only profit-related and disembogues in a virtual 
strategy, like in the managerial oriented case (target >12% profit), the 
influence on innovation capability is presumably less positive. Action 
wishes a clear appreciation within the dyad to harmonise it. Otherwise, 
different appreciation within the dyad could lead unambiguously into stress 
between the owner and the CEO. 
Similar influences can have catchwords because it is en vogue to 
have ideas written on your enterprise webpage, but not as an action 
platform in your mind. Clear and balanced conduct and communication 
potentially lead to a common approach (Monge, Cozzens and Contractor, 
1992; Amabile, 1996), which gives the CEO the autonomy to act 
independently in the interests of the owner with informative communication 
in both directions between the CEO and the owner.  
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7.2.1.2 Communication 
Communication requests easy-to-understand words in enterprises 
- no euphemisms like positive practices in the entrepreneurial oriented 
case, and symbolic negative, applied in the managerial case. The owner 
and the CEO within their interrelationship then know the current status of 
imminent actions without having to ask. An information asymmetry 
between the two actors (Eisenhardt, 1988) seems to be counterproductive. 
Open communication, as the basis of a conduct of constructive debate, 
face to face, is natural and is likely the basis of cooperation within the 
interrelationship. It supports a common set of speech acts to define the 
types of messages, a common ontology by which the actors can describe 
their capabilities to each other, and a common set of prescriptive 
conversation policies to define acceptable exchanges of messages 
(Nodine and Unruh, 1997). With open communication, the possibility of 
creativity within the dyad increases. Hannah Arendt (1958) is convinced 
that speech alone is already creativity, which is confirmed by practical 
doing in the entrepreneurial oriented case. Communication is the 
foundation to define what I like and what I do not like (Monge, Cozzens 
and Contractor, 1992; Amabile, 1996; Tasheva and Hillman, 2018) and 
helps to move from initial dissent to finally find a common consent. 
Communication in a pragmatic sense really means to do it without any fear 
of a rebuke from the owner. Communication develops a common reality 
(James, 1994) and enhances mutual trust, which moderates the 
relationship between task conflict and interrelationship conflict (Simons 
and Peterson, 2000) and supports the realisation of common dynamic 
ends. Collective practical experiences reveal their effect by verification in 
the action result. This reduces mutual expectations and in the same way 
emotions, and comes to the fore by the utility of all participants. The 
success defines what is true and what is not, and this reality requests 
proactive substitutes from the CEO in the direction of the owner. A good 
communication within the dyad is likely to be impacted positively if the 
message is positive or negative. This substitute supports trust in the 
owner-CEO interrelationship by creation of realities that are stored and 
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suitable. Hence, the whole process of communication seems as an 
investigation into the owner-CEO interrelationship, assists the 
complications of dyad dynamics and supports more than the exterior 
pretence. 
Creativity is based in dissent (Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 
1994; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2018), and varying viewpoints of the world 
from the willingness of the actors disembogue in a consensus until the 
pragmatic reality (Rorty, 1979, James 1994), which shows the necessary 
corrections through which an interrelationship has to withstand the strain. 
As demonstrated in the entrepreneurial oriented case, an innovation-
oriented communication, face to face between the owner and the CEO, 
which is expressed in a horizontal hierarchy and a team approach, is 
possible and appears to be in the same way essential in other 
organisational levels of the enterprise. The owner in the paternalistic 
oriented case tends to communicate in a one-way direction, whilst the 
managerial oriented owner generates an atmosphere of a face-to-face 
communication, which is not perceived in the same way by the CEO. In 
both cases, it is clear that this behaviour is potentially not innovation 
friendly. Hence, the verification of the interrelationship quality reveals in 
the performance, in the content of this study, in the capability to innovate. 
The quality of communication (Olson, 1987; Gobble, 2012) between owner 
and CEO defines what kind of sphere of influence a CEO has, and in the 
same way whether he/she has autonomy or not. 
 
7.2.1.3 Autonomy 
Autonomy is likely important to have solid self-awareness (Duval 
and Wicklund, 1973) and self-confidence and induce trust from the owner, 
as positively confirmed in the entrepreneurial oriented case, which 
supports the team approach (Dierdorff, Fischer and Rubin, 2018). In 
dynamic and uncertain global and technological environments the CEO 
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supports autonomy (Cotgrove and Box, 1970; Dansereau, Graen and 
Haga, 1975; Graen and Scandura, 1987; Johannisson and Huse, 2000; 
Winkler, 2009; Wang and Rode, 2010, Gobble, 2012, Jian, 2015) in order 
to become more and more of an effective organisational leader (Rubens, 
Schoenfeld, Schaffer and Leah, 2018). It reveals in the entrepreneurial 
case that autonomy increases the affinity, immunity, and the trust within 
the interrelationship, rather than in the paternalistic oriented case, where 
the owner demonstrates generically what happens if the CEO has no 
autonomy. This interrelationship behaviour tends to be negatively related 
to the innovation capability of the enterprise. The creativity of a CEO 
desires reduction of the owner’s input. If the owner stands in the 
foreground, the CEO cannot take over power or responsibility in the daily 
business. An autonomous CEO stands in the foreground in the 
entrepreneurial oriented case and demonstrates operational 
independence and his influence on the innovation capability out of a 
trustful interrelationship with his owner. The opposite is true in the 
paternalistic oriented case, in which the owner bestows a negative effect 
because he is not willing to hand over the operational responsibility to the 
CEO and deprives her of the necessary autonomy and trust. The consent 
to power is not the same between the owner and the CEO. The above-
mentioned dyad dynamics influenced by communication disembogue by 
verification in the CEO autonomy and are reflected in the quality of trust 
that is endowed by the owner to the CEO. 
If the strategy includes a set of overall project goals towards 
innovation (Gobble, 2012), as practised in the entrepreneurial oriented 
case, and the owner allows a high level of procedural autonomy 
accompanied by a clear planning and feedback process, the CEO is likely 
able, by a high quality of communication between his work group, to 
support the work of individuals as well, throughout the entire enterprise 
(Monge, Cozzens and Contractor, 1992; Amabile, 1996). Where “radius of 
operation” is not just a catchphrase, it provides the basis for the daily work 
of the CEO, enabled by the owner’s unrestricted trust (Schoorman, Mayer 
and Davis, 2007; Monge, Cozzens and Contractor, 1992; 
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Csikszentmihalyi, 1994; Amabile, 1996). If the CEO cannot trust his owner, 
then the basis of the interrelationship is certainly destroyed. The 
paternalistic oriented owner practises the opposite and limits the 
autonomy of the CEO significantly and leads her into a heteronomy. The 
CEO is strongly dependent on the owner’s action. The autonomous 
opportunities and the operational constraints of the owner in respect to the 
strategic definitions stand in a dynamic oxymoron. The CEO in the 
managerial oriented case has this necessary autonomy. He is able to act - 
operationally - independently and self-responsibly inside and outside the 
enterprise, with one significant restriction: the autonomous behaviour of 
the CEO must not reduce the expected profit or jeopardize the liquidity to 
serve the owner’s cash pay-out. Beugelsdijk and Jindra (2018) find that 
higher decision-making autonomy increases the probability of product 
innovation. The autonomy of the CEO (Agarwal, Goel and Vashishtha, 
2014) is grounded in a mutual thinking and feeling between the CEO, 
which has its roots in the communication within the owner-CEO 
interrelationship and finds its verification in the acting of the CEO and 
hence particularly within the innovation capability.  
When the CEO is involved in an innovation process, the amount of 
decision latitude, influence and autonomy that the owner will allow is 
revealed as a crucial factor (Dansereau, Graen and Haga, 1975; Graen 
and Scandura, 1987; Winkler, 2009; Jian, 2015). Autonomy here is 
characterised by trust (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Möllering, 
2005; Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007), mutual liking and respect 
(Cotgrove and Box, 1970; Winkler, 2009; Wand and Rode, 2010) and 
disembogues finally in the necessary power for the CEO to execute. 
 
7.2.1.4 Power 
Power is likely to be impacted positively if the owner has an 
autonomous CEO who is able to enforce strategic targets and operative 
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interest in the enterprise. Power is revealed as a key factor in corporate 
governance (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003) and as a potentially major 
conflict among the owner and the CEO (Jensen and Warner, 1988) and is 
able to generate interrelationship conflicts. Power in organisations 
contents the ability to influence individual and organisational behaviour, 
change the course of actions, overcome resistance and convince people 
to do things that they would not do otherwise (Pfeffer, 1992). It reveals as 
a management tool that generates rational and emotional perceptions in 
the receiver, as revealed in the three examined cases, and can generate, 
in practice, many conflicts. Power as an operational imperative of the CEO 
demands proactive cooperation from the owner, which is cooperation with 
dependence and requires trust from the owner. 
This conflict potential is significant in the paternalistic oriented 
dyad and rudimentary in the managerial oriented dyad, not least by limited 
trust in the CEO. The CEO in the paternalistic oriented dyad has not got 
the power to decide, and hence innovation capability tends to suffer. The 
owner gives the CEO no credit to decide. She acts in the inquired case as 
a puppet and in this sense not face to face. That the CEO is desperate in 
these circumstances is of no interest to the owner and it is also 
conceivable that this power evaluation within the interrelationship is contra 
to the innovation capability.  Even if the CEO has the power as CEO to 
decide, the reality demonstrates that the CEO has no ability to influence 
the owner’s behaviour and change the course of actions, and is not able to 
convince the owner to do things that she would do otherwise. The dyad in 
this case seems to be an emotional reality, with less ability for rational 
actions as innovative activities, and demonstrates how relational dynamics 
potentially shape the interrelationship situation and hence particularly 
influence the innovation capability. The CEO does not succeed in the 
paternalistic oriented enterprise and demonstrates her inability to come 
out on top within the interrelationship with her owner, with all its negative 
influences on the innovation capability of the enterprise. “How can I please 
my owner” in the dynamic daily togetherness burdens the feeling of the 
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CEO and has a higher priority in the paternalistic dyad, rather than the 
rational performance of the enterprise. 
In contradiction to this disequilibrium is the entrepreneurial owner’s 
awareness of the necessity of the CEO´s power. He is able to do what is 
necessary in the daily operations without any consultation with his owner, 
and the owner likes this and stands behind the CEO and supports him if 
necessary. The CEO is the source of power, supported by the owner. The 
entrepreneurial owner fosters the power of the CEO because he likely 
knows that without power the CEO’s authority is not enough to govern the 
enterprise and will not earn the required respect from his staff, which is 
probably necessary to reach the strategic targets. The CEO´s power is 
revealed in the eyes of the entrepreneurial owner as an instrument of 
power to reach his own targets, grounded in trust in the CEO. This stroke 
is perfectly implemented in the entrepreneurial case, is accepted from both 
sides, depicts the interrelationship behaviour and is potentially verified in 
the innovation capability of the enterprise. In contradiction to this is the 
CEO in the managerial dominated case, with less power. In the daily 
business he is competent to demonstrate his power within the organisation 
but in the direct contact with his owner he is not equal face to face in 
respect to the power distribution, which does likely not have that much 
negative impact on the creative endeavour of the CEO because he is 
tough enough to differentiate and follow his own interests in the daily 
business. As long as the success of the enterprise is on target, every 
action will be ratified afterwards, which is a huge act of faith. All effects will 
likely have a potential impact on the interrelationship: negative effects 
stress the interrelationship and demonstrate dynamic conflict potential 
beyond rational influences. 
This inquiry in three different cases reveals the fact that the 
sufficient power of the CEO is likely to be increased if the owner supports 
the CEO without any constraints in relation to third parties. Within the 
dyad, an open communication helps to evaluate the action. Power 
requests for verification (James, 1994) and is revealed in the opportunity 
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of the CEO to change individual and organisational behaviour. If that is not 
given within the dyad, a negative impact to the innovation capability is 
likely inevitable. Power includes the competence of the acting individual. It 
seems to be obvious that only with power, given by the owner rooted in 
the owner-CEO dyad, is the CEO able to influence subordinates by 
decisions and lead an enterprise, controlling the conduct of the employees 
and the entire enterprise. Power likely induces further a proactive 
responsibility for actions. 
 
7.2.1.5 Responsibility 
The innovation capability is likely to be affected positively if the 
CEO and the owner take their individual responsibility, which is based in 
their functional power and their personal role: the owner as strategic driver 
and the CEO as operational driver. The CEO and the owner can hardly 
devolve their responsibility, even if it is en vogue to submit responsibility to 
employees and define leadership bottom up. Responsibility can emerge as 
a diktat to decide and act, satisfying continuous readiness to act on 
rational and emotional circumstances. Responsibility is sometimes not 
deferrable and defies the ability to act. Current decisions could be 
outdated tomorrow. The economic digital world is quite dynamically driven 
by progress and hence by innovation. Strategic reflections could be wrong 
before they are implemented and this claims a close cooperation between 
the owner-CEO. Different comprehension and unspoken individual and 
social anxieties could hamper the acceptance of more necessary 
responsibility and influence the owner-CEO interrelationship.  
The paternalistic oriented case is in a situation where the 
responsibility of the owner is not deferrable. For the time being, the 
paternalistic oriented owner tries to postpone his action but the clock is 
ticking. This behaviour paralyses the CEO, burdens the interrelationship 
with her owner and the entire enterprise and seems to be fatal for the 
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innovation capability. On the other hand, the CEO knows about the current 
situation and is also keen to take over responsibility. However, the CEO 
has not the courage to act against the owner, being grounded in their 
interrelationship. She is too weak to assert her interests and the owner 
favours a weak CEO to avoid a face to face interrelationship and also 
favours a unilateral dependency. The owner keeps the vertical hierarchy 
on hold with authority and the CEO has not the courage and the strength 
to act. The owner symbolises the opposite of a team player. Hence, the 
paternalistic oriented case persists in a degeneration phase, caused by an 
owner-CEO dyad with its verification in a low innovation capability 
potential. Responsibility likely demands courageous proactive action and 
there should be passion to act within the interrelationship, which is 
revealed more demonstratively in the entrepreneurial oriented case.  
On the basis of missing close cooperation within the managerial 
dyad is the CEO with his reduced level of responsibility. He has to resist 
the stress from the owner in case of wrong decisions, but he enjoys, on 
the other hand, a high degree of freedom. The CEO has to carry the load 
of responsibility on his own shoulders, which has a favourable effect on 
the dyad if the performance of the enterprise is in the interests of the 
owner, but if not, negative effects on the dyad are inevitable, with an effect 
of a lower risk awareness, which could have negative potential for the 
innovation capability. The quality of the managerial dyad is focused on the 
owner’s financial targets. Deviations lead to stress within the 
interrelationship. Trust in the CEO´s responsibility is revealed as a 
unilateral non-negotiable rational reality. The social stress that occurs in 
this situation for the CEO is approved and influences the sustainability of 
the owner-CEO interrelationship and is verified particularly in the 
innovation capability of the enterprise. 
The owner and the CEO in the entrepreneurial oriented case have 
similar and proximate dominant traits (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997), like responsibility and autonomy. Both actors know and assume 
their individual responsibility and are aware of their tasks. They both 
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demonstrate their passion for the task they have to enact and take their 
responsibility role proactively. The whole togetherness and support among 
each other is exemplary, and is presumably the trigger for the constructive 
face-to-face interrelationship of both actors and seems to be innovation 
friendly. A coincidence in appreciation and perception and in acting will be 
signalled in the verification (James, 1994), which is revealed in a collective 
responsibility for the same tasks. The rational interdependence in a 
vertical hierarchy and the social and professional togetherness between 
owner and CEO lead to a responsible interrelationship (team), where a 
mutual reliance strengthens the individual to decide in necessary steps the 
targets of the enterprise. The CEO feels secure in the performance of his 
responsibility and knows that he has the support of his owner in the case 
of failure, which potentially increases the innovation capability of the 
enterprise. 
 
7.2.1.6 Support 
It is certain that individuals need, from childhood, good support 
and the feeling of being safely attached (Bowlby, 1958; Petzold, 2012):to 
take individuals seriously, to be honest, and to be understood. Individuals 
have a need for appreciation, affiliation, and perceived security (Rogers, 
1959, Petzold; 2012). If the CEO is not safely attached, he/she is not 
taken seriously and honestly and is not understood within the dyad; he/she 
likely acts uncertainly and transmits this behaviour to the entire enterprise, 
which can have a significant negative potential on the innovation capability 
(Van de Ven, 1997; Jeschke, Isenhard, Hees and Trantow, 2011). This 
phenomenon is revealed exactly in the paternalistic oriented case, where 
the CEO does not get the necessary support and feels unsafely attached 
within the organisation. This has led to the situation where the CEO is 
thinking about leaving the enterprise because she has no standing and no 
backing from her owner. The owner is too strong and if the CEO is acting 
against his interests he denies his support. The owner likes to fix the 
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traditions and effects a potentially negative influence on the innovation 
capability. The owner in the entrepreneurial oriented case is generically 
entrepreneurial, supporting his CEO and standing behind him, even in the 
case of failure, thereby giving him the feeling that he is safely attached 
within the organisation. This support of the owner is realised by everybody 
in the organisation and no one has any doubt about the autonomy and the 
power of the CEO. He acts likely with absolute respect and the safe 
support and trust of the owner. 
Without any doubt the owner stands behind his CEO in the 
managerial case and supports him as best he can, but with a significant 
limitation. Success is mandatory, and if the CEO does not reach the 
performance targets of the agreed budget he loses the standing, backing, 
and support of his owner, which bestows on him a limited safe attachment. 
They have only a common dyad reality if the CEO accepts the reality of 
the owner, which is profit related. If this target can be reached by 
innovation it is welcome, if not the owner-CEO interrelationship will get 
stressed. Reality is only that which brings the success forward (James, 
1994) in the eyes of the owner, and that in the short-term. Astonishingly in 
this inquiry is the fact that the owner in the paternalistic oriented case does 
not stand behind his daughter in the business environment, nor does he 
give support, appreciation and care for his daughter, so that she does not 
have the unlimited feeling of staying safely attached in the enterprise. The 
owner instead harms his CEO and gives her no backing, seemingly happy 
to stand there as the big old hero whilst using his daughter, the CEO of the 
enterprise, as a pawn in his hands. 
 The innovation capability of the enterprise is likely to be affected 
positively if the CEO gets support from their owner for their actions, 
whether successful or not. I came to the conviction that support is likely 
the mandatory factor within the owner-CEO interrelationship in order to 
potentially foster the innovation capability. If support is missing, particularly 
in the case of wrong decisions, a CEO will decide with more anxiety and 
reduce his/her risk propensity to innovate. Missing support by the owner 
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can destroy the structural order of the dyad and deregulate the 
interrelationship. It is likely that this support and care of the owner adjust 
the interrelationship, which is based on trust and the functionality of 
togetherness, and colour the next relational model action, as analysed in 
the enquired cases’ reality.  
 Support and appreciation likely give the acting individuals the 
safety to act, even if the outcome is uncertain. They give immunity and 
existential safety, which is significantly important for a dependent acting 
CEO. The last point is likely mandatory in the owner-CEO interrelationship 
in respect to innovation capability. In successful actions, the support of the 
CEO is natural. In case of false actions and failings, the CEO will be more 
and more vulnerable and need crisis liability and reciprocity, a backing for 
the situation from the owner that relies on protection of the weaker 
individual. An emotional attachment could likely strengthen the owner-
CEO interrelationship and protect the CEO from mental overload. If fear of 
failure is dominating the interrelationship, negative influences in the area 
of the innovation capability of the enterprises are likely unavoidable. The 
CEO in the entrepreneurial oriented dyad confirms the support of his 
owner if wrong decisions and executions are made, and has obvious 
enough resilience to manage the situation (Herrman, Stewart and Diaz-
Granados, 2011; Dovey, Burdon and Simpson, 2017). Permanent 
communication means that wrong decisions and failures are not a surprise 
within the owner-CEO interrelationship. They are announced and 
discussed in good time. This conduct is seemingly not possible in the 
paternalistic and managerial oriented cases, and leads to the fact that the 
risk-taking propensity - and with it the innovation capability – disappears in 
varying degrees.  
Failed investments in innovations adversely affect the rational 
reality and burden the owner-CEO interrelationship. The crucial point 
seems to be how the dyad learns from this situation. Within the owner-
CEO interrelationship, similar experiences and perceptions must be learnt 
from and acted upon in the next case more professionally in respect to the 
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intended target in order to improve the innovation capability in particular. 
The quality of the interrelationship seems to be crucial and demonstrates 
by the different influence show relational dynamics based on emotional 
and rational aspects potentially shape the situation within the owner-CEO 
dyad and beyond. 
 
7.2.1.7 Conclusion 
Six influence factors: action, communication, autonomy, power, 
responsibility and support demonstrate how emotional and rational 
dynamics shape the situation within the owner-CEO interrelationship and 
reveal potential in the innovation capability of the enterprise. Within the 
pragmatism approach (Rorty, 1979, James 1994) occur relational 
dynamics on an emotional and rational basis, which will be continuously 
changed in comparison to a static, rational approach specific to each of 
the current theories: agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
stewardship theory (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007), and team 
production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999). Mutual dependencies and 
mutual trust play a significant role in the perception and sensibility of the 
daily togetherness within the owner-CEO dyad. The pragmatism approach 
(James, 1974) reveals in the inquiry of the owner-CEO interrelationship a 
system of emotional and rational meanings, so itis likely that this 
influences the innovation capability of the MSEs and constitutes a reality 
that occurs in the practical and experienced dyad. Hence, emotions likely 
influence rational behaviour. The collective team approach, with an owner 
and a CEO who integrate their human and physical resources (Belloc, 
2012) within the interrelationship, and have more operational closeness, 
seems to potentially stimulate the innovation capability. In respect of 
continuously conflicting dynamics, the innovation capability of the 
enterprise is likely to be affected positively if the owner and the CEO use 
the interrelationship influence model. 
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The prior discussed influences within the owner-CEO 
interrelationship demonstrate generic innovation conditions in German 
MSEs and reveal factors that are able to shape the dynamic situation. The 
continuous interrelationship influence model approach reveals first that 
action and support bear the main factors for the owner to influence the 
owner-CEO interrelationship, whilst second, for the CEO, the factors are 
power and autonomy. Finally, a common agreement and acting platform 
for the owner and CEO to facilitate communication and responsibility 
seems crucial. The factors of communication and responsibility demand 
the proactive cooperation of the owner and the CEO within their 
interrelationship to ensure appreciation, affiliation, and perceived security 
(Rogers, 1959; Petzold, 2012). All influence factors in the owner-CEO 
interrelationship are revealed in the interrelationship influence model 
(Figure 3), which improves potentially by its rational and emotional 
behaviour the innovation capability in the enterprise. It becomes more and 
more clear that a contract between owner and CEO, as requested in the 
agency and stewardship theories, cannot foresee relational dynamic 
conflicts and confirms the relational contract theory of Macneil (1980).  
New actualities create new realities (James, 1974) and so it 
seems necessary to repeat the interrelationship influence model in an 
endless loop to generate new knowledge to improve the innovation 
capability of the enterprise. This entrepreneurial action, initiated by a 
common understanding between owner and CEO, leads into the next loop, 
a continuous recurrent change which increases the resilience of the dyad 
in case of stress and conflicts and bears potentially positive effects to the 
innovation capability. The action to communicate a strategic change is the 
inspiration to allow the CEO to use his/her autonomy and power to lead 
the enterprise with responsibility to the announced target.  
The results of this study, which are verified in the pragmatic reality, 
reveal - beyond rational influences - emotional influences that were not 
reflected deeply in the existing literature. The current corporate 
governance theories: agency theory, stewardship theory, and team 
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production theory (Table 1) are not grasped deeply enough. These 
predominantly rational approaches are extended by an emotional 
influence, as discussed in the interrelationship influence model (Figure 3). 
Whilst the team production theory and the stewardship theory take more 
account of social and collective influences, these influences deny the 
agency theory its existence. Social influences, based on rational and 
emotional aspects within the owner-CEO interrelationship, have potential 
to influence the innovation capability in medium-sized technology 
enterprises, as do situational influences. 
 
7.2.2 Situational Interrelationship Influences 
The literature review identified that much of the research on the 
interaction of owners and CEOs is revealed within corporate governance, 
based on situational influences in agency, stewardship and team 
production theory. In this section I discuss the relevance of the three 
theories in respect to situational interrelationship influences, as discussed 
in Chapter 6. The adoption of the ideology-based framework enabled me 
to examine variations in owner-CEO interrelationships to tease out how 
economic theories might be relevant to the research question: How does 
the owner-CEO interrelationship potentially influence the innovation 
capability of medium-sized technology enterprises?   
The corporate governance principle in the current literature is 
separated into two factions: shareholder principle and stakeholder 
principle (Bottenberg, Tuschke and Flickinger, 2017), with their different 
effects on the owner-CEO interrelationship. Basically, it seems that the two 
principles are more competing than complementary, and this will be 
discussed. As the analysis indicated, the team production-oriented case 
potentially stimulates the innovation capability of the enterprise more than 
a stewardship or agency approach could. The origins of that result could 
be the consolidation of the owner´s and CEO’s common knowledge, as 
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demonstrated in the entrepreneurial oriented case. Whilst more agency 
theory-near cases serve budget controlling activities and the owner´s 
hubris and satisfaction, the team production-oriented and technology-
driven owner has more of a realisation of innovation targets in the 
foreground. This significant difference seems to be a result of the 
collective thinking of the two protagonists and is more task driven then 
individual driven, and likely bears less emotional influences, which have 
the potential to reduce interrelationship conflicts and could stimulate the 
innovation capability positively (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006; Sapra; 
Sapra, Subramanian and Subramanian, 2014). The collective thinking, 
paired with a face-to-face interrelationship that is based on a horizontal 
hierarchy, likely supports the concentration on professional tasks and 
reduces the potential of intra-personal conflicts.  
A comparable aspect is possibly the strategic philosophy. It makes 
in my eyes no difference if corporate governance is focused on business 
development, profit enhancement or conservation of the status quo (see 
Table 6). All of these targets could be flanked by innovation activities, but 
the collective identity seems to be particularly important (Tassabehji and 
Elliman, 2006) to the announcement of strategic targets (Craig and Dibrell, 
2006) and the volition to improve value creation (Huse, 2005b). This 
appears more in the team production approach, because of the collective 
agreed target and execution, rather than in the agency and stewardship 
approach, where the strategy definition and the execution lie in the hands 
of the CEO and the owner can only monitor the proceedings. Hence, 
mistrust is constrained, but increasing monitoring potentially affects the 
innovation capability. The commitment of the stakeholders within the 
owner-CEO interrelationship to strategic decisions bears potential to 
stimulate the innovation capability. Bottenberg, Tuschke and Flickinger 
(2017) argued that stakeholder-created strategic decisions are less 
oriented towards maximising profit and potentially support the innovation 
capability more (Trantow, Hees and Jeschke, 2012). Strategies and the 
strategic execution result in unavoidable conflicts between the team 
members and hence impact on costs, due to concentrations on multiple 
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interest groups (Bottenberg, Tuschke and Flickinger, 2017). I see this 
potential problem as being relatively small in the owner-CEO 
interrelationship if good communication is mandatory and trustful 
togetherness is given, as appeared in the entrepreneurial oriented case.  
The analysis showed that two agency theory-near owners have a 
stronger social conflict with their CEO. The application of liquid assets, 
market orientation, and innovation ambitions reveals as different and bear 
many conflicts in the two cases, whilst the entrepreneurial case with a 
more collective approach reaches consent here and reduces tensions and 
conflict dynamics within the interrelationship. Certainly, that is due to the 
fact that the quality of the owner-CEO interrelationship, which is based on 
the psychological and social interrelationship influences, discussed in 
Section 7.2.1, is in this case stronger than in others. Individual stimulus, 
expectation, motive, and mutual support bear potential to influence the 
effectiveness of the interrelationship, as well as social influences. A stable 
owner-CEO interrelationship possibly also opens the doors easier for 
endogenous support like that which is required in co-creation or open 
innovation, which could potentially stimulate the innovation capability of 
the enterprise (Ramaswamy and Ozcan, 2014; Lee, Olson and Trimi, 
2012) and extend the network around common interests; this is likely more 
possible in a team production approach. A consequence of the 
stakeholder approach is that it likely leads to a higher attachment of the 
CEO to the enterprise, which could entail better cooperation between 
owner and CEO (Reckwitz, 2018) in the case of crises (Bottenberg, 
Tuschke and Flickinger, 2017). Sharing of profit indicates in the same way 
also a reduction of the CEO’s wages and a withdrawal of contractually 
agreed wage-standards if necessary, and could help to bridge difficult 
enterprise stages. If the collective stands in the foreground in the owner-
CEO interrelationship, exogenous disturbances are easier analysed and 
proactive counteracts are more likely, which support a team production 
approach. To be a part of the collective in crises or prosperity periods 
hypothetically affects the CEO as stakeholder and team members by 
emotions that are not easy to describe, but potentially motivate the CEO 
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and increase their interrelationship quality. This claim needs further 
research. 
Teams are able to produce more when they are working together 
than when they are working separately (Blair and Stout, 1999). Each extra 
effort of the owner or the CEO can generate extra value creation, which is 
shared in team production theory. Shirking, rent-seeking, and reliance 
could be a problem, which was more analysed in the cases that were not 
team oriented, where the owner in the managerial oriented enterprise 
replied to the CEO that he executes the necessary actions. In the 
paternalistic case it was the CEO who stated that the owner supports her 
and that the business moves on. Both behaviours seem to indicate mutual 
consent, but the whole individual power was not used. The analysis 
indicated that all CEOs and owners have reasons to want all of the others 
to corporate fully and hope in the same way to benefit from their 
involvement, and are likely to have an interest in finding an 
interrelationship that is effective at eliciting support and cooperation from 
the counterparts, whose contributions are important to improve the 
innovation capability. The owner and CEO as a sum can create together in 
a good working interrelationship potentially more than when they are 
separate. Finally, it seems that what is good for the enterprise is 
prospectively good for the stakeholders, too. Likely it needs more than the 
volition to innovate and it has less to do with the corporate governance 
principle. Instead, it has more to with the fact that the owner and the CEO 
fit with their characteristics one principle or the other, and if she/he is 
willing to serve the requirements, which are more endogenous factors. 
The study shows that both endogenous and exogenous factors potentially 
influence the innovation capability.  
The shareholder approach in agency and stewardship theory and 
the stakeholder approach in team production theory must be, in my eyes, 
not imperatively competitive. These approaches have also the possibility 
to complement each other. Control, trust, and sharing symbolise each of 
the theories and could not be seen as static elements in corporate 
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governance. Control and monitoring are revealed as necessary elements 
in interrelationships if there is no history between the protagonists. The 
analysis indicated that trust fosters commitment of the owner and CEO, 
which could stimulate the innovation capability. In the available history of 
this issue, trust likely will emerge and the owners will consolidate this 
status. The collective conduct will move into the foreground and a more 
team-oriented approach will develop. Trust, interdependences and sharing 
of power, responsibility, and incentives win through and potentially 
stimulate the innovation capability of the enterprise. The thus developed 
team approach leads to an interrelationship on a higher level and 
potentially influences the innovation capability positively. By these 
circumstances the team production likely provides a more positive ground 
for a fair interrelationship, and supports co-determination (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2010) between owner and CEO and reduces the one-way 
interrelationship mentality in the agency and stewardship theories. The 
analysis indicated that the corporate governance approach within the 
owner-CEO interrelationship follows over time an evolutionary process 
from a more control-oriented agency theory to a more collective trust-
oriented stewardship theory, with both theories dominated by a 
shareholder concept to a more stakeholder approach, where collective 
team spirit and trust stand in the foreground and where the initial CEO 
dependency of the owner moves to a mutual interdependency at eye level. 
Initial theoretical competitiveness between shareholder and stakeholder 
principles intertwine in the transmission and emerge as complementary in 
a pragmatic approach, as verified in the entrepreneurial case, and support 
a long-term owner-CEO interrelationship, as suggested in the team 
production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999). Analysis of this verified that a 
hybrid principle is more likely than a theoretical existence of one corporate 
governance theory, which supports the assumption that the dynamic 
pragmatic reality verifies the potential influence of the innovation 
capability, not the theory. 
Monitoring and control reveal as a key issue in agency theory, 
whilst it is more substituted in stewardship and team production theory by 
180 
 
trust. I argue that monitoring is a key element for each professional CEO 
in MSEs, whether in agency, stewardship or team production in a 
pragmatical approach. Without monitoring as a logic and control unit in 
corporate governance it seems likely impossible to lead an MSE to 
success. Why the CEO does not discuss this monitoring proactively with 
their owner independently, whether in a shareholder or stakeholder 
principle in order to reduce dynamics between the two parties, is an 
important question. The latest dynamics could come up within the next 
annual report, guided by a lot of emotions. This more collective-team 
approach involves the owner indirectly in the execution and reduces the 
scope for rational and emotional frustration in MSEs. If trust emerges it 
does not equally imply that an agency approach loses the claim for 
separation between ownership and control. It merely means to implement 
team ideas in a pragmatical agency approach, which forces the conclusion 
that a hybrid governance approach by an increase of trust in an agency 
theory could have positive potential to influence the innovation capability 
(Ozcelik, Langton, and Aldrich, 2008; Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, 2010; 
Miao, Newman, Schwarz and Cooper, 2017; Hasche, Linton and Öberg; 
2017).The owner’s input in MSEs is more intensive than in large 
enterprises, and leads to an inevitably closer cooperation between owner 
and CEO. If the owner-CEO interrelationship follows a team production-
near behaviour, with collective ends, it is likely that the innovation 
capability will be stimulated, rather than in an agency context, where 
ownership and control are more strictly separated. Interviews with the 
team-oriented owner reveal manifoldly the impression that situational 
circumstances are potentially less emotionally explosive than in the other 
interrelationships, which potentially influence the innovation capability of 
the enterprise and contribute, by this finding, to knowledge. The more 
collective behaviour in the team-oriented approach could lead to a closer 
link between the participants, which could reduce or in the same way 
increase emotional dynamics. Likely it seems to be important to establish 
a professional distance between owner and CEO, rather than to lose the 
desired rational imperative in technology and profit oriented MSEs. 
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The different ideological effects (Johannisson and Huse, 2000), as 
a further antecedent of corporate governance, indicate further situational 
interrelationship influences. The analysed patriarchal case, dominated by 
saturation and instability, is unlikely to stimulate the innovation capability. 
A unilateral understanding of reality contradicts the pragmatical reality 
approach and has likely potential to constrain the innovation capability, as 
it seems counter-productive for a team production approach. A similar 
influence appeared in the managerial case, where the wait-and-see 
mentality and a reduced decision-making of the CEO within the 
interrelationship was less team oriented. The opposite reveals in the 
entrepreneurial case, where the necessary openness to innovation was 
part of the owner-CEO interrelationship on the team level, as extensively 
discussed in Section 7.2.1. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have examined the potential influences of the 
owner-CEO interrelationship on the innovation capability in medium-sized 
technological enterprises. I have asked whether this interrelationship is 
affected by corporate governance theories like agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997) and team production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999) and by different 
ideologies (Johannisson and Huse, 2000), and I have highlighted social 
and situational interrelationship influences in the area of innovation 
capability. The previous research on innovation capability (Crossan and 
Apaydin, 2010) has tended to look at the internal workings of the firm and 
has ignored the stronger influences of the owner in MSEs and focused on 
the internal workings more than on rational influences. Emotional 
influences within the owner-CEO interrelationship have often been 
neglected. 
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In my discussion, I demonstrated that social and situational 
interrelationship influences (Figure 3, interrelationship influence model) 
can have a number of stimulating or constraining potentials to the 
innovation capability, particularly in MSEs. A stable owner-CEO 
interrelationship founded on mutual trust and commitment, based on 
action, communication, autonomy, power, responsibility and support can 
create a lasting approach to improve the innovation capability. Moreover, a 
stronger commitment towards team production and an entrepreneurial 
conduct within the owner-CEO interrelationship may support innovations 
and innovation capability, and may help the enterprise to manage dynamic 
challenges. Medium-sized technological enterprises may tap the potential 
of the owner-CEO interrelationship more effectively because they are 
considered emotional and rational influences. Refined knowledge and 
expertise in owner-CEO interrelationships enable protagonists to 
understand the value of an efficient interrelationship and their potential to 
influence the innovation capability. It could be argued that the owner 
knows how to profit from the owner-CEO interrelationship in order to 
influence innovation capability, rather than view the interrelationship as a 
time consuming and contractual necessity. Stable owner-CEO 
interrelationships, as well as expertise in emotional and rational influences 
between individuals, are likely anchored in successful corporate 
governance systems. This provides an environment in which the positive 
effects of interrelationship influences are facilitated. 
However, one major problem of corporate governance potential 
influences on the innovation capability that remains is that its success 
depends strongly on the quality of the existing owner-CEO 
interrelationship. Particularly, a strong owner-CEO interrelationship that is 
not managed adequately (Coff, 1999) can weaken rather than enhance 
the enterprise innovation capability. Whereas owner-CEO 
interrelationships characterised by mutual trust and commitment to 
interrelationship influences towards the success of the enterprise can 
serve to stimulate innovation capability, interrelationships that lack these 
criteria can constrain the enterprise innovation capability. It could be 
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argued that MSE corporate governance interrelationships could be more 
conducive to interrelationship dynamics when the owner’s and the CEO’s 
emotional and rational aspects are highly intertwined. However, instead of 
generating doubts about the existence of emotional influences of owners 
and CEOs, the protagonists have to realise that emotions likely influence 
rational behaviour (Pham and Tuan, 2007). This ongoing discussion, for 
example, involves ways in which the owner and the CEO can help to 
stimulate a climate that is positively related to the innovation capability in 
MSEs. 
Lessons from the entrepreneurial dominated case context (and its 
hybrid -agent, steward, team conduct) operating owner and CEO 
portrayed in this thesis could serve as a blueprint and comparison for 
adaption in other corporate governance cases. On the one hand, the 
managerial and paternalistic dominated cases could learn from the 
entrepreneurial dominated case model of governance as to how owner 
and CEO are able to moderate an interrelationship that is on eye level, 
grounded in trust and takes social influences seriously and in a mutually 
beneficial manner. On the other hand, the underlying ideology and a 
stakeholder-oriented system with a horizontal hierarchy within corporate 
governance in a team production approach potentially stimulate the 
innovation capability (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010) of MSEs. This allows, 
for a modern medium-sized technology enterprise, an approach that 
answers the needs of global markets in respect to innovativeness. Thus, in 
the absence of an ideal model of corporate governance (Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed, 2009) and enterprise ideology (Johannisson, 2002), hybrid 
solutions that smartly integrate different elements within their owner-CEO 
interrelationship and likely in their organisation, such as in the 
entrepreneurial oriented case, could turn out to be successful. 
Supposedly, a strong investigation into the owner-CEO interrelationship is 
revealed both as a challenge and as a potential stimulation influence for 
the innovation capability in medium-sized technological enterprises.  
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Social and situational influences were defined within the owner-
CEO interrelationship that are likely to influence the innovation capability 
in MSEs and contribute thus new knowledge to the existing level of 
knowledge. Beyond situational rational influences are crucial social 
emotional influences that are revealed out of the owner-CEO dynamics 
and are theorised in the interrelationship influences model. First, an 
interrelationship influence model (Figure 3) was conceptualised and 
reveals six dynamic interrelationship influence factors: action and support 
as the owner’s main authority, autonomy and power as a major authority 
of the CEO, and communication and responsibility as shared authorities of 
the owner and the CEO. The theoretical model reveals an ostensibly 
causal coherence between the owner-CEO interrelationship and the 
innovation capability in MSEs. The innovation capability is likely to be 
impacted positively if the owner and CEO have a close cooperation, are 
action-oriented and have an interrelationship that is face to face, which 
means equality between the two actors and the ability to deal with conflicts 
to find common consent within their interrelationship. The face-to-face 
conduct reduces the hierarchy between the owner and the CEO and 
supports their horizontal interaction, which could be the most important 
reason that the dyad is able to produce more than the sum of their 
individual input (Blair and Stout, 1999). This general conduct is explicitly 
developed in the interrelationship influence model, which conceptualises 
continuous recurring activities. Second, an entrepreneurial dominated 
team production approach seems to be the best method to stimulate the 
innovation capability by situational influences. The stakeholder approach, 
with its long-term collective perspective on firm performance and value 
creation and the mutual commitment of the stakeholders to strategic 
philosophy and decisions, generates potentially a positive effect to the 
innovation capability (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010) of the enterprise and 
supports more the resilience and stability of the owner-CEO 
interrelationship and the emotional harassing fire. Nevertheless, the 
analysis shows that a hybrid of the existing corporate governance theories 
bears potentially more positive stimulation to the innovation capability in a 
very dynamic market than persistence in agency theory might yield. 
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Hence, corporate governance research should not neglect social 
and situational influences by the owner-CEO interrelationship in MSEs. 
Wrong management, ignorance, and hubris, have less Dasein-existence 
and will be eliminated within the owner-CEO interrelationship. The 
innovation capability is likely to be affected positively if the owner and 
CEO have equal rights and duties in a horizontal team hierarchy and act 
as entrepreneurs who follow the interrelationship influence model. 
Creative entrepreneurs need self-awareness and self-consciousness and 
the courage to act in dissent. The owner and the CEO have to call or 
summon the opponent within the interrelationship out of their 
unconsciousness and into an awareness of themselves as a free and 
independent individual within a mutual dependent interrelationship. 
Innovation capability is potentially founded in the volition to summon 
oneself. A rational structured and an emotionally respecting owner-CEO 
interrelationship potentially influences the innovation capability in medium-
sized technology enterprises positively.  
“Your action and your action alone determine your value.”  
(Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 1797) 
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Chapter 8 
8 Conclusion 
In my revisit of corporate governance in general and in particular 
of the owner-CEO interrelationship in medium-sized technology 
enterprises and its potential influences on the innovation capability, I 
aimed at taking a more all-inclusive look at rational and emotional affects 
within the owner-CEO interrelationship because these findings underline 
that the traditional focus of economics researchers on “rational” behaviour 
is limited (Kirchgässner, 2008). Linked back to the theoretical corporate 
governance discussion about agency, stewardship, team production 
theory, and enterprise ideologies mechanisms in MSEs, I based my 
investigations on social, psychological, and situational interrelationship 
influences rather than previous research, which tends to look at the 
internal workings of the enterprise and ignores the influences of the owner. 
I revealed that the owner-CEO interrelationship has potential to stimulate 
or constrain the innovation capability, particularly in smaller (MSEs) 
enterprises where owners have more input than in large public 
enterprises. This thesis contributes to the theoretical development to 
corporate governance theory and explains better the owner-CEO 
interrelationship and its potential to influence the innovation capability in 
MSEs, and illustrates the interplay between social (see Table 4), 
psychological (Table 5), and situational interrelationship influences (Table 
6) in an interrelationship influence model (Figure 3).The findings show that 
the reality is subtler than merely a self-serving, self-actualising, or a team-
conducting corporate governance behaviour between the two top 
management protagonists, owner and CEO. Also, emotional dynamics 
between the protagonists within their interrelationship have a significant 
affect. A number of effects that combine the influences have been 
identified.  
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This chapter has been divided into five sections. It begins first by 
the contribution this study has made to current knowledge. Section Two 
discusses implications for policy and practice. Section Three assesses 
recommendations for continuing research. Section Four clarifies limitations 
of this research and, finally, Section Five then provides a concluding 
statement on the project. 
 
8.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
This study adopted a multiple case study methodology, providing 
an in-depth understanding of the owner-CEO interrelationship and its 
potential influence on the innovation capability of MSEs. Empirical 
evidence was gathered from three different MSEs with different ideological 
orientations. The selected methodological approach worked well to 
highlight the effect and interplay of forces of mutual dependent owner-
CEO interrelationships within the enterprise, in terms of innovation 
capability. The owner-CEO dyad is in general charged to lead an MSE in 
Germany by an appropriate corporate governance to economic success 
and in particular to innovation, which will find expression, among other 
things, in the innovation capability of the enterprise. The inclusion of 
dynamic social, psychological, and situational data has provided a level of 
insight that a rational analysis could not. This methodological approach 
worked well to highlight the impact of the owner-CEO interrelationship and 
its potential influence on the innovation capability.  
The adoption of an inductive analytical approach to the data 
encouraged an openness to different theoretical perspectives, as themes 
of action, communication, autonomy, power, responsibility, and support 
emerged from the data. Analysis centred on social and situational 
influences from the owner-CEO interrelationship and hence by results of 
conflicting meanings attached by the issues to the corporate governance 
team. The theoretical framework that emerged from the analysis as the 
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most appropriate to explore and explain the identified phenomena was a 
combination of existing theoretical lenses, drawing on James´s (1994) and 
Rorty´s (1979) pragmatism and the moral dimension towards a new 
economics, Mikl-Horke´s (2015) constitution problems. James (1994) 
mentioned that pragmatism occurs as a dynamic reality, which behoves 
continuous changes in comparison to rational approaches where the 
existing theories like agency theory, stewardship theory, and team 
production theory belong too, but with the restriction of leaving out 
emotional influences that also influence reality. 
A substantial and growing evidence base confirms that the 
interrelationship between individuals in an organisational context can 
make a positive difference for the output of collective achievements, ends, 
and intentions. However, many theories do not realise this potential, and a 
primary reason for this may be the quality of experiences available to real 
business settings. Considerable advances have been made to understand 
organisational relationships, corporate governance, and performance of 
enterprises through agency, stewardship, and team production theoretical 
perspectives. This review (Table 1) highlights the success and efforts of 
enterprises in applying and extending these theories into this unique 
context (see 7.2 and 7.3). These theories highlighted how conflicts of 
interests can arise between owner and CEO and focus on shareholders 
and stakeholder’s rights to control and trust the executive responsible 
CEO and what seems to be an adequate reward. The control issue 
reveals in endless theoretical studies the main problem in the owner-CEO 
relationship, with a valid interest in the probably most important personal 
relationship in MSEs. Control, trust, or benevolence emerge as the 
emphasis in respect to governance mechanisms and focus predominantly 
on a rational owner-CEO relationship. Shareholders and stakeholders 
have a legitimate interest in the viability of this relation and scholars have 
appreciated this interest since the beginning of the last century and 
underlined the importance of this issue. However, organisational 
relationships may be more complex than those analysed through agency, 
stewardship, and team production theory. The claim of these theories may 
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not apply in all situations. An alternative complementary model of the 
owner-CEO relationship within the context of corporate governance is the 
interrelationship influence model, which focuses beyond the rational 
aspects of cooperation (Reckwitz, 2018) – on social aspects and a focus 
on thinking, acting, and feeling of the two protagonists. The research 
complements the understanding of the relational model of the owner-CEO 
dyad by describing its influences and theoretical and practical contribution. 
I extend the previous agency, stewardship, and team production 
theory research (Chapter 2) by developing an in-depth picture of real 
business settings in German “Mittelstands” enterprises (Chapter 4-6) by 
defining several influences of conduct attributes within the owner-CEO 
interrelationship. Owners who focus on their leadership behaviour to urge 
the CEO to cost reduction, to enhance the firm performance, or to long-
term-welfare, act myopically in the current dynamic frantic environment, 
rather than investing further in the quality of their interrelationship 
according to rational and emotional issues.  
Agency theory addresses a divergence of interests between the 
owner and the CEO, whilst stewardship theory focuses on an owner-CEO 
relationship, which agrees completely in their interest, and team 
production theory concentrates on a collective co-management and co-
participation by the team members. All three theories (discussed in Table 
1) defend a traditional static approach and ignore social and situational 
dynamic influences. The current study contributes with an interrelationship 
influence model, a focus on relational dynamics and tensions and conflicts 
between owner and CEO in their togetherness. Trust, as discussed in 
2.2.2, emerges in the stewardship and team production theory as a major 
issue and is neglected in the agency theory. This trust comprehension 
results in a static concept and does not reflect dynamic circumstances that 
are influenced by different events and perceptions between the two 
protagonists. Similar differences are highlighted in the owner-CEO 
dependence. Whilst agency and stewardship theory favour a more 
dependent CEO, team production theory privileges a more independent 
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CEO who is focused on the interests of all participating stakeholders. The 
contractual relationship between owner and CEO assumes trust and a 
relationship of dependency as a basis for both parties, but not all possible 
events are defined in a contract, and this underlines the approach of a 
relational contract (Macneil, 1980). Tacit occurrences lead often to 
misunderstandings and a reduction of trust, with its influences on the 
interrelationship. These rational dynamics lead to a different 
understanding of trust over time and contents more than the static 
intention to trust the CEO that he/she will act in the interests of the owner.  
Stewardship theory discusses higher order needs of the CEO and 
claims that the CEO in stewardship theory has higher order needs than 
the agent in agency theory, but both theories follow a shareholder 
approach and focus on the wealth enrichment of the owner (see Table 1). 
This reveals as contradictory. The team production theory follows a 
stakeholder approach and has got, as higher order needs, the 
stakeholders and hence all participants more in mind. I follow with these 
findings this approach and add the imperative of a more social focus of 
higher order needs in the context to enrich society by corporate 
transaction. This thesis contributes by the knowledge of this study to 
focus, through the owner-CEO interrelationship, more on overall objectives 
like enhancing the innovation capability of the enterprise in order to deliver 
essential innovations to society and thereby ensure a long-lasting right to 
exist or to enhance societal progress, which is a real higher order need, 
rather than the maximisation of profit or wealth.  
To optimise the profit and wealth problematic of the current 
theories through the execution of the CEO and the control function of the 
owner lies the emphasis in these theories - mostly on the unique economic 
and legal function of the protagonists. These protagonists behove, finally, 
the whole accountability within the enterprise and carry many legal rights 
to protect the interests of the firm and avoid harm from internal and 
external stakeholders. In respect to the owner-CEO interrelationship, legal 
and economic rights and duties are not sufficient and limit the current 
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theories. An additional focus on human interests (Ehresmann and Badura, 
2018), individual needs and anthropoid respect is crucial to motivate a 
CEO in his/her daily execution and reveals a further contribution of this 
thesis. Former theories degrade a CEO to an algorithmic agent and as a 
recipient of orders from his owner. The settings in real business 
environments are different and need provision for humanity between 
owner and CEO, where the interrelationship influence model is focused 
on, and this subsequently contributes by its findings to current knowledge. 
The complexity of the owner-CEO interrelationship is missing in 
the three reviewed theories and limits theoretically its application and finds 
a new contribution to knowledge in this thesis. The interrelationship, based 
on social as well as on situational influences, builds on interactions 
between the two protagonists to play a crucial role in their cooperation in 
German MSEs. Tensions and conflicts between the owner and CEO are 
deeper analysed in the interrelationship influence model and consider the 
dynamic complexity of human coexistence. This contribution will change 
the theoretical model in organisational theory and corporate governance 
through a higher focus on the human interests of the protagonists and 
their primary needs, rather than on pure economic interests, with all their 
implication for policy and practice.  
 
8.2 Implication for Policy and Practice 
An interesting implication of the interrelationship influence model is 
related to the cultural, geographical, and legal variables and the process of 
implementation of structural changes in the organisational context. This 
thesis is focused on the national German MSE culture, which is dominated 
by a specific “Mittelstands”-culture. A more differential examination in other 
countries, i.e., in the UK, with its one-tier system, could lead to different 
structural settings. The examined cases follow a more traditional 
hierarchical structure. Differences could occur in a more decentralised, 
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flatter, or more participative organisation, or in dynamically changing 
organisations. This study discusses in its theoretical contribution the 
dynamic influences within the owner-CEO interrelationship and segregates 
realities out of real business settings. The findings and conceptualisation 
have implications for practice, policy and further research.  
Agency theory, stewardship theory, and team production theory 
more describe the individual characteristics and the role of the CEO and 
the owner, and take less notice of the relational dynamics that occur 
between individuals in their togetherness, which will have implications for 
theory and practice. An egoistic rational engagement, an altruistic, 
cooperative involvement, or a network participation, differ the above-
mentioned theories but the reality in real business settings reveals on the 
one hand as attributable affiliation theory and in all three theories probably 
with one dominant affiliation. On the other hand, this reveals that business 
dynamics like a difficult business environment, economic problems, 
extensive growth, or succession problems can change the behaviour of 
the top management. For example, how would a team member in the 
team production approach in an existence-threatening situation act? Team 
oriented or more self-serving? Even if self-serving behaviour is in the 
interests of his/her enterprise and not in the interests of the team, this 
depicts a completely new situation that has to be considered.  
The three real business settings were all led by profitable and 
success-oriented strategies. Business is led by the purpose to earn money 
in a profit-oriented environment. This could be different in non-profit, non-
financial oriented cases, which contains implication for theory and 
practice. Stewardship theory is more focused on non-profit organisations 
(Westhead and Howorth, 2006), while agency theory is the dominant 
approach in financial objectives. But also, this knowledge seems to be not 
static and behoves business dynamics, and is hence a function of time. It 
seems that under the assumption of long-term business requirements, 
social and situational dynamics can change the cooperation of individuals 
(Reckwitz, 2018) in the top management.  
193 
 
A rational-functional, a social-functional or a social-professional 
relationship behaviour, as described in the literature review, is 
predominantly business oriented and hence task oriented. The satisfaction 
of Maslow´s (1970; 1992) hierarchy of needs contains more than 
business-related needs. Human-based needs (Tasheva and Hillman, 
2018) can play a crucial affect and want consideration, and contain 
implications for policy and practice. Human-based needs have a craving 
for information exchange. An asymmetric information assumption is one 
indicator for agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Stewardship theory 
postulates an information symmetry, and the same is true in team 
production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999). The real business setting in this 
thesis concludes that there is a desirable level of communication beyond 
an exchange of business information. Stewardship theory assumes an 
alignment of the goals between owner and CEO (Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997), but on which foundation: rational, emotional, or both? 
This thesis posited a clear implication for both: rational and emotional 
effects, with their consequences for policy and practice. The attention to 
the interrelationship, to the thinking, acting, and feeling, to the interaction 
within the relation and their dependency in the owner CEO-dyad require 
extension in policy and practice. 
This thesis reveals an interdependence between owner and CEO 
in all three real business cases, even if in different characteristics. The 
German two-tier system induces an independence between owner and 
CEO but the opposite is the case in real business settings. This cognition 
needs entering into policy and practice. Social and situational dynamics 
within the owner-CEO dyad reveal situations beyond the rational business 
settings in unrecognised dimensions, and need further research. 
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8.3 Future Research 
I have examined the owner-CEO interrelationship and identified 
whether particular interrelationship influences have potential to affect the 
innovation capability of the enterprise and provide an interrelationship 
influence model (Figure 3). A more well-grained analysis is required to 
support the evidence presented here in respect to the owner-CEO 
interrelationship, which would include more detailed realities, the 
examination of new variables, and testing. Irrespective of ideological 
contentions about the relative merits of agency, stewardship, or team 
production orientation and complementary or competitive approaches to 
owner-CEO interrelations, corporate governance research should continue 
to investigate how differences in the owner-CEO interrelationship 
potentially influence the innovation capability and other value creations. 
Research interested in the relative advantages of any governance models 
should explore how and when different modes of corporate governance 
interrelationship influences contribute to enterprise outcomes to advance 
our knowledge on the role of owner-CEO interrelationship settings for the 
competitiveness of enterprises.   
The paternalistic/maternalistic oriented interrelationship construct 
needs future research. The pride and arrogance of the paternalistic leader 
in this investigated case, who overestimated his own power and mentally 
overloads his CEO, seems to be completely non-rational. An MSE is a 
mega system confronted with a mega change in speed and dynamics from 
inside and outside. General values and virtues can get lost in paternalistic 
enterprises. Avoiding morals leads to excesses in big enterprises as well 
as in MSEs. Are the wrong paragons espoused at the beginning of this 
conduct? Control mechanisms are out of order and families and 
shareholders are not able to control individuals. In this coherence, it could 
also be interesting to study a maternalistic oriented interrelationship 
construct where the owner is female and women define different accents. 
How do gender differences in the top management affect interrelationship 
influences? 
195 
 
From the methodological view, a long-term study with similar 
research content to this study could be interesting for future research. How 
does the owner-CEO interrelationship change over the life cycle of the 
enterprises and shifting ideologies? To observe the whole ideological 
business records would take many years but could shed further light on 
the scientific tradition of ideological studies in economic entities. The 
difficulty would be in this research to decide on the right start-up, which 
changes over time from an entrepreneurial behaviour into paternalistic 
behaviour and the economic parameters of an MSE. 
Private equity firms have often encountered a problem in case of a 
merger or acquisition of a new entity (Carleton and Lineberry, 2004), if the 
assumptions of the existing leadership make sense. It emerges that more 
and more soft facts like the owner-CEO interrelationship play a crucial role 
in the successful integration. It seems that the composition of the owner-
CEO interrelationship could have an influence on the performance of the 
enterprise. This study, with its basic findings, makes future studies in this 
direction interesting in order to give private equity firms a better 
understanding of the influence factors of the owner-CEO interrelationship, 
and in the same way some further CEO selection criteria for the investor.  
In short, a variety of theoretical and empirical projects in real 
business settings are needed to help scholars to fully understand the 
owner-CEO interrelationship. This study opens the door for further studies 
- more than expected. 
 
8.4 Limitation 
The findings of this study are based on in-depth analysis of three 
case studies. The study does not claim to generalise to a population of 
firms from these case studies; instead the aim was to generate theory out 
of real business settings that provided a plausible and valid 
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conceptualisation that the influence of the owner-CEO interrelationship 
might have on the innovation capability to firms. Further research is 
therefore needed to examine and test the conceptualisation in this thesis.  
The case studies were selected for this study on the basis of a 
specific dominant ideology (see 3.3.2). It is difficult to make an 
unambiguous assignment to one ideology orientation or evolution stage, 
which confirms the findings of Johannisson (2002) - that businesses 
probably nurture at least two ideologies concurrently. Whilst the 
managerial oriented/dominated enterprise was moving to a managerial–
paternalistic stage, the paternalistic oriented/dominated enterprise was 
trying to move from the current stage into a paternalistic–managerial 
stage, not least by the activities of the young and managerially educated 
CEO. This dynamic was not possible to examine within the time frame of 
this thesis.  
Another limitation of this thesis is the measurement of the 
innovation capability (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997; Hartmann, 2011; Smith, Busi, Ball and Van der Meer, 2008: 
Saunila, 2017b; Adams, Bessant and Phelps, 2006e) in the invention and 
elaboration stage. This is only derived from the theory but not from the 
practical and successful implementation of innovation. The measurement 
of the innovation capability was in this study only possible at a qualitative 
level (e. g. two of three studied MSE cases have no R&D department, 
hence the analysis of R&D expenses is not quantifiable). Ultimately, the 
success of an enterprise is dependent on the implementation and 
amortisation of innovation, and not only from its invention and elaboration, 
which were not analysed in this study. This study derives the innovation 
capability more from the strategic intention of the selected enterprises and 
from the own cognition of the participants. Here, the entrepreneurial 
oriented enterprise is in a clear advantage because of the clear 
innovation-related strategy, which is not that clear in the other two 
enterprises. Legitimate interests would also be to focus on managerial and 
paternalistic oriented enterprises, with a clear focus on innovation in their 
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strategy. It could be that these exclude themselves, but this is not 
examined in this study and limits it thus far.  
The study identified that hidden actors may influence the owner-
CEO interrelationship, but these were not examined. The wife of the 
paternalistic oriented owner and the main investors in the managerial 
oriented enterprise, who were mentioned many times by the participants in 
this study, were not examined in detail, which limits the autonomy of the 
examined owner. 
A contentious situation was touched on in the paternalistic 
oriented enterprise. The CEO was clearly struggling with the current 
situation with her father. The interviews were more personal than expected 
and necessary, more than in other interviews, which overwhelmed me 
partly. The CEO’s trust of me and her openness provided a deep insight 
into the psychological situation in the paternalistic oriented enterprise. This 
situation sometimes touched on ethical issues and at times I felt 
uncomfortable.  
Another point of limitation is that three case studies provide only a 
limited number of owner-CEO configurations. Further research might 
examine different configurations. For example, would a finance investor in 
an entrepreneurial environment generate difficult results? Is there a 
gender effect which was not explicitly localised in the study at hand, and is 
the same true in respect to the age and educational background of the 
actors? How would a female owner act within the interrelationship with her 
CEO? How might the relationship be affected if the CEO changed from a 
male to a female CEO? In Germany, gender issues are becoming more 
apparent and could be interesting for future research, like other 
recommendations, which are discussed in the next section. 
 
198 
 
8.4.1 Reflection on the Project and Method Used 
The project, with its selected method, experiences certain practical 
limitations. A project armed with minimal limited financial resources and 
also personal resources like a private organised thesis soon reaches its 
boundaries. It was difficult for me to find acceptable enterprises with a 
clear ideological dominance, and finding individuals that fit into the desired 
grid was the next hurdle in order to get the willingness of the management 
to participate within this study. I had to negotiate the tension within the 
selected enterprises and the available management time and effort of the 
participants, as well as getting them to agree to participate in the study. A 
more field-intensive time instead of a writing-intensive (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) time would be useful. 
Interrelationships are soft facts and generate many nuances in the 
assessment and within the analysis. The analysis stage would benefit from 
having an additional scholar partner at my side to avoid individual 
valuations and have regular discussions about the experiences and 
interpretation. On the other hand, I felt confident that the generated 
assumptions about cause and effect have sufficient validity and that the 
experiences, the analysis and the evaluation provide a compelling and fair 
representation of the experiences of the individuals and the cases.  
In respect to my a priori and a posteriori bias, it has to be accepted 
that sometimes it was not that easy to ensure distance from the research 
participants (Finlay, 2002; Creswell, 2013). The three different cases 
claimed me in different ways. One owner was not structured in the 
interviews. He never stopped speaking and it was quite difficult to follow 
him; in another case it was enormously difficult to get any valid statement 
and another CEO strayed from the context and it was necessary to 
frequently bring him back to the main focus. 
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Pragmatism, as my philosophical approach, was helpful on many 
occasions during the study. The ontological and epistemological openness 
to practical relevance opens doors in many directions. The creative 
openness in cognitions and actions of all studied actors, even if they had 
different characteristics, was supported by the pragmatic approach. I 
realised for the contribution of this study that it is quite difficult to change 
the habits of the owner and CEO. But it seems to be possible to change 
the circumstances under which better conditions could be generated, 
which mirrors the essential findings of this study revealed out of the 
pragmatic reality.  
 
8.4.2 Author´s Individual Critique 
My critique starts with my preformed mind in respect to my25 
years’ experience in leading positions, among others, as owner and CEO 
in German MSEs. Many situations seem to me to be quickly clear, but 
after a second observation and picking holes in an argument I realised that 
non-rational issues like social and emotional dynamics are not that easy to 
analyse, unlike an algorithm. Biases and preoccupations resolve only 
slowly over time and help to understand more the hidden meaning, 
perceptions, and consciousness of the participants’ statements. 
In all three cases, I gained the impression that the interviewed 
actor tended to ask how I would see the current business situation in the 
enterprise and asked for support and advice. Maybe it would have been 
better to send a third person into the field to have pre-structured interviews 
with the actors, but I believe that the openness with which the interviewees 
provided findings would not have been possible with someone without my 
experience and standing. 
    Ego sum, qui sum! 
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8.5 Concluding Statement 
The general contribution to knowledge is to provide 
interrelationship influences that have potential to influence the innovation 
capability of MSEs. Different influences were isolated and enlighten the 
influence factors. The study shows that the owner´s action and support, 
combined with the CEO´s autonomy and power and a common obligation 
of the owner and the CEO to communicate and take over responsibility for 
their action, is crucial for the quality of influence by the owner-CEO 
interrelationship in respect to the innovation capability of the entire 
enterprise, guided by a team oriented and entrepreneurial dominated 
ideology.  
This thesis generates a theoretical understanding where the 
central concept of the phenomenon is identified as a concept central to the 
process being examined. The theoretical findings of former researchers 
(Van de Ven, 1986; Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson,1997; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Blair and Stout, 1999; West and Farr, 1989; Johannisson 
and Huse, 2000) were more general and look to the internal workings of 
the enterprise and ignore influences of the owner. The owner-CEO 
interrelationship is primarily influenced by social and situational dynamics, 
which have potential impact on the innovation capability. An issue of 
further focus was the analysis of problems that occur among these two 
major decision makers and drivers, and the thesis tries to develop 
appropriate answers for managing these problems in a theoretical 
contribution. Business processes are more affected by non-rational effects 
than is assumed in many economic theories, as demonstrated in the study 
at hand. 
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